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This thesis is a philosophical examination of the explanatory roles of diagnoses in 
psychiatry. In medicine, diagnoses normally serve as causal explanations of patients’ 
symptoms. Given that psychiatry is a discipline whose practice is shaped by medical 
traditions, it is often implied that its diagnoses also serve such explanatory functions. This 
is evident in clinical texts that portray psychiatric diagnoses as referring to diseases that 
cause symptoms. However, there are problems which cast doubt on whether such 
portrayals are justified. I address these problems and examine whether psychiatric 
diagnoses provide explanations of symptoms. The first problem is conceptual. In 
diagnostic manuals, psychiatric diagnoses are defined by their symptoms. This suggests 
that invoking them as explanations of the symptoms amounts to circularity. I argue that 
this can be resolved with an appropriate conceptual framework that captures the complex 
semantic values of diagnostic terms and their different uses in clinical discourse. I put 
forward such a framework based on two-dimensional semantics. The second problem is 
ontological. Empirical research suggests that diagnostic categories in psychiatry do not 
correspond to invariant causal types, but are associated with variable combinations of 
diverse causes that interact across biological, psychological, and social levels. Given this 
heterogeneity, I argue that psychiatric diagnoses fall short of paradigmatic cases of causal 
explanation, but that some can still provide other sorts of useful causal explanatory 
information. The original contribution of this thesis is the illumination of the conceptual 
relations between diagnoses and symptoms. This philosophical work is important, 
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1.1 The problem 
1.1.1 Overview 
Diagnoses are central to the practice of medicine. For clinicians, they provide labels for 
conditions to aid communication, inform predictions about clinical outcomes, and guide 
therapeutic interventions. For patients, they legitimise sickness, sanction certain 
behaviours, and authorise access to therapeutic, social, and financial resources. In 
addition to these denotative, therapeutic, and social functions, diagnoses in medicine 
often serve as causal explanations of patients’ symptoms. For example, when a patient 
presents with the symptom of abdominal pain, the diagnosis of acute appendicitis 
explains why he or she has abdominal pain by indicating the condition that is causing it. 
This thesis is a philosophical investigation of whether diagnoses in psychiatry similarly 
serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms. 
 The ways that psychiatric diagnoses are sometimes described in clinical resources 
suggest that at least some clinicians consider them to have such causal explanatory roles. 
For example, textbooks targeted at psychiatrists, physicians, and medical students 
sometimes portray psychiatric diagnoses as referring to the causes or providing 
explanations of symptoms, as shown by the following passages: 
 
Depression is more common in older persons than it is in the general population. 
Various studies have reported prevalence rates ranging from 25 to almost 50 
percent, although the percentage of these cases that are caused by major depressive 




The diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is not warranted if the symptoms 
can be explained by schizophrenia, mania or mental retardation. (Sethi, 2008: p. 109, 
italics added) 
 
Most auditory hallucinations not associated with falling asleep or waking up are 
caused by schizophrenia or depression. (Collier et al., 2013: p. 317, italics added) 
 
In other words, a positive response to screening for a psychiatric disorder in a 
relative of a patient increases the likelihood that a psychiatric disorder is the cause of 
the patient’s symptoms. (Schneider and Levenson, 2008: p. 8, italics added) 
 
As an example, think of the differential diagnosis of a patient with episodes of 
anxiety and breathlessness. These symptoms are often caused by panic disorder. 
(Stevens and Rodin, 2010: p. 74, italics added) 
 
Similar claims can also be found in health information resources about psychiatric 
disorders that are written by clinicians and targeted at the general public, as shown by the 
following passages about schizophrenia, generalised anxiety disorder, and major 
depressive disorder from Patient.info and NHS Choices, two of the leading health 
information websites in the United Kingdom: 
 
Schizophrenia is a serious mental health condition that causes disordered ideas, 




GAD is a long-term condition that causes you to feel anxious about a wide range of 
situations and issues, rather than one specific event. (NHS Choices, 2014a, italics 
added) 
 
Depression affects people in different ways and can cause a wide variety of 
symptoms. They range from lasting feelings of sadness and hopelessness, to losing 
interest in the things you used to enjoy and feeling very tearful. (NHS Choices, 
2014b, italics added) 
 
Furthermore, such claims are even made in clinical research, as shown by the following 
two passages from scientific papers. In the former the diagnoses of schizophrenia and 
major depressive disorder are invoked as explanations of anhedonia, while in the latter it 
is suggested that a diagnosis of major depressive disorder takes explanatory precedence 
over a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome: 
 
Fourteen percent of the anhedonia was explained by schizophrenia, 13 percent was 
explained by depression, and 73 percent was not explained. (Loas et al., 2000: p. 503, 
italics added) 
 
When a well-recognized underlying condition, such as primary depression, could 
explain the subject’s symptoms, s/he was classified as having “CFS-explained”. 
(Jason et al., 2014: p. 43, italics added) 
 
These passages show that psychiatric diagnoses are sometimes communicated to 
clinicians, researchers, and the public as if they are causes or explanations of patients’ 
symptoms, much like the diagnoses in other medical specialties. Of course, this is not to 
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say that such language is universal in clinical texts. For example, the Shorter Oxford 
Textbook of Psychiatry takes great care not to refer to diagnoses as causes of symptoms, 
instead referring to symptoms as “occurring in” disorders (Cowen et al., 2012). 
Nonetheless, the passages quoted above indicate that the idea that psychiatric diagnoses 
refer to conditions which cause symptoms has significant influence in contemporary 
psychiatric discourse. This is perhaps not surprising when we consider psychiatry’s 
historical and cultural underpinnings as a medical discipline. As noted by Jeffrey Poland 
(2014: pp. 31–33), psychiatric practice occurs in a context shaped by medical roles and 
traditions, and so it is understandable that its practitioners apply to it the methods and 
rhetorical tropes of other medical disciplines. 
However, there are worries about psychiatric diagnoses that call into doubt 
whether they actually do explain their symptoms. One such worry concerns the way that 
psychiatric diagnoses are defined. According to the most recent editions of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which 
is the dominant classification system in psychiatry, psychiatric diagnoses are formally 
defined in terms of their symptoms, which suggests that they merely describe, rather than 
explain, these symptoms. Another worry concerns the natures of the causes that underlie 
psychiatric syndromes. Even if diagnostic terms are taken to refer to whatever causal 
structures underlie the symptom clusters, it is doubtful whether these causal structures 
exhibit enough stability for their respective diagnostic categories to have genuine 
explanatory value. 
In this thesis, I address these worries to attain a better understanding of the 
epistemic functions of diagnoses in psychiatry. I begin by exploring the functions of 
diagnoses and the nature of diagnostic explanation in medicine more generally. I then 
examine the semantics of diagnostic terms with appeal to recent theories in the 
philosophy of language in order to tackle the conceptual problem of whether the 
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descriptive definitions of psychiatric diagnoses in the most recent editions of the DSM 
necessarily preclude them from referring to the causes of their symptoms. After tackling 
the conceptual problem, I review the current empirical evidence and theoretical models in 
psychiatry in order to address the ontological problem of whether the causal profiles 
associated with the current diagnostic categories in psychiatry are stable and repeatable 
enough for the diagnoses to genuinely serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms in 
clinical practice. It is now worth laying out these conceptual and ontological problems in 
more detail. 
 
1.1.2 The conceptual problem 
As noted above, the DSM is generally considered to be the dominant system for 
diagnostic classification in psychiatry, with the current edition being DSM-5 (2013). The 
manual offers a standard classification and formal definitions of psychiatric diagnoses 
that are used by clinicians, researchers, the pharmaceutical industry, insurance companies, 
and policy makers. Importantly, the definitions of psychiatric diagnoses in the DSM are 
in terms of symptom criteria, as the following excerpts from DSM-5 demonstrate: 
 
The essential feature of delusional disorder is the presence of one or more delusions 
that persist for at least 1 month (Criterion A). (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013: p. 92, italics added) 
 
The essential feature of a major depressive episode is a period of at least 2 weeks 
during which there is either depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure in 
nearly all activities (Criterion A). In children and adolescents, the mood may be 
irritable rather than sad. The individual must also experience at least four additional 
symptoms drawn from a list that includes changes in appetite or weight, sleep, and 
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psychomotor activity; decreased energy; feelings of worthlessness or guilt; difficulty 
thinking, concentrating, or making decisions; or recurrent thoughts of death or 
suicidal ideation or suicide plans or attempts. (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013: p. 163, italics added) 
 
Panic disorder refers to recurrent unexpected panic attacks. A panic attack is an 
abrupt surge of intense fear or intense discomfort that reaches a peak within 
minutes, and during which time four or more of a list of 13 physical and cognitive 
symptoms occur. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 209, italics added) 
 
The essential feature of generalized anxiety disorder is excessive anxiety and worry 
(apprehensive expectation) about a number of events or activities. (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 222, italics added) 
 
While the DSM is widely accepted as the authoritative classification system in psychiatry, 
it is worth mentioning that there is another diagnostic manual, namely the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD), which includes a chapter 
dedicated to mental and behavioural disorders. The current revision is ICD-10 (1992). 
There are some mostly minor differences between ICD-10 and its approximate 
contemporary DSM-IV, some of which reflect their respective European and American 
origins (Bolton, 2008: p. 1). However, throughout their respective revision processes, the 
World Health Organisation and the American Psychiatric Association made efforts to 
bring the ICD and the DSM in line with each other (First, 2009). As a result, the 
similarities between them are so significant that at present they can hardly be considered 
to constitute distinct classifications of psychiatric disorders (Cooper, 2014: p. x). In ICD-
10, as in DSM-5, psychiatric diagnoses are defined in terms of their symptoms, which the 
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following passages about generalised anxiety disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder 
respectively demonstrate:  
  
The essential feature is anxiety, which is generalized and persistent but not restricted 
to, or even strongly predominating in, any particular environmental circumstances 
(i.e. it is “free-floating). (World Health Organisation, 1992: p. 140, italics added) 
 
The essential feature of this disorder is recurrent obsessional thoughts or compulsive 
acts. (World Health Organisation, 1992: p. 142, italics added) 
 
These descriptive definitions in DSM-5 and ICD-10 suggest that psychiatric diagnoses are 
constituted by their symptoms. For at least two and a half centuries, it has generally been 
accepted in philosophy that causes are distinct from their effects (Hume, [1748] 2000; 
Swain, 1980; Lewis, 1986a). That is, something cannot be its own cause. Therefore, if 
psychiatric diagnoses merely describe clusters of symptoms as suggested by the DSM-5 
definitions, then they cannot refer to the causes of these symptoms. 
 The DSM and ICD formalised the descriptive approach to defining psychiatric 
diagnoses, but the worry that psychiatric diagnoses merely have definitional connections 
with their respective symptoms had been present even before the introduction of the 
fully descriptive nosology in DSM-III (1980). In “The Myth of Mental Illness” (1960), the 
psychiatrist and leading figure of the antipsychiatry movement Thomas Szasz presents 
two arguments against the validity of the concept of mental illness. The first argument is 
that mental illness diagnoses are mere shorthand labels for certain kinds of behaviour, 




This is obviously fallacious reasoning, for it makes the abstraction “mental illness” 
into a cause, even though this abstraction was created in the first place to serve only 
as a shorthand expression for certain types of human behaviour. (Szasz, 1960: p. 
114) 
 
The second argument is that mental illnesses are not genuine disorders because, unlike 
bodily illnesses, they are not characterised by pathophysiological lesions, but by 
deviations from social and moral norms. Critics of Szasz have tended to target the second 
argument (Kendell, 1975; Fulford, 1989; Shorter, 2011), with the first argument receiving 
considerably less attention. However, it is the first argument that is at the core of the 
conceptual problem regarding psychiatric diagnoses. 
Tim Thornton (2007: p. 16) offers an interpretation of Szasz’s first argument in 
terms of necessity and contingency, with reference to David Hume’s analysis of causation 
in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding ([1748] 2000). According to Hume, causal 
connections are contingent. We perceive causes and effects as distinct events, but do not 
perceive any necessary connection between them. Even if the causal chain is broken 
down further, we only perceive a finer succession of distinct causes and effects, but not 
any glue between them. Hence, one can conceive one event occurring without the other. 
For example, while it may be the case that a particular patient’s abdominal pain is caused 
by acute appendicitis, it is conceivable that acute appendicitis could occur without 
abdominal pain or that abdominal pain could occur without acute appendicitis. However, 
if a psychiatric diagnosis is defined by its symptoms, then the connection between the 
diagnosis and the symptoms is not contingent, but necessary. Since causal connections 
have to be contingent, it follows that the connection between a psychiatric diagnosis and 
its symptoms is not causal. 
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 Szasz’s argument can also be hinged at the level of language, and examined in terms 
of analyticity and syntheticity. According to Immanuel Kant ([1781] 1998), an analytic 
proposition is true in virtue of its meaning, as its predicate concept is contained in its 
subject concept. A classic example is the proposition, “all bachelors are unmarried”. This 
proposition is analytically true, because the concept “unmarried” is contained in the 
concept “bachelor”. By contrast, a synthetic proposition can only be true in virtue of its 
relation to the state of affairs in the world, because its predicate concept is not contained 
in its subject concept. For example, the proposition, “all bachelors are unhappy”, is 
synthetic, because the concept “unhappy” is not contained in the concept “bachelor”. 
Applied to diagnoses, the proposition, “this patient with acute appendicitis has abdominal 
pain”, is synthetic, because the concept “abdominal pain” is not contained in the concept 
“acute appendicitis”. However, the proposition, “this patient with panic disorder has 
recurrent unexpected panic attacks”, is analytic, because, according to the DSM-5 
definition, the concept “recurrent unexpected panic attacks” is contained in the concept 
“panic disorder”. Again, this suggests that the relations between psychiatric diagnoses and 
their symptoms are not empirical, but definitional. 
 The above considerations raise serious doubts about whether psychiatric diagnoses 
can serve the same causal explanatory functions as medical diagnoses. This is articulated 
by Jennifer Radden in her paper, “Is This Dame Melancholy? Equating today’s 
Depression and Past Melancholia” (2003). Radden notes that while the purely descriptive 
approach to defining and classifying psychiatric diagnoses in the most recent editions of 
the DSM does permit probabilistic predictions, it renders its diagnostic categories devoid 
of explanatory value. Because the connection between a psychiatric diagnosis and its 
symptoms is definitional rather than causal, such a diagnosis does not explain its 
symptoms, but merely describes them. The diagnosis of panic disorder does not explain 
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why a patient has recurrent and unexpected panic attacks any more than a man’s 
bachelorhood explains why he is unmarried. 
There appear, therefore, to be two kinds of talk going on regarding psychiatric 
diagnoses. As noted in §1.1.1, some clinical textbooks and public information resources 
refer to diagnoses as if they are causes of their symptoms, but the DSM diagnostic criteria 
refer to diagnoses as if they are constituted by their symptoms. On closer examination, 
such instances of such ambiguity are even present within the pages of DSM-5. The 
diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder, for example, suggest that the diagnosis is 
constituted by its symptoms. However, the exclusion criteria for brief psychotic disorder 
refer to major depressive disorder as if it can be an explanation of symptoms: 
 
The disturbance is not better explained by major depressive or bipolar with 
psychotic features or another psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia or catatonia, 
and is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (e.g. a drug of 
abuse, a medication) or another medical condition. (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013: p. 94) 
 
The problem is that these two kinds of talk are in tension. If psychiatric diagnoses refer 
only to clusters of symptoms, then this suggests that they cannot be causal explanations 
of these symptoms. 
This ambiguity might seem to be dissolved by the suggestion in the introduction of 
DSM-5 that the diagnostic criteria are supposed to be summaries, rather than complete 
definitions: 
 
The symptoms contained in the respective diagnostic criteria sets do not constitute 
comprehensive definitions of underlying disorders, which encompass cognitive, 
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emotional, behavioral, and physiological processes that are far more complex than 
can be described in these brief summaries. Rather, they are intended to summarize 
characteristic syndromes of signs and symptoms that point to an underlying 
disorder with a characteristic developmental history, biological and environmental 
risk factors, neuropsychological and physiological correlates, and typical clinical 
course. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 19) 
 
This is also the stance assumed by Lawrie Reznek (1991: p. 188), who suggests that 
psychopathic personality disorder does not refer to a cluster of symptoms, but to 
whatever causal structure explains these symptoms, just as gold refers not to the surface 
properties of yellowness and solidity, but to the atomic structure that explains these 
properties. However, this analogy is not accurate. Whereas yellowness and solidity are 
contingent properties that are not essential for a substance to qualify as gold (Kripke, 
[1972] 1980: p. 123), DSM-5 explicitly states that the symptom criteria for a given 
diagnosis are essential to the diagnosis and necessary for the diagnosis to be made, such 
as the presence of one or more delusions being the “essential feature” of delusional 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 92). Hence, in spite of the above 
quoted passage, the diagnostic criteria in DSM-5 still suggest that certain symptoms 
constitute part of the meaning of the diagnosis. 
And so, the tension still remains between the two kinds of talk regarding 
psychiatric diagnoses. If a psychiatric diagnosis is supposed to point to an underlying 
disorder, as suggested by the above quoted passage, then the connection between the 
diagnosis and its symptoms would be expected to be contingent, just as acute appendicitis 
and abdominal pain are contingently connected, and gold and yellowness are contingently 
connected. However, in spite of the above passage, the DSM-5 criteria themselves 
suggest that the connection between a psychiatric diagnosis and certain symptoms is 
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necessary. This is the conceptual problem regarding the explanatory status of a 
psychiatric diagnosis, which I address towards the middle of the thesis. 
 
1.1.3 The ontological problem 
As described above, the conceptual problem regarding diagnostic explanation in 
psychiatry results from the diagnoses being defined by their symptoms. However, even if 
we take psychiatric diagnoses to refer to whatever causal structures underlie the 
respective symptom clusters, we face a further ontological problem. It is far from clear 
whether the current diagnostic categories in psychiatry actually do correspond to causal 
structures that are sufficiently repeatable to be explanatorily valuable with respect to 
individual clinical cases. 
Again, this problem is related to the descriptive ways in which psychiatric diagnoses 
are defined and classified in the recent editions of the DSM. In the early editions, DSM-I 
(1952) and DSM-II (1968), syndromes were often defined on the basis of their supposed 
causes (American Psychiatric Association, 1952: p. 12). By contrast, the following edition, 
DSM-III (1980), presented a largely atheoretical system of diagnostic classification based 
on descriptions of observable symptoms, rather than on theoretical assumptions about 
aetiology. This classification system drew heavily from the symptom-based diagnostic 
criteria for psychiatric disorders developed by Feighner et al. (1972) and other related 
schemes. The next edition, DSM-IV (1994), placed less emphasis on the classification 
being purely atheoretical, but retained the DSM-III’s descriptive approach to defining 
disorders. Following calls by the DSM-5 taskforce for a more theoretical approach to 
classification (Kupfer et al., 2002), there was a modest attempt to move towards an 
aetiologically-informed taxonomy in DSM-5 (2013). However, the actual change was 
slight and was largely restricted to a revised chapter organisation, wherein disorders that 
are believed to have similar aetiologies were placed adjacent to each other. Despite this 
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new chapter organisation, the definitions of individual diagnoses in DSM-5 have 
remained descriptive. Correspondingly, the current ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 
1992) also employs a descriptive approach to psychiatric classification that is largely 
neutral with respect to causes. 
The descriptive approach to diagnostic classification in psychiatry has been 
defended on the grounds that standardised operational criteria based on observable 
symptoms would increase reliability and facilitate communication between health 
professionals with different theoretical perspectives. Hence, DSM-III notes that “the 
inclusion of etiological theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of 
varying theoretical orientations” (American Psychiatric Association, 1980: p. 7). On the 
other hand, the downside of such an aetiologically neutral classification system is that it 
allows for the possibility of its diagnostic categories failing to correspond to distinctive 
and invariant causal structures. Such a concern is raised by Kendell and Jablensky: 
 
[T]he surface phenomena of psychiatric illness (i.e., the clustering of symptoms, 
signs, course, and outcome) provide no secure basis for deciding whether a 
diagnostic class or rubric is valid, in the sense of delineating a specific, necessary, 
and sufficient biological mechanism. (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003: p. 7) 
 
In the recent philosophical literature, this problem has been framed as a debate about 
whether psychiatric disorders can be considered natural kinds (Zachar, 2000; Cooper, 
2005; Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; Kendler et al., 2011; Tsou, 2013; Haslam, 2014). 
The worry is that if a diagnostic category does not capture a stable kind of pathological 
process, then we have grounds to doubt its epistemic value. 
The problem also partly recalls Szasz’s (1960) second argument in “The Myth of 
Mental Illness”, previously mentioned in §1.1.2, that mental illnesses are unlike physical 
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illnesses because they are not characterised by causative pathophysiological lesions. It is 
perhaps fair to say that our scientific understanding of some psychiatric disorders has 
progressed since the publication of Szasz’s paper and subsequent book (Shorter, 2011). 
However, Szasz’s argument still resonates strongly. Empirical research has revealed an 
array of causes associated with many of the major psychiatric syndromes, but the story 
has not been one of characteristic lesions (Bolton, 2012). Rather, it has been one of 
complexity and heterogeneity at multiple levels of analysis, including the biological, 
psychological, and social (Poland et al., 1994; Murphy, 2006; Kendler, 2008; Hyman, 
2010). As such, it may be that a given diagnostic category in psychiatry does not 
correspond to a distinctive causal structure, but is associated with a range of possible 
causal pathways, each involving the complex interactions of diverse factors across 
different levels. The question, then, is whether this lack of unity undermines the use of 
the diagnosis as an explanation of a patient’s symptoms in clinical psychiatry. I address 
this ontological problem regarding diagnostic explanation in psychiatry in the latter half 
of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Significance of the research 
1.2.1 Importance of the problem 
The question of whether or not diagnoses in psychiatry explain their symptoms is not 
only of philosophical interest, but has implications for clinical psychiatry. As noted in 
§1.1.2, Szasz (1960) argues that psychiatric diagnoses are just shorthand labels for certain 
behaviours and that they are not determined by distinctive causative lesions. He presents 
his arguments as undermining the legitimacy of psychiatry as a scientific and medical 
discipline. Although it has been over half a century since Szasz first published “The Myth 
of Mental Illness”, the key points of his arguments continue to resonate in contemporary 
critiques of psychiatry. Some authors appeal to the ways that psychiatric diagnoses are 
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defined descriptively through their symptoms to contest particular diagnoses, including 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Summerfield, 2001) and attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Saul, 2014). Other authors appeal to the failure of psychiatric diagnoses to 
correspond to invariant causal structures, arguing that this warrants changes in research, 
clinical, and educational practices (Bentall, 2003; Poland, 2014), and even suggesting that 
it shows psychiatric diagnoses to be little more than political devices used to enable 
various social arrangements (Ingleby, 1982; Moncrieff, 2010). 
In the context of everyday clinical practice, the explanatory role of a diagnosis can 
influence how a patient perceives and responds to his or her illness. For instance, it may 
confer a sense of alleviation by providing the patient with the understanding of why he or 
she is unwell (Chiong, 2004; Kirmayer et al., 2004; Jutel, 2011). Furthermore, the 
explanatory status of a diagnosis can influence the judgments of clinicians and patients 
regarding the legitimacy of the disorder. This is evident, as we shall see in Chapter 2, in 
cases of chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia, where the lack of medical 
explanations for the symptoms can frustrate patients and leave clinicians sceptical (Ware, 
1992; Nettleton et al., 2004). 
 These considerations indicate that clinicians and patients consider the ability to 
explain symptoms a desirable feature of a diagnosis. Hence, the issue of whether or not 
psychiatric diagnoses genuinely explain their symptoms is not trivial, but has ethical 
implications for the care of patients. As we saw in §1.1.1, psychiatric diagnoses are often 
communicated to the public as if they refer to conditions that cause certain symptoms. 
Moreover, an interview study by Young et al. (2008) and recent fieldwork performed by 
the psychologist Svend Brinkmann (2014) indicate that patients who are diagnosed with 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder do indeed assume that their diagnoses provide 
explanations of their problems. However, if psychiatric diagnoses do not serve as 
explanations of symptoms, then it is likely that patients and the wider public are being 
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misinformed about psychiatric diagnoses. This raises the possibility that patients are 
misled into believing that their symptoms are being explained, when they are merely 
being labelled. 
 Whether or not psychiatric diagnoses are explanations of symptoms also has 
potential implications for legal cases. As noted by Wilson and Adshead (2004), there is a 
strong intuition that some people with psychiatric disorders are sometimes not 
responsible for their actions. This is reflected by the fact that the presence of psychiatric 
disorder is sometimes considered a defence in criminal law. For example, under Section 2 
of the Homicide Act 1957 in England and Wales, the offence of murder can be reduced to 
that of manslaughter on the grounds that the defendant has diminished responsibility due 
to a psychiatric disorder. Section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and Wales 
also allows the defendant to be admitted to hospital on a compulsory basis instead of 
receiving a custodial sentence if he or she is suffering from a psychiatric disorder at the 
time of sentencing. Hence, a psychiatric diagnosis can influence decisions about the 
defendant’s culpability. 
The notion that a defendant is to be excused because his or her action was the 
product of a disorder has been criticised on philosophical grounds (Radden, 1982; Morse, 
1999; Wilson and Adshead, 2004). Nevertheless, it still explicitly stated in criminal 
legislation. For instance, the amendment of the Homicide Act 1957 by the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 in England and Wales states that one of the conditions for the defence of 
diminished responsibility is that the mental disorder causally explains the defendant’s 
behaviour: 
 
(1) A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be 
convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning 
which – (a) arose from a recognised medical condition, (b) substantially impaired 
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D’s ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and (c) 
provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the 
killing …. For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental 
functioning provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a significant 
contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.  (Coroners and Justice Act, 
2009: s. 52 (1)) 
 
However, if the defendant’s diagnosis is only a description, rather than an explanation, of 
his or her symptoms, then it is doubtful whether it can function as a legal defence for his 
or her behaviour, as it does not meet the above stated conditions for diminished 
responsibility. This is particularly the case if the definition of the diagnosis is partly 
constituted by the defendant’s behaviour. For example, the DSM-5 definition of 
antisocial personality disorder includes the following symptoms: 
 
1. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors … 2. 
Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying … 3. Impulsivity … 4. Irritability and 
aggressiveness … 5. Reckless disregard for safety … 6. Consistent irresponsibility 
… 7. Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having 
hurt, mistreated, or stole from another. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 
659) 
 
As noted by Landy Sparr (2009), such personality disorder diagnoses are sometimes used 
as legal defences in European countries. However, the fact that the diagnosis is partly 
defined by harmful or unlawful behaviour suggests that its use as an excuse for such 
behaviour is circular. Therefore, the question of whether or not certain psychiatric 
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diagnoses explain their symptoms is of direct relevance to the question of whether or not 
these diagnoses can serve as legal defences in criminal cases. 
 
1.2.2 Positioning of the research 
This thesis is a work in philosophy of science as applied to psychiatry. Somewhat 
unusually for a work in applied philosophy of science, its focus is not primarily on 
empirical psychiatric research, but on clinical psychiatric practice. Analytic philosophy of 
psychiatry is a rapidly expanding discipline and since the turn of the millennium has 
yielded important insights into a variety of longstanding issues related to psychiatric 
diagnosis, including the validity of psychiatric classification (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003; 
Poland, 2014; Tsou, 2015), whether diagnostic categories correspond to natural kinds 
(Zachar, 2000; Cooper, 2005; Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; Haslam, 2014), models 
of explanation in psychiatric research (Murphy, 2006; Mitchell, 2008; Kendler, 2008; 
Schaffner, 2008), the concept of mental disorder (Wilkinson, 2000; Bolton, 2008), and 
how values relate to diagnosis (Sadler, 2005; Fulford et al., 2006; Thornton, 2007). 
However, very little has been written from the angle of philosophy of science about the 
epistemic roles of psychiatric diagnoses in the clinical context. As such, the question of 
whether diagnoses serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms in psychiatry is yet to be 
addressed in detail in the literature. 
I aim to fill this gap. My original contribution to knowledge in this thesis is the 
improved philosophical understanding of the explanatory relations between diagnoses 
and symptoms in clinical psychiatry, as well as in medicine more generally. This consists, 
more specifically, of the application of philosophical models of explanation to unpack the 
epistemic roles of diagnoses in clinical practice, the development of a semantic 
framework informed by recent philosophy of language to analyse the seemingly 
paradoxical uses of diagnostic terms in psychiatric discourse, the detailed examination of 
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the implications that causal heterogeneity and complexity have for the explanatory roles 
of psychiatric diagnoses, and the consideration of how diagnoses could complement 
other epistemic resources to achieve better causal explanations in clinical psychiatry. 
Of course, the themes in this thesis overlap with some key issues that have been 
discussed at length by previous authors in the philosophy of psychiatry and it is inevitable 
that my ideas draw heavily from the crucial insights of these authors. However, my 
investigation differs from this previous work in important ways. For example, I approach 
the topic of diagnostic categories in psychiatry from a different angle. As noted above, 
some authors frame this as a metaphysical issue by asking whether or not psychiatric 
disorders are natural kinds (Zachar, 2000; Cooper, 2005; Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary, 
2010; Kendler et al., 2011; Haslam, 2014), while others frame it as an issue concerning 
what constitutes a valid psychiatric classification (Kendell and Jablensky, 2003; Poland, 
2014; Tsou, 2015). In contrast, I frame it as an epistemological issue concerning whether 
or not the diagnostic categories in psychiatry function as explanations in the clinical 
context. While this covers some of the same material as the above mentioned discussions 
of natural kinds and psychiatric classification, I hope to show that approaching this 
material from the angle of explanation in clinical practice can offer novel insights into the 
problem of how good are our diagnostic categories in psychiatry. 
My discussion of explanation in psychiatry also differs from previous discussions of 
explanation by other philosophers in the field. Two kinds of explanatory question 
regarding diagnoses in medicine and psychiatry can be distinguished (Qiu, 1989: pp. 199–
200; Thagard, 1999: p. 20). The first kind of explanation, which I call disease explanation, 
belongs to empirical research. This is the explanation of a clinical syndrome in general. 
Here, the goal here is to develop a general model that brings together the relevant causal 
factors and mechanisms responsible for the syndrome. The second kind of explanation, 
which I call diagnostic explanation, occurs in the context of clinical practice. This is 
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where a patient presents with a set of symptoms and the physician makes a diagnosis that 
explains these symptoms. Much of the philosophical literature on explanation in 
psychiatry has focused on disease explanation. The problem is how the construction of a 
general model of a psychiatric disorder is possible given the problems posed by the high 
degrees of heterogeneity and complexity at every level of analysis (Murphy, 2006; 
Kendler, 2008; Mitchell, 2008). However, diagnostic explanation has not been discussed 
at length in the literature. My investigation stands out from previous discussions of 
psychiatric explanation in that it focuses on the diagnostic question, where the patient’s 
symptoms constitute the explanandum and the diagnosis is the explanans. A significant 
implication of this is that it keeps the thesis relevant to clinical psychiatric practice, 
perhaps more so than to empirical psychiatric research. 
Finally, my investigation stands out from previous work in the field by offering 
some novel solutions to some of the recognised problems regarding psychiatric 
diagnoses. For example, while the conceptual problem of whether psychiatric diagnoses 
can be said to explain symptoms when they are defined by these symptoms has been 
mentioned in the literature, as yet it has not received detailed treatment. In this thesis, I 
present a solution to this problem involving a new application of the philosophical theory 
of two-dimensional semantics that has not been attempted before. Similarly, the problem 
of causal heterogeneity is a recognised problem, but I present an original response by 
showing how heterogeneous diagnostic categories can provide other sorts of explanatory 
information that can be genuinely causal in quite satisfying ways. I also present what I 
hope to be an original defence of a deflationary approach to the problem of diagnostic 
classification in psychiatry, based on the recognition that clinical psychiatry has another 
epistemic resource, the individualised formulation, which can complement the categorical 




1.2.3 Scope of this thesis 
This thesis, as far as I am aware, is the first detailed philosophical investigation of the 
explanatory functions of psychiatric diagnoses in the context of clinical practice. While I 
hope to contribute novel insights into the roles and uses of diagnoses in medicine and 
psychiatry, I concede that my discussion looks at just one aspect of diagnosis from a 
fairly narrow disciplinary perspective. Specifically, it examines the diagnosis as an 
explanatory hypothesis about the patient’s clinical presentation through the lens of 
analytic philosophy of science. As such, it must be made clear from the outset that my 
discussion is not intended to offer a comprehensive treatment of the many other 
interesting and important issues concerning diagnosis, to some of which I alluded at the 
beginning of §1.2.2. Three of these issues warrant special mention here due to the 
prominent positions they occupy in the literature on diagnosis in the philosophy of 
psychiatry and the philosophy of medicine. 
 The first issue of note concerns the concept of disorder. The question here is what 
demarcates disorder qua medical problem from other kinds of problem, such as moral 
and social problems, or indeed from normal health. Interestingly, this debate is also partly 
inspired by Szasz’s arguments in “The Myth of Mental Illness” (1960). As noted in §1.2.1, 
Szasz presents his arguments as undermining the status of psychiatry as a medical 
discipline. Mental illnesses, he argues, are not genuine disorders, but “problems in living”. 
Since Szasz initially presented his arguments, numerous theorists have offered 
philosophical accounts of disorder, with psychiatric disorders often featuring at the 
centre of the discussion. In reply to Szasz, the psychiatrist Robert Kendell (1975) defends 
psychiatry as a medical discipline by suggesting a naturalistic account of disorder based 
on reduced life expectancy and fertility. A more sophisticated naturalistic account of 
disorder is offered by the philosopher Christopher Boorse (1977), who argues that 
disorder is a substandard statistical deviation from normal biological function. Perhaps 
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one of the most influential philosophical accounts of disorder is Jerome Wakefield’s 
(1992) harmful dysfunction analysis, according to which a condition’s disorder status is 
not determined solely by a factual claim about the presence of biological dysfunction, but 
also requires an evaluative judgement that the condition is harmful. Other normative 
accounts of disorder include those based on action failure (Fulford, 1989) and on 
flourishing (Megone, 1998). In more recent years, philosophers have explored more 
nuanced and pluralistic discussions of disorder that depart from the accounts based on 
single criteria (Cooper, 2005; Bolton, 2008). There have also been more focused 
discussions regarding whether or not particular conditions should be considered 
disorders, including grief (Wilkinson, 2000), ageing (Schramme, 2013), attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (Saul, 2014), and obesity (Hoffman, 2016). 
 The problem of demarcation between disorder and non-disorder has been raised in 
relation to diagnostic validity. Wakefield (1992), for instance, suggests that a diagnostic 
category is valid if it discerns genuine cases of disorder from cases of non-disorder. 
However, whether or not a diagnostic category is valid in this sense is a different issue 
from whether or not it serves as an explanation of a set of symptoms. Of course, I 
concede that the two issues are related, as a diagnostic category’s lack of explanatory 
value might provide a reason to suspect that the condition denoted by the category 
should not be considered a genuine disorder. Nonetheless, disorder status and 
explanatory function can come apart, and so are not necessarily connected. For example, 
the category of menopause can be invoked to explain a woman’s hot flushes, reduced 
libido, and cessation of menstruation, but it does not follow from this explanation that 
the condition denoted by the category is a medical disorder. Therefore, once one has 
established whether or not a given diagnosis serves as an explanation of a set of 
symptoms, whether or not the condition it denotes should be considered a disorder 
remains a further question. Addressing this further question would require commitment 
32 
 
to a particular account of disorder, which is beyond the intended scope of my 
investigation. 
 The second issue of note concerns the roles of values in diagnosis. Once again, the 
debate can be traced back to Szasz (1960), who argues that mental illnesses are not 
genuine medical disorders, because they are characterised by deviations from social and 
moral norms. As noted above, some theorists responded to Szasz by suggesting accounts 
of psychiatric disorder that do not invoke values (Kendell, 1975; Boorse, 1977). Other 
theorists, including Bill Fulford (1989), John Sadler (2005), and Tim Thornton (2007), 
acknowledge that psychiatric diagnoses are value-laden, but argue that this value-
ladenness does not necessarily undermine their scientific validity. Sadler proposes that 
values are involved at every level in psychiatric diagnosis, including the diagnostic criteria, 
the stereotype of the condition, the judgement about its disorder status, and the very 
enterprise of constructing a classification system. I fully accept that values are involved in 
diagnosis and that understanding their roles is important. However, a comprehensive 
analysis of values in psychiatric diagnoses is not necessary for my investigation into 
whether or not psychiatric diagnoses function as explanations of symptoms. The two 
issues can, for the most part, be kept apart, although I concede that they may be 
contingently related. As such, I discuss value-ladenness in this thesis only where it is 
directly relevant to the question of the explanatory role of a diagnosis. 
 The third issue of note concerns the relation of diagnosis to evidence-based 
medicine. This is an important topic, particularly given that evidence-based medicine has 
been portrayed as being a new and dominant paradigm in clinical medicine (Evidence-
Based Medicine Working Group, 1992). Accordingly, in recent years, the philosophy of 
medicine literature has swelled with highly welcome critical discussions of problems in 
evidence-based medicine, including the hierarchy of study designs, the epistemic purpose 
of randomisation, the role of tacit knowledge in clinical judgement, and the evidential 
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value of mechanistic reasoning (Bluhm, 2005; Thornton, 2007; Worrall, 2007; Bird, 2011; 
Howick, 2011; Andersen, 2012). The topics of diagnosis and causal explanation are 
certainly related to the topic of evidence-based medicine. For example, populations for 
statistical trials are usually defined in part by diagnostic criteria, and there is an active 
debate regarding the respective roles of statistical evidence for correlations and 
mechanistic causal explanations in guiding clinical decisions (Clarke et al., 2014: p. 346). 
However, for the specific purposes of this thesis, the discussion of whether psychiatric 
diagnoses explain symptoms and the discussion of how diagnoses relate to evidence-
based medicine can, to a significant degree, be kept apart. Hence, while I do suggest that 
diagnoses and the explanations they provide can help to inform predictions and guide 
therapeutic interventions, I do not intend in this thesis to examine precisely how, or 
indeed whether, such epistemic resources can complement an evidence-based medicine 
approach. 
In summary, the above mentioned issues can be seen as being orthogonal to, rather 
than challenging, the analysis I provide in this thesis. Of course, there are areas where the 
topic of my investigation and these other issues meet, and I would be delighted if it turns 
out that my discussion helps to shed new light on these issues. However, given the 




The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 considers the variety of epistemic, 
instrumental, and semiotic roles that diagnoses normally serve for clinicians, patients, and 
society. The overall aim of the chapter is to show that the explanatory role of a diagnosis 
is of particular importance, because it provides justificatory support for many of its other 
roles. I back this up with some evidence from sociological research on medically 
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unexplained syndromes, which suggests that diagnoses that fail to explain also often fail 
to reliably inform predictions, effectively guide therapeutic interventions, elicit support 
from social services, and provide hope for patients. I then explore some of the arguments 
made by prominent critics of psychiatry, which suggest that these concerns may also 
apply to psychiatric diagnoses. 
 Chapter 3 examines in more detail how diagnoses in medicine normally explain 
patients’ symptoms. The general aim is to explicate the nature of the explanatory relation 
in a paradigmatic example of diagnostic explanation in medicine, which can serve as a 
point of comparison for my later discussion of diagnosis in psychiatry. This proceeds 
through consideration of models of explanation in the philosophy of science and their 
adequacy when applied to the medical context of diagnosis. I begin by considering Carl 
Hempel’s (1965a) covering law account of scientific explanation and showing why it does 
not adequately capture the way in which a diagnosis explains a patient’s symptoms. 
Rather, the nature of diagnostic explanation in medicine is best captured by a causal 
model of explanation. I endorse the proposal by Margherita Benzi (2011) that many 
medical diagnoses, though by no means all, are causal explanations based on particulars. 
That is to say, they explain by indicating the actual causes of the symptoms in individual 
cases, rather than by subsuming them under general causal regularities. However, in 
addition to making a simple causal claim of the form “C causes E”, I argue that the 
diagnostic explanation also relies on some mechanistic knowledge of how C produces E 
to make the causal connection intelligible. Drawing on the work of Kenneth Schaffner 
(1986) and Jeremy Simon (2008), I suggest that this knowledge of mechanisms is supplied 
by the theoretical framework in which the clinician operates. 
 Chapter 4 addresses the conceptual problem described in §1.1.2. The descriptive 
definitions of psychiatric diagnoses in the DSM suggest that they refer to clusters of 
symptoms. Given that causes are distinct from their effects, this might seem to suggest 
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that diagnoses in psychiatry cannot serve as causal explanations of patients’ symptoms in 
the ways that many medical diagnoses do as described in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I 
argue that this is not necessarily so. The argument proceeds through examination of the 
semantics of diagnostic terms with appeal to theories of reference in the philosophy of 
language. I begin by considering Jennifer Radden’s (2002) distinction between descriptive 
and causal conceptions of diagnostic terms, and the view suggested by Carl Hempel 
(1965b) and Paul Thagard (1999) that the historical development of a diagnostic term 
involves a progressive change from the former to the latter. A problem with this is that it 
implies radical incommensurability between older and newer conceptions of a diagnostic 
term (Feyerabend, 1962; Kuhn, 1962; Fleck, [1935] 1981). This is untenable, because it 
contradicts the intuition that scientific discoveries do not merely involve changes in the 
meanings of disease terms, but actually do increase our understanding of the respective 
diseases. I then look at how the causal theory of reference developed by Saul Kripke 
([1972] 1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975a) can offer a more reasonable account of the 
meanings of diagnostic terms that avoids the implication of radical incommensurability. 
In spite of its strengths, a problem with a pure causal theory of reference is that it 
relegates the symptoms of psychiatric disorders to mere contingent features of the 
diagnoses, which contradicts the fact that such symptoms are often necessary conditions 
for applying the diagnoses according to DSM-5. To resolve the problem, I draw on the 
conceptual framework of two-dimensional semantics, as developed by Robert Stalnaker 
(1978), David Chalmers (1996), and Frank Jackson (1998). Such a framework permits a 
semantic pluralism that accommodates the actuality of diagnostic terms being defined 
through their symptoms, yet being used to refer to the putative causes of these 
symptoms. 
 Chapter 5 moves on to the ontological problem described in §1.1.3. Although the 
solution to the conceptual problem presented in Chapter 4 shows that symptom-based 
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descriptive definitions do not necessarily preclude psychiatric diagnoses from alluding to 
the causes of these symptoms, whether categorical diagnoses in psychiatry actually 
provide satisfactory causal explanations of individual patients’ symptoms is also 
dependent on whether we have enough scientific understanding of these causes and, 
more fundamentally, on whether the diagnostic categories are respectively associated with 
distinctive causal profiles that are sufficiently invariant across cases. In this chapter, I 
review the current findings from empirical research into psychiatric aetiology for some 
disorders, paying special attention to the example of major depressive disorder. I use this 
example to illustrate the problems of causal heterogeneity and complexity that are 
associated with most psychiatric diagnoses. These problems suggest that psychiatric 
disorders cannot be conceptualised in simple essentialistic terms. In other words, the 
diagnostic categories in psychiatry do not correspond to distinct and invariant causative 
pathologies, but are associated with variable ranges of possible causal pathways, each 
involving complex interactions between diverse biological, psychological, and social 
factors. I review some recent attempts to conceptualise psychiatric disorders as 
homeostatic property clusters (Borsboom, 2008; Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; 
Kendler et al., 2011; Tsou, 2013), an idea introduced by the philosopher of biology 
Richard Boyd (1999) to analyse kinds that are constituted by clusters of unnecessary and 
insufficient properties that are connected via contingent causal relations. I then present 
some problems for homeostatic property cluster accounts of psychiatric disorders. 
Finally, I consider whether the above considerations also apply to common psychiatric 
diagnoses other than major depressive disorder, including schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, generalised anxiety disorder, the dementias, panic disorder, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and some of the personality disorders. 
 Chapter 6 examines the implications of the problems discussed in Chapter 5 for the 
explanatory functions of psychiatric diagnoses. To address the problems of causal 
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heterogeneity and complexity in psychiatry, theorists have suggested the respective 
strategies of idealisation (Murphy, 2006) and theoretical pluralism (Kendler, 2008; 
Mitchell, 2008) in disease explanation. With respect to diagnostic explanation, though, 
such heterogeneity makes them fall short of the paradigmatic case in medicine, described 
in Chapter 3, where a diagnosis picks out a specific cause of the patient’s symptoms. 
Nonetheless, I argue that some psychiatric diagnoses, though by no means all, can still 
supply different sorts of clinically relevant causal information. In particular, I suggest that 
some psychiatric diagnoses provide negative information to exclude certain medical 
disorders as causes of the patients’ symptoms, some provide probabilistic or disjunctive 
information about the range of possible causal processes that could be contributing to 
the patients’ symptoms, and some provide causal information about the relations 
between the symptoms themselves. I also discuss the limitations of these sorts of causal 
explanatory information and suggest some psychiatric diagnoses to which they do not 
apply. 
 Chapter 7 explores the normative and methodological implications for clinical 
psychiatric practice of the above issues concerning diagnostic explanation. As noted in 
Chapter 6, categorical diagnoses in psychiatry fall short of the paradigmatic explanatory 
diagnosis in medicine, although some may provide more modest sorts of causal 
explanatory information. I consider three strategies for modifying and improving the 
discourse and practices regarding diagnoses in psychiatry. The first strategy is to amend 
the ways in which diagnoses are communicated in psychiatric discourse. The problems of 
causal heterogeneity and complexity suggest that psychiatric diagnoses are often 
misleadingly essentialised, which Nick Haslam (2014) argues can encourage harmful 
stigma. I propose that this warrants modification of our language in psychiatry, so that 
psychiatric diagnoses and whatever explanatory information they might supply are 
conveyed more accurately to people. The second strategy involves revising diagnostic 
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classification so that the categories correspond to more distinctive and stable causal 
structures (Poland et al., 1994; Bentall, 2003; Murphy, 2006; Tsou, 2015). While this is an 
epistemically respectable project, I argue that there are serious challenges that make it 
unlikely for a successful aetiologically-based classification to be implemented in the near 
future. The third strategy, which I endorse, is to supplement the categorical diagnosis 
with an individualised formulation (World Psychiatric Association, 2003). I show how a 
categorical diagnosis and an individualised formulation can complement each other to 
arrive at a more satisfactory causal explanation of the patient’s symptoms in the particular 
case. The upshot is that despite being causally heterogeneous, a psychiatric diagnosis can 
still serve an important role in the development of a causal explanation. However, again, 
the quality of the explanation remains limited by our incomplete scientific understanding 
of the mechanisms through which different causal factors interact, as well as by our 
ability to match certain causal factors to particular patients. 
 Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the thesis. Here, I recapitulate my main points and 
summarise my answer to the main research question. I also tentatively reflect on some of 




2. The Functions of Diagnoses 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The diagnosis is a key concept in contemporary medical practice, and serves a variety of 
functions for clinicians, for patients, and for society more broadly. This chapter explores 
these functions and some of the ways in which they are connected. More specifically, I 
argue that many of these functions receive justificatory support from the explanatory role 
of the diagnosis. My overall aim is to show why it is desirable for diagnoses to serve as 
explanations of patients’ symptoms. This is significant for the thesis as a whole because it 
highlights important implications for the status of psychiatry if it turns out that its 
diagnoses do not explain. 
I proceed as follows. In §2.2, I introduce the variety of functions served by 
diagnoses in clinical practice. Because the intention in this section is to provide a general 
overview, I draw on examples from across the whole of medicine, including psychiatry 
and the various specialties of bodily medicine. In §2.3, I argue that the explanatory 
function of a diagnosis provides justificatory support for many of the other functions. I 
substantiate this with evidence from the medical and sociological literature regarding 
diagnoses that fail to explain, namely the so-called medically unexplained syndromes, and 
the implications of such explanatory failure on the other roles of the diagnoses. I then 
consider why these concerns might also apply to psychiatric diagnoses. 
Before I go on further, I would like to clarify some terminology and distinguish 
between two commonly used meanings of “diagnosis”. Mildred Blaxter (1978) notes that 
“diagnosis” is an ambiguous term that can refer to either a category or a process. A 
clinician may use the term to denote the condition from which the patient is suffering, 
such as “the diagnosis is acute appendicitis”, or to indicate how this conclusion can be 
reached, such as “the diagnosis is clinical and radiological”. Similarly, John Sadler (2004: 
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p. 166) distinguishes “diagnosis-as-denotative-signifier” from “diagnosis-as-epistemic-
act”, and Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (2012: p. 110) distinguishes “diagnosis” from the process 
of “diagnostics”. To avoid this ambiguity, I reserve the term “diagnosis” to refer to the 
categorical conclusion and refer to the process leading to the conclusion as the 
“diagnostic process”. 
 
2.2 The various functions of diagnoses 
2.2.1 Hypothesis 
The clinical consultation between patient and clinician usually begins with the clinician 
taking a history from the patient to elicit his or her symptoms and other relevant 
information, examining the patient to elicit any signs, and reviewing any available 
investigation results (Stanley and Campos, 2013). In practice, one or more of these steps 
may be omitted, depending on the particular scenario. For instance, in an emergency 
scenario involving loss of awareness, the patient is unable to provide a history, and the 
clinical team have to rely on examination signs and investigation results to make a 
diagnosis. Conversely, in general practice, many diagnoses are informed by the symptoms 
and signs, without laboratory or radiological investigations being requested. Nonetheless, 
these minor differences aside, the diagnostic process normally begins with the gathering 
of a flexible combination of symptoms, signs, and investigation results, henceforth 
referred to as patient data. 
After the patient data is gathered and consolidated, a diagnosis is inferred from the 
patient data. Further investigations may then be undertaken to acquire evidence that 
could support or undermine the diagnosis. Usually, several possible diagnoses are initially 
stipulated and further assessment is undertaken to help select the correct diagnosis from 
the list of possibilities, a practice known as differential diagnosis (Longmore et al., 2014: 
p. 13). For example, after assessing a patient with severe chest pain, a doctor may 
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stipulate myocardial infarction, pulmonary embolism, and gastro-oesophageal reflux 
disease as potential diagnoses. After further investigations reveal a positive troponin 
result that supports the diagnosis of myocardial infarction, a negative D-dimer result that 
undermines the diagnosis of pulmonary embolism, and no further evidence of gastro-
oesophageal reflux disease, the doctor may then conclude that the correct diagnosis from 
these possibilities is myocardial infarction. 
The diagnosis, then, functions as a testable hypothesis about the patient’s condition 
that is informed by the patient data. Indeed, several authors have commented on the 
similarity between the diagnostic process in medicine and hypothesis formation in 
science, and consider medical diagnoses to be akin to scientific hypotheses (Rzepiński, 
2007; Sadegh-Zadeh, 2012; Aliseda and Leonides, 2013; Stanley and Campos, 2013; Willis 
et al., 2013). For example, Willis et al. suggest that although its conditions are less 
controlled than those in a laboratory, the diagnostic process is “an example of science in 
action” (Willis et al., 2013: p. 501). This is both an observation about the scientific 
knowledge of diseases that is crucial to medicine and about the kinds of method used by 
clinicians to form diagnoses. 
In light of the observed similarities between diagnostic process and hypothesis 
formation, some theorists have applied the resources of philosophy of science to analyse 
the inferential practices that take place in the diagnostic process. One popular and 
plausible view is that the diagnostic process involves abductive reasoning, or inference to 
the best explanation (Aliseda and Leonides, 2013; Stanley and Campos, 2013). Stanley 
and Campos defend this view by arguing that neither deduction nor induction are 
sufficient for the generation of a diagnostic hypothesis. They argue that deduction and 
induction are too restrictive, because they are limited to the application of general laws or 
the extrapolation of previously observed patterns to new cases, while the diagnostic 
process often involves reference to phenomena that are not explicit in the supporting 
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evidence, which suggests the use of abduction. I also suggest that inference to the best 
explanation provides a good description of the clinical practice of differential diagnosis, 
whereby a doctor considers several potential diagnoses before committing to one as the 
correct diagnosis. Another popular view is that the diagnostic process involves statistical 
inference (Ledley and Lusted, 1959; Westmeyer, 1975). Willis et al. (2013) assume a more 
pluralist view and suggest that the diagnostic process draws on many kinds of reasoning, 
including deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, falsification, inference to the best 
explanation, and statistical inference. 
 
2.2.2 Explanation 
We have just seen that the diagnostic process is akin to scientific hypothesis formation, 
whereby the diagnosis is inferred from a set of patient data, consisting of symptoms, 
signs, and investigation results. In turn, it is often the case that the diagnosis explains the 
patient data. The idea that diagnoses in medicine often and ideally function as 
explanations of patients’ symptoms is generally accepted in the philosophical and medical 
literature, with many authors endorsing the view that they are causal explanations: 
 
Discomfort makes the patient think that something is wrong with him, and a why-
question arises in his mind. … He complains to the physician of these symptoms. 
… All these clinical manifestations (symptoms, signs and laboratory data) require 
an explanation from the physician, and finally a diagnosis is reached. (Qiu, 1989: p. 
199) 
 
When a patient goes to a physician with a set of complaints and symptoms, the 
physician’s first task is to make a diagnosis of a disease that explains the symptoms. 
(Thagard, 1999: p. 20) 
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To solve a clinical diagnostic problem means first to recognize a malfunction and 
then to set about tracing or identifying its causes. The diagnosis is thus an 
explanation of disordered function, where possible a causal explanation. (Schwartz 
and Elstein, 2008: p. 224) 
 
Once formulated, however, a diagnosis can be synthetically described, from a 
statistical viewpoint, as a relation between a set of findings (signs, symptoms, 
laboratory test results) and a certain pathological condition attributed to the patient. 
What kind of relation? According to a common opinion among experts in 
computational models, medical diagnoses express explanatory relations …” (Benzi, 
2011: p. 365) 
 
It is uncontroversial in the medical literature that the ideal diagnosis is a biomedical 
causal explanation. … Such a diagnosis posits a physiological cause for a set of 
physical signs and symptoms. (Cournoyea and Kennedy, 2014: pp. 928–929) 
 
And so, there is often a bidirectional epistemic relation between the diagnosis and the 
patient data. The diagnosis is inferred from the patient data and the patient data is 
explained by the diagnosis. I analyse in detail the nature of the explanatory relation in 




In addition to post hoc explanation of patient data, a diagnosis serves a predictive function. 
The clinician is very often able to make reliable predictions about the likely future 
outcome for a patient based on the diagnosis. These include predictions about the 
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prognosis, which consists of the clinical course and likelihood of survival, predictions 
about potential complications, and predictions about responses to treatments. For 
instance, the diagnosis of acute appendicitis informs the clinician that the patient’s 
condition is likely to deteriorate rapidly without treatment, that a potential complication is 
peritonitis, and that a good recovery is likely following an appendicectomy. Similarly, the 
diagnosis of common cold suggests that the patient is most likely to recover completely 
without treatment within a few days, but also that there is a risk of sinusitis as a potential 
complication. Therefore, a diagnosis serves the epistemic function of supporting 
inductive inferences about the future. 
 
2.2.4 Intervention 
It is uncontroversial that an important function of a diagnosis is guiding intervention. 
Indeed, theorists have proposed that the value of the diagnosis must be considered 
relative to the therapeutic goals of medicine. Caroline Whitbeck argues that the diagnosis 
is “aimed at obtaining the best medical outcome for the patient” (Whitbeck, 1981: p. 
326), while Annemarie Jutel (2011: p. 21) notes that the diagnostic process is very often 
motivated by the goal to ascertain the correct treatment. Therefore, a diagnosis not only 
has epistemic significance, but also instrumental utility in guiding treatment, which makes 
it a key component of practical reasoning in medicine. 
As alluded to earlier, this interventional function of a diagnosis is supported by its 
predictive function. A diagnosis can inform predictions about likely responses to 
treatments, and so can guide therapeutic decision making. For example, a clinician can 
predict from the diagnosis of acute appendicitis that the patient is likely to make a good 
recovery following an appendicectomy, thus supporting the decision to intervene 
therapeutically with an appendicectomy. Similarly, a clinician can predict from the 
diagnosis of common cold that the patient is likely to recover without any specific 
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treatment, thus supporting the decision not to prescribe an antibiotic. This interventional 
function of a diagnosis is greatly aided by the knowledge provided by evidence-based 
medicine. Later in §2.3.1, I show how it can also be further supported by the explanatory 
function of the diagnosis. 
 
2.2.5 Denotation 
As well as the above mentioned epistemic functions, the hypothesised diagnosis serves a 
linguistic function as a denotative label for the condition with which the patient is 
presenting. It comprises a term that is understood to refer to a state of affairs in the 
patient, such as “myocardial infarction” referring to ischaemic necrosis of the 
myocardium due to coronary artery occlusion. Furthermore, as noted by physician and 
psychoanalyst Michael Balint (1964: p. 25), such a diagnostic term provides a useful 
shorthand description that organises a variety of disparate clinical features into a unified 
phenomenon. This is important, because it facilitates the communicative exchanges of 
clinicians. Hence, diagnostic terms constitute part of a common language with which 
clinicians can reliably and concisely convey clinical information to each other. I offer a 
more detailed analysis of the semantics of diagnostic terms in Chapter 4. 
 
2.2.6 Classification 
Denotation is closely related to classification. Designating a condition with a specific term 
implies conceptually distinguishing it from other conditions. The diagnosis of myocardial 
infarction specifically denotes ischaemic necrosis of the myocardium, which is taken to be 
conceptually distinct from, for example, inflammation of the pericardium or dissection of 
the aorta. Moreover, the diagnostic term is not merely taken to denote an individual 
instance of the condition, but represents a generalised category. Hence, the condition 
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denoted by the diagnosis is often considered to be a repeatable type, of which individual 
cases are tokens (Sadler, 2005: pp. 419–420; Sadegh-Zadeh, 2012: p. 172). 
Diagnostic terms, then, demarcate and classify diseases into clinically significant 
categories. Hence, Annemarie Jutel claims that the diagnosis is “one of medicine’s most 
powerful classification tools” (Jutel, 2011: p. 15). This is reflected by the profound and 
pervasive influences of formal diagnostic classification systems on public policy, health 
insurance, and pharmaceutical research (Cooper, 2005: p. 1). As noted in Chapter 1, two 
of the leading formal diagnostic classification systems in current usage are the World 
Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD), now in its tenth revision 
(1992), and, in the field of psychiatry, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), now in its fifth edition (2013). However, 
even outside the official taxonomies of ICD-10 and DSM-5, the classificatory functions 
of diagnoses are deeply embedded in everyday clinical practice. For example, the Oxford 
Handbook of Clinical Medicine (Longmore et al., 2014), which is considered an indispensable 
resource for medical students and physicians, organises diagnoses into cardiovascular 
disorders, respiratory disorders, gastrointestinal disorders, endocrine disorders, infectious 
diseases, malignancies, and so on. 
The classificatory function of a diagnosis complements some of the other epistemic 
functions discussed above. First, it supports the predictive function discussed in §2.2.3. 
The characterisation of clinical phenomena into a disease that is considered to be 
categorically distinct from other diseases reflects the assumption that instances of this 
disease share similarities that are theoretically important and inductively powerful 
(Cooper, 2012: pp. 61–64). For example, the acceptance of acute appendicitis as a distinct 
diagnostic category suggests that clinicians recognise that cases of acute appendicitis 
behave alike in some clinically significant respects. Hence, they can infer that new cases 
of acute appendicitis will also behave in similar ways. Second, the classificatory function 
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of the diagnosis also supports the function of the diagnosis in guiding therapeutic 
intervention. More specifically, it supports the generalisation of a given treatment strategy 
from past cases to future cases. Because a diagnosis groups together cases under a 
category based on clinical similarity, an inductive generalisation can be made from the 
observed treatment responses in studied cases with the diagnosis to all cases with the 
diagnosis, thus allowing the development of an evidence-based treatment guideline. 
 
2.2.7 Normative 
The functions discussed so far have been largely descriptive, that is, they concern the role 
of the diagnosis in picking out a biological state of affairs that is assumed to be part of 
the external world, albeit occurring within the body of the patient. However, the 
diagnosis also has a normative function. Assigning a diagnosis to a patient does not only 
pick out a state of affairs, but usually implies the evaluative judgement that this state of 
affairs is abnormal (Bolton, 2008: pp. xiii–xiv). 
More specifically, the diagnosis usually implies that the patient has a medical 
disorder. According to Jerome Wakefield (1992) it is important that a diagnostic category 
discerns cases of genuine disorder from non-disordered cases, such as variants of 
normality. While this has some plausibility, I argue that it is not necessarily the case that 
the condition picked out by a diagnosis has to be considered a disorder, as it is also 
possible for a diagnosis to indicate non-disorder. An example, previously mentioned in 
Chapter 1, §1.2.3, is the diagnosis of menopause to account for a woman’s complaints of 
hot flushes, reduced libido, and cessation of menstruation. Nonetheless, even such a 
diagnosis of non-disorder implies an evaluative judgement about the status of the 
patient’s condition based on the standards of normality and abnormality that are assumed 
by the medical profession. 
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The normative function of a diagnosis is often used to offer vindication for some 
its other functions. With respect to the interventional function discussed in §2.2.4, for 
example, the normative judgment regarding whether the patient’s condition is a disorder 
informs the decision about whether medical intervention is appropriate at all. As we shall 
see, this normative function is also closely connected to the semiotic and social functions 
of a diagnosis. 
 
2.2.8 Semiotic 
So far, I have discussed functions of a diagnosis that are useful for the clinician. 
However, a diagnosis can also serve a useful function for the patient. More specifically, it 
functions as a “semiotic mediator”, or a meaningful label which the patient can use to 
understand and act upon his or her condition (Brinkmann, 2014). For example, a 
diagnosis could be taken by the patient as legitimising his or her illness, thus validating his 
or her personal experience of being unwell as something that deserves to be taken 
seriously. This draws on the above mentioned normative function of the diagnosis. More 
broadly, Carl Elliott (1999) proposes that a diagnosis can influence the narrative by which 
one interprets one’s life and shapes one’s future. When the effect of the diagnosis on the 
one’s life narrative is significant, such as with a chronic, untreatable, or potentially fatal 
condition, it can profoundly reorganise one’s sense of personal identity and attitude 
towards what is valuable in life. This reorganisation of the sense of identity can also be 
collective (Jutel, 2011: p. 11). For example, Roth and Nelson (1997), in their qualitative 
study of patients diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, found 
the construction of HIV-positive identities and membership in the HIV-positive 
community to be prominent themes in the patients’ narratives. 
Often, the semiotic function served by diagnosis can be helpful for the patient, as it 
can enable the patient to plan his or her life accordingly. This can be the case even if the 
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diagnosis is of a serious condition. For instance, polycystic kidney disease is an autosomal 
dominant inherited disease associated with progressive renal failure and a significantly 
increased risk of subarachnoid haemorrhage (Longmore et al., 2014: p. 312). A diagnosis 
of polycystic kidney disease could enable the patient to take measures to control his or 
her blood pressure, attend regular neuroimaging scans to screen for cerebral aneurysms, 
consider the possible need for dialysis in the future, and make an informed decision 
about family planning in light of it being possible that his or her children could inherit the 
disease. However, it should also be recognised that a diagnosis could also have a harmful 
effect on a person’s life narrative. Rachel Cooper (2012) explores the ways in which 
people’s narratives are influenced by the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, 
which is defined in DSM-5 by a number of character traits, including “repeated lying … 
aggressiveness … disregard for safety of self or others … irresponsibility” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 659). Given the moral undesirability of these traits, the 
diagnosis makes it very difficult for the patient to construct a good narrative of his or her 
life. Drawing on posts on an internet support group for people with antisocial personality 
disorder, Cooper (2012: pp. 65–66) observes that people tend to respond to the diagnosis 
in one of three ways. Some challenge the diagnosis. Others consider the diagnosis to 
legitimise their immoral behaviours and embrace the idea that they are bad people, 
arguably leaving them worse than they have been before receiving the diagnostic label. 
Others are left uncertain about what to do with the diagnosis and feel abandoned by 
mental health professionals. This suggests that while diagnoses can serve many helpful 
functions, they also have the potential to cause iatrogenic harm. 
 
2.2.9 Social 
Finally, a diagnosis has social implications beyond the clinical interaction between the 
patient and the clinician. Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (2012: 336–339) characterises the 
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diagnosis as a performative speech act that generates a social status for the patient, much 
like a judicial verdict. For instance, he observes that the utterance, “you have acute 
appendicitis”, explicitly appears as a simple description, but expresses the implicit 
performative, “I assert that you have acute appendicitis” (Sadegh-Zadeh, 2012: pp. 55–56). 
This speech act influences attitudes and behaviours at individual, institutional, and 
cultural levels. 
 At the level of individual behaviour, John Sadler (2005: pp. 421–422) notes that the 
diagnosis endows the clinician with certain privileges. These might include initiating 
pharmacological treatment, surgical intervention, psychological therapy, and potentially 
invasive testing. Hence, the social function of the diagnosis is closely related to its 
interventional function discussed in §2.2.4 and its normative function discussed in §2.2.7. 
At an institutional level, a diagnosis entitles the patient to therapeutic, supportive, 
and financial resources to which he or she had not previously been entitled. For example, 
the diagnosis of myocardial infarction entitles the patient to a hospital bed, nursing care, 
laboratory and radiological investigations, medical and surgical interventions, 
rehabilitation, and outpatient follow-up after discharge into the community. When the 
illness is more chronic and disabling, a diagnosis can also authorise the patient’s access to 
further supportive and financial resources, including attendance to support groups, carer 
input, disability benefits, and supported accommodation. 
 At the level of culture, a diagnosis legitimises sickness and sanctions certain kinds 
of behaviour (Jutel, 2011: p. 7). The sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951: pp. 436–437) 
proposes that the patient is thrust into a “sick role”, which bestows on him or her certain 
rights and duties. The patient’s rights are to not be considered responsible for his or her 
illness and to be exempt from some of his or her normal obligations. These are reflected 
by the intuition that the sick person deserves sympathy and the fact that is sickness is 
considered a legitimate reason for absence from work. The patient’s duties are to try to 
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get well and to seek appropriate medical care. Again, this draws on the normative 
function of the diagnosis discussed in §2.2.7. 
 The sanctioning of certain kinds of behaviour is also relevant in the legal setting. As 
previously noted in Chapter 1, §1.2.1, psychiatric diagnoses can function as defences and 
influence sentencing in criminal law. Relevant legislations include Section 2 of the 
Homicide Act 1957 and Section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and Wales. A 
medical diagnosis can also be used to support claims for damages in civil law. An 
example is the Mesothelioma Act 2014, which allows patients diagnosed with mesothelioma 
to receive damages for past asbestos exposure. 
 
2.3 When diagnoses fail to explain 
2.3.1 The importance of the explanatory function 
The various functions discussed in §2.2 make the diagnosis a valuable epistemic resource 
in clinical practice. In this current section, I focus my attention specifically on the 
explanatory function of the diagnosis which I briefly mentioned in §2.2.2. In particular, I 
argue that this explanatory function is important because it provides justificatory support 
for many of the other functions. My claim is not that the explanatory function is 
necessary for these other functions, but the more modest proposal that these other 
functions are strengthened by the explanatory function of the diagnosis. I then 
substantiate this by examining some cases where diagnoses fail to explain. 
 There is a clear connection between the function of a diagnosis as a hypothesis and 
its function as an explanation. In general, when we infer hypothesis from a set of data, we 
want the hypothesis to explain the data. This squares with the idea that the diagnostic 
process involves abductive reasoning, or inference to the best explanation (Aliseda and 
Leonides, 2013; Stanley and Campos, 2013). Moreover, as noted by Peter Lipton (2004), 
explanatory power is a value that is used to judge the quality of the hypothesis. Hence, 
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explanatory considerations not only motivate and guide the inferential process in 
diagnostic hypothesis formation, but are appealed to in the evaluation of the hypothesis. 
The explanatory function of a diagnosis, in particular its causal explanatory 
function, supports its predictive and interventional functions. To be clear, this is not to 
say that causal explanation is necessary for successful prediction or intervention. As 
noted by Jennifer Radden (2003: p. 46), a diagnostic category that is defined by a cluster 
of symptoms without allusion to an underlying cause can still permit probabilistic 
predictions. We may not know what causes this cluster of symptoms, but we could 
nonetheless make inductive inferences about similar cases based on enumerative 
induction, which can then inform an evidenced-based treatment guideline. Nonetheless, 
Radden also argues that a diagnosis that is explanatory is superior to one that is 
descriptive, because it opens up possibilities for further hypotheses and targeted 
interventions. Explaining why a patient has a particular cluster of symptoms provides 
understanding of the underlying causal structure and mechanisms, which can signal 
potential targets for therapeutic interventions, inform decisions regarding treatment 
approaches, and allow us to make predictive inferences that go beyond mere enumerative 
induction. 
Holly Andersen (2012: p. 997) argues that this is especially important where the 
patient’s condition is complicated by a comorbid condition. This is because while we may 
have evidence-based treatment guidelines for individual disorders, it is impractical to 
expect there to be evidence-based treatment guidelines for all possible combinations of 
disorders. Andersen gives the example of a patient diagnosed with a particular type of 
breast carcinoma who also has comorbid type II diabetes mellitus. Here, there may be an 
evidence-based treatment guideline for breast carcinoma and an evidence-based 
treatment guideline for treating type II diabetes mellitus, but there may not be trial-based 
evidence specifically for managing the combination of type II diabetes mellitus and this 
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particular type of breast carcinoma. Hence, evidence-based treatment guidelines may not 
be enough to inform the most appropriate treatment in this particular case. Rather, 
Andersen argues that we can appeal to causal explanatory knowledge, particularly 
knowledge involving mechanisms, to inform the treatment decision. Consider that there 
is evidence of one potential breast carcinoma treatment being more effective than 
another, but also that the clinician has knowledge that this treatment interferes with a 
chemical pathway that can worsen type II diabetes mellitus symptoms. The clinician can 
utilise the causal explanatory knowledge of the two diagnoses to assess the potential 
interactions between the mechanisms involved in the two disorders and their prospective 
treatments, in order to arrive at a treatment plan that is likely to be optimal for the 
particular patient. 
The denotative and classificatory functions of a diagnosis are also complemented 
by its explanatory function. As I shall argue in Chapter 3, where a diagnosis serves as an 
explanation of patient data, it does so partly by denoting a kind of causal structure that is 
instantiated by the actual patient. For example, the diagnosis of acute appendicitis 
explains a patient’s abdominal pain by denoting a distinctive pathological type, in this 
case acute inflammation of the appendix, which is causing the abdominal pain. 
Conversely, causal explanatory considerations partly justify why some conjunctions of 
clinical phenomena, but not others, are made into diagnostic categories and assigned 
diagnostic terms. According to Neil Williams (2011b), it is often the case that when 
seemingly disparate clinical phenomena are clustered together and characterised as a 
distinctive category, it is because scientists and medical professionals the clinical 
phenomena to be connected by a unifying causal explanation. Indeed, a diagnostic 
category can be discarded and replaced by more precise categories if it turns to be too 
causally heterogeneous to serve as a satisfactory causal explanation, such as dropsy being 
discarded and replaced by the more precise categories, congestive cardiac failure, cirrhosis 
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of the liver, and nephrotic syndrome (Peitzman, 2007). Hence, the causal explanatory 
value of a diagnostic category influences our judgements about the validity of the 
classification. As we shall see in Chapter 7, this is apparent in many of the recent 
philosophical critiques of diagnostic classification in psychiatry (Poland et al., 1994; 
Murphy, 2006; Tsou, 2015). 
The explanatory function of a diagnosis is often considered to justify its normative 
and social functions. As noted by Annemarie Jutel, a diagnosis “explains certain kinds of 
deviance in terms of disease rather than of moral failing” (Jutel, 2011: p. 229). This is 
then regarded as a reason to excuse the patient from certain responsibilities and grant 
him or her certain rights according to the “sick role” (Parsons, 1951). For instance, a 
child diagnosed with influenza may be temporarily granted absence from school, because 
his or her failure to concentrate is explained as being due to an unpleasant and 
unfortunate medical problem, rather than deliberate school refusal. We have also already 
seen in Chapter 1, §1.2.1, how the presence of a causal explanation is considered to be a 
legal excusing condition in criminal legislation. The amendment of the Homicide Act 1957 
by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 in England and Wales, for example, states that a 
condition for the defence of diminished responsibility is the presence of a mental 
disorder that causally explains the defendant’s behaviour. 
However, it is worth noting that the legitimacy of this sort of reasoning is 
disputable, because it assumes a dubious dichotomy between the medical and the moral. 
For example, Jennifer Radden (1982) criticises causal explanation as a legal excusing 
condition and argues that the mere fact that a disease was causally involved in the 
production of a criminal action does not justify excusing the action. Rather, she argues 
that a disease is relevant to the excuse only inasmuch as it can be associated with the 
traditional excusing conditions, namely ignorance and compulsion. Derek Bolton (2008), 
in his analysis of the concept of mental disorder, also comments on the dubious 
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dichotomy between the medical and the social, stating that “there may be no clear basis 
for distinguishing between mental health problems and social problems, or between 
mental health problems and ‘normal – more or less normal – problems of living’” 
(Bolton, 2008: p. viii). Hence, to assume that a causal explanation provided by a diagnosis 
can demarcate the medical from the moral or the social is to commit a conceptual error. 
Nonetheless, I suggest that it is still possible for the explanatory function of a diagnosis 
to provide justificatory support for its use as a social tool without assuming the above 
dichotomy between the medical and the moral. For instance, by explaining that the 
patient’s symptoms are caused by a particular kind of condition, the diagnosis supports 
the mobilisation of therapeutic, supportive, and financial resources of the sorts and in the 
amounts deemed by medical professionals and policy makers to be beneficial for this 
particular kind of condition. 
Finally, the semiotic function of the diagnosis draws on its explanatory function. 
Part of why a diagnosis serves as a meaningful label for the patient is because it is taken 
to provide an explanation of why he or she has been suffering from his or her symptoms. 
In a qualitative study of adults diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
Svend Brinkmann (2014) notes that the participants commonly mediate understanding of 
their problematic behaviours by invoking their diagnoses as explanations of these 
behaviours when summarising their stories. While Brinkmann comments on the possible 
circularity of invoking a syndromic diagnosis like attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
as an explanation of symptoms, his research does at least show that patients consider 
explanation to be an important function of a diagnosis. Other authors have also written 
about the way in which a diagnosis helps the patient reorganise his or her narrative and 
make sense of his or her condition by providing an explanation. For example, Kirmayer et 
al. suggest that “explanations may offer some reassurance and consolidation, promote 
coping and resilience, and allow the person to plan realistically for the future” (Kirmayer 
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et al., 2004: p. 664). Similarly, Winston Chiong writes that a diagnosis “can also be an 
explanation for patients who have had symptoms but do not know their cause”, which 
“may seem to resolve the mystery, such that even patients with intractable, chronic 
diseases may feel relief when diagnosed” (Chiong, 2004: p. 129). And so, the explanatory 
function of a diagnosis does not only have epistemic significance and instrumental utility 
for the clinician, but also has intrinsic value for the patient. 
 
2.3.2 Medically unexplained syndromes 
So far, I have given an overview of the various functions served by diagnoses and have 
argued that the explanatory function of the diagnosis is important because it provides 
justificatory support for its other functions. However, not all diagnoses function as 
explanations. There are some diagnoses that are customarily called medically unexplained 
syndromes, precisely because it is assumed that they fail to explain patients’ symptoms. 
These include chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel syndrome. As 
we shall see, their explanatory shortcomings are reflected by other epistemic and 
instrumental limitations. Hence, cases of medically unexplained syndromes provide 
further support for the idea that causal explanation is a desirable function in part because 
it strengthens the other functions of the diagnosis. 
 Medically unexplained syndromes are estimated to account for around a quarter of 
primary care consultations (Kirmayer et al., 2004). The diagnoses are syndromic, that is, 
they are not defined in terms of underlying disease processes, but in terms of symptom 
criteria. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define chronic 
fatigue syndrome as follows: 
 
A case of the chronic fatigue syndrome is defined by the presence of the following: 
1) clinically evaluated, unexplained, persistent or relapsing chronic fatigue that is of 
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new or definite onset (has not been lifelong); is not the result of ongoing exertion; 
is not substantially alleviated by rest; and results in substantial reduction in previous 
levels of occupational, educational, social, or personal activities; and 2) the 
concurrence of four or more of the following symptoms, all of which must have 
persisted or recurred during 6 or more consecutive months of illness and must not 
have predated the fatigue: self-reported impairment in short-term memory or 
concentration severe enough to cause substantial reduction in previous levels of 
occupational, educational, social, or personal activities; sore throat; tender cervical 
or axillary lymph nodes; muscle pain; multijoint pain without joint swelling or 
redness; headaches of a new type, pattern, or severity; unrefreshing sleep; and 
postexertional malaise lasting more than 24 hours. (Fukuda et al., 1994: p. 956) 
 
Cournoyea and Kennedy (2014) argue that such a diagnosis fails to explain, because it 
merely restates the symptoms without providing any causal information and, importantly, 
whatever cause there might be for the set of symptoms is currently unknown. Tentative, 
though plausible, suggestions have been made regarding psychodynamic, cognitive, 
neuroendocrine, immunological, and cultural factors that may be involved in the 
conditions, but the precise causal structures of medically unexplained syndromes remain 
undetermined (Kirmayer et al., 2004: p. 666). 
Typically, a diagnosis of a medically unexplained syndrome is only made after 
investigations have failed to reveal any underlying medical causes for the patient’s 
symptoms and other diagnoses have been eliminated. For example, Cournoyea and 
Kennedy (2014: p. 929) present the case of Brad, who presents with persistent fatigue, 
difficulty concentrating, joint pain, and neck soreness. The clinician considers possible 
explanations for Brad’s symptoms, including such autoimmune disorders as systemic 
lupus erythematosus and rheumatoid arthritis, and such infectious diseases as 
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cytomegalovirus infection, Epstein-Barr virus infection, and Lyme disease. Only once 
these possible causes are excluded by tests is Brad given a diagnosis of chronic fatigue 
syndrome. And so, not only does a medically unexplained syndrome diagnosis fail to 
serve as a medical explanation of the patient’s symptoms, but it specifically implies the 
absence of medical explanation (Jutel, 2011: pp. 80–81). Such a diagnosis is not so much 
a positive hypothesis arrived at via inference to the best explanation, but a negative 
hypothesis, or a diagnosis of exclusion, resulting from a process of eliminative inference. 
The absence of a causal explanation is associated with uncertainty and 
disagreement regarding classification. As noted in §2.2.6, medical disorders are often 
classified according to the kinds of causal process involved or where they are located. 
However, if the cause of a disorder is unknown or disputed, then it is left unclear how it 
should be classified, or indeed if it constitutes a valid category. For example, David and 
Wessely (1993) contest the assumed classification of chronic fatigue syndrome as an 
inflammatory disease of the nervous system under the category of benign myalgic 
encephalomyelitis in ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1992) and instead argue that it 
should be classified as a psychiatric disorder under the category of neurasthenia. An 
unfortunate clinical consequence of this classificatory uncertainty is the unsystematic 
approach to specialist referral from primary care. Due to the lack of knowledge regarding 
the underlying causes of the syndromes, patients with medically unexplained syndromes 
are often repeatedly referred to multiple different specialties (McGorm et al., 2010). This 
can result in patients feeling like they are being “passed between health specialists” and 
being unsure about who to approach for help (Nettleton et al., 2005: p. 208). 
 There may also be other limitations regarding therapeutic intervention, as the 
absence of a causal explanation leaves the clinician uncertain about how best to treat the 
patient (Cournoyea and Kennedy, 2014: p. 929). Of course, as noted in §2.3.1, the 
presence of a causal explanation is neither necessary nor sufficient for there to be an 
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effective treatment. Diagnoses that do not allude to underlying causes can still permit 
inductive inferences that inform evidence-based treatment guidelines. Conversely, a 
diagnosis could provide a causal explanation, but we may currently lack the technological 
means to therapeutically manipulate this cause. Nonetheless, the presence of a causal 
explanation can signal targets for therapeutic interventions and justify decisions regarding 
treatment approaches. The above considerations are illustrated by the example of chronic 
fatigue syndrome. Here, the absence of a clear explanation for the syndrome is reflected 
by the fact that there is very little in the way of agreed or successful treatment (Fukuda et 
al., 1994; Deale and Wessely, 2001). Current treatment strategies are highly miscellaneous 
and tend to be palliative, rather than being targeted at an underlying disease process. 
Moreover, while there is empirical evidence supporting the uses of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy and graded exercise treatment, the expected outcomes are the management of 
symptoms and the improvement of coping ability, rather than the resolution of whatever 
disease process might be responsible for the symptoms (Luyten et al., 2008). Such 
inability to identify the underlying pathology that explains the patient’s symptoms can 
leave the doctor feeling impotent when it comes to treatment (Nettleton et al., 2004: p. 
63). 
 In addition to the above mentioned epistemic and instrumental limitations, the 
absence of a causal explanation is often taken to undermine the normative, semiotic, and 
social functions of a diagnosis. As noted by Nettleton et al. (2004: p. 48), there is an 
assumed hierarchy between explanatory and non-explanatory diagnoses, such that 
medically unexplained syndromes are sometimes considered by patients, clinicians, and 
social organisations not to be legitimate medical disorders. At the individual level, this can 
be associated with patient dissatisfaction. A qualitative study by Norma Ware (1992) 
reports that patients diagnosed with chronic fatigue syndrome often feel betrayed by the 
lack of explanatory information provided by their diagnoses, tend to consult many other 
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clinicians hoping that their symptoms might eventually be explained, and become 
secretive about their conditions due to worries that they won’t be perceived as “real”. A 
participant in the study even reported that it would be easier in some ways to have a 
more serious but more understandable diagnosis like cancer (Ware, 1992: p. 353). Other 
researchers also report that patients who receive medically unexplained syndrome 
diagnoses feel let down and frustrated, because their hopes for explanations that would 
help them make sense of their conditions are left unfulfilled (Kirmayer et al., 2004: p. 668; 
Nettleton et al., 2004: p. 64). At a wider organisational level, this perceived illegitimacy 
can be associated with the withholding of services. For example, Joseph Dumit (2006: p. 
580) reports that patients with chronic fatigue syndrome in the United States of America 
are sometimes denied disability benefits on the grounds that such a syndromic diagnosis 
is not supported by a biological explanation. 
 And so, the above mentioned problems associated with medically unexplained 
syndrome diagnoses show that explanation is a desirable function of a diagnosis. Where 
diagnoses fail to provide explanations for patients’ symptoms, there may be uncertainties 
regarding classification, therapeutic limitations, perceptions of illegitimacy, feelings of 
dissatisfaction, and dismissive social attitudes regarding these diagnoses. I now examine 
how some of the above considerations are also of relevance to diagnoses in psychiatry. 
 
2.3.3 Problems with psychiatric diagnoses 
In §2.3.2, I presented medically unexplained syndromes as paradigmatic cases of 
diagnoses that are widely considered not to provide explanations of patients’ symptoms 
and laid out some of the broader implications of their explanatory shortcomings. It may 
be apparent that some of the sorts of property that are associated with the explanatory 
shortcomings of medically unexplained syndrome diagnoses are also shared by psychiatric 
diagnoses, such as syndromic definitions based on symptom clusters, exclusion criteria 
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that recommend ruling out possible medical causes before the diagnoses are established, 
and contentions regarding the precise causal structures of the disorders. Given these 
similarities and the potential associated implications, more detailed investigation is 
warranted regarding whether or not psychiatric diagnoses actually do provide 
explanations of patients’ symptoms. I do not intend to fully answer this question in the 
current chapter, as the rest of the thesis is dedicated to this task. Rather, I would like here 
to highlight some of the critiques of psychiatric diagnoses that are related to their 
uncertain explanatory statuses, in order to further support the point made in Chapter 1, 
§1.2.1, that the question of whether or not psychiatric diagnoses genuinely function as 
explanations of symptoms has significant implications for clinical discourse and practice. 
Like medically unexplained syndromes, psychiatric disorders have historically been 
beset by controversies. Among the most famous of those sceptical of psychiatric 
disorders are the proponents of the antipsychiatry movement of the 1960s. We have 
already visited Thomas Szasz (1960) in Chapter 1, who criticises the concept of mental 
illness. First, he argues that mental illness cannot legitimately be invoked as an 
explanation of someone’s behaviour because it is merely a shorthand label for the 
behaviour. Second, he argues that mental illness is not determined by a physiological 
cause, but by moral and social norms. Other antipsychiatrists offer different critiques of 
psychiatry. For example, Michel Foucault ([1961] 1964) argues that our current ways of 
thinking about psychiatric disorders as medical problems are the products of contingent 
historical developments, and so it is possible that these current ways of thinking might 
not have arisen had history worked out differently, while R. D. Laing (1967), criticises the 
medical conception of schizophrenia and instead argues that it is a normal and 
understandable response to an existentially distorted social world. 
 Szasz’s (1961) critique is noteworthy, because it draws connections between the 
supposed illegitimacy of a psychiatric diagnosis qua causal explanation and shortcomings 
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with respect to its normative and social functions. That is to say, he uses his argument 
that mental illness diagnoses fail to explain people’s behaviours to support the normative 
claim that mental illnesses are not genuine medical disorders and also to oppose the 
sanctioned uses of involuntary treatments for mental illnesses. This sort of approach has 
also been used by proponents of the subsequent critical psychiatry movement. David 
Ingleby (1982) argues that psychiatric diagnoses are only allowed to instigate the social 
responses of mobilising clinical resources and sanctioning certain behaviours because 
they are presented by the psychiatric profession as designating diseases that are 
responsible for the patients’ symptoms, much like diagnoses in other medical specialties. 
However, the suggestion is that psychiatric diagnoses do not designate genuine diseases 
that explain the symptoms, and so such social responses are not justified. Hence, Ingleby 
suggests that if people are made aware that the diagnoses instigate social responses that 
are not supported by medical explanations, then “questions would immediately arise 
about the propriety of those responses” (Ingleby, 1982: p. 137). Similarly, Joanna 
Moncrieff (2010) suggests that the notion that psychiatric diagnoses pick out underlying 
diseases that cause symptoms is just an assumption and that challenging this assumption 
could open up the associated social responses to scrutiny. 
 Writing from an analytic philosophy, rather than a social theory, point of view, 
Jeffrey Poland (2014) criticises the epistemic shortcomings of the psychiatric diagnoses in 
the DSM: 
 
The DSM categories and associated epistemic practices related to information 
processing, inferential practice, explanatory practice, and clinical understanding, are 
ineffective and harmfully biased because, given their atheoretical focus on clinical 
phenomenology, they do not effectively identify and represent important features, 
problems, contexts, and processes … (i.e., they do not underwrite sound clinical 
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inferences and judgments concerning what is wrong and what is likely to be 
helpful). (Poland, 2014: p. 48) 
 
Poland’s critique suggests that explanatory failure is connected to other shortcomings 
regarding classification, prediction, and intervention. That is to say, psychiatric diagnoses 
that do not adequately inform us about the processes underlying patients’ problems are 
poor categories that are unlikely to support reliable inferences or guide effective 
treatment decisions. He describes such diagnoses as “free riders” that contribute little 
over and above descriptions of symptoms (Poland, 2014: p. 34). 
Moncrieff (2010) also argues that causal explanatory shortcomings are associated 
with limitations regarding therapeutic interventions in psychiatry. She writes: 
 
In contrast to most medical conditions like diabetes, tuberculosis and heart disease, 
no psychiatric condition can be traced to a specific dysfunctional bodily process … 
There is no evidence that any class of psychiatric drug acts by reversing or partially 
reversing an underlying physical process that is responsible for producing 
symptoms … Therefore the idea that the behaviours seen by psychiatrists are 
indicative of an underlying disease is simply an assumption. (Moncrieff, 2010: p. 
373) 
 
Of course, whether or not psychiatric conditions can be traced to specific processes and 
whether or not psychiatric drugs do act by reversing specific processes are empirical 
questions that require empirical support. I reserve detailed examination of the empirical 
data relevant to the former question for Chapter 5. Nonetheless, a more modest point 
can still be gleaned from the above critique. If it is the case that a psychiatric diagnosis 
does not provide a causal explanation for a cluster of symptoms, then such a diagnosis 
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cannot be said to supply a justification for a given treatment for the disorder on the basis 
of the supposition that the treatment acts by interfering with a particular causal process. 
Furthermore, there is a sense in which such a treatment would be palliative. Given the 
lack of knowledge regarding whatever causal process might be underlying the cluster of 
symptoms, it would seem that only the cluster of symptoms itself, but not any underlying 
causal process, would be a tangible target for therapeutic intervention. 
 To sum up, there are controversies regarding the explanatory roles of psychiatric 
diagnoses. The above critiques show some of the ways in which potential explanatory 
shortcomings could limit or delegitimise the roles of psychiatric diagnoses in sanctioning 
certain social responses, predicting clinical outcomes, and guiding therapeutic 
interventions. Given these controversies and the potential implications for psychiatric 
practice, it is important to pursue a better understanding of what sorts of explanatory 
role, if any, are served by diagnoses in psychiatry. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have emphasised the role of the diagnosis as a valuable epistemic 
resource that serves a variety of functions in clinical medicine. It functions as a testable 
scientific hypothesis, a denotative signifier, a classificatory category, a causal explanatory 
construct, a predictive indicator, a normative judgement, a therapeutic guide, a semiotic 
mediator, and a social performative. I have shown that the explanation of symptoms is a 
desirable function of a diagnosis, in part because it provides justificatory support for 
many of its other functions. I then supported this with appeal to medically unexplained 
syndrome diagnoses, where explanatory failures are associated with uncertainties 
regarding classification, therapeutic limitations, perceptions of illegitimacy, and deeply 
dissatisfied patients. Finally, I indicated why these could also potentially be concerns for 
diagnoses in psychiatry, whose explanatory statuses are highly contentious. As we have 
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seen, a number of critics have argued that potential shortcomings with the explanatory 
functions of psychiatric diagnoses are connected to serious problems regarding their 
classificatory, predictive, normative, interventional, and social functions. Therefore, the 
philosophical question of whether or not psychiatric diagnoses explain has important 
implications for clinical psychiatric practice and discourse. The rest of this thesis is 
dedicated to answering this question. In order to answer it, though, we need to 
understand precisely what it is for a diagnosis to explain a set of symptoms. This will be 
the focus of Chapter 3. 
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3. Medical Diagnoses as Causal Explanations* 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter 2, it is generally accepted that many diagnoses in clinical medicine, 
though by no means all, serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms. This explanatory 
function is considered desirable, because it can guide interventions, support predictions, 
and convey understanding to the patient. This indicates a bidirectional epistemic relation 
between the diagnosis and the patient’s symptoms. The diagnosis is inferred from the 
symptoms and the symptoms are explained by the diagnosis. 
 In this present chapter, I elucidate the nature of this explanatory relation. My aim is 
to develop a philosophical account of how it is that a diagnosis serves as an explanation 
of a patient’s symptoms. Of course, as noted in my discussion of medically unexplained 
syndromes in Chapter 2, not all diagnoses in medicine serve as explanations. Hence, the 
model of explanation I develop is intended to capture the nature of explanation in those 
paradigm cases where the diagnoses genuinely do explain the patients’ symptoms. 
Because these paradigm cases come from bodily medicine, I will mostly be dealing with 
general medical diagnoses in this chapter. However, the relevance for the rest of the 
thesis is that it will serve as a point of comparison for my later discussion of diagnoses in 
psychiatry. That is to say, understanding how diagnoses explain symptoms in those 
uncontroversial medical cases where they do provides a standard with which to assess 
whether psychiatric diagnoses similarly serve such explanatory functions. 
                                                          
 
 
* A version of this chapter has been published as: Maung, H. H. (2016b). “The Causal 
Explanatory Functions of Medical Diagnoses”. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. Published online 
first 16th September 2016. DOI: 10.1007/s11017-016-9377-5. 
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In §3.2, I clarify what the explanandum 
is in diagnostic explanation. This is important, because to “explain symptoms” is an 
ambiguous expression in need of further specification. I then turn my focus to 
establishing the nature of the explanans in §3.3. In §3.3.1, I look at Carl Hempel’s (1965a) 
deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical models of scientific explanation, and 
argue that diagnostic explanations are neither explanatory in virtue of their argumentative 
structures nor in virtue of the general regularities between the diagnoses and the patient 
data. In §3.3.2, I present Margherita Benzi’s (2011) argument that medical diagnoses 
explain by identifying the actual causes of the patient data in individual cases, rather than 
by subsuming them under general causal regularities. I then argue in §3.3.3 that although 
Benzi is correct to stress that diagnostic explanation appeals to actual causation, a more 
complete account also needs to consider how a successful causal explanation of a 
patient’s symptom presentation not only involves a simple causal claim of the form “C 
causes E”, but also relies on mechanistic causal knowledge of the form “this mechanism 
produces this phenomenon” (Darden, 2013: p. 20). In §3.3.4, I suggest that the former is 
the outcome of the diagnostic search, while the latter is provided by the theoretical 
framework in which the physician operates. This is supported with appeal to Kenneth 
Schaffner’s (1986) work on theoretical generalisations in medicine and Jeremy Simon’s 
(2008) work on disease ontology. 
 
3.2 The explanandum 
3.2.1 Contrastive explanation 
Before we explore what sort of explanation a diagnosis provides, it is important to clarify 
precisely what it is that is being explained. It might seem straightforward to say that a 
diagnosis is invoked to explain why the patient has a certain set of symptoms. However, 
it is uncontroversial in the philosophical literature that explanations are contrastive. We 
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do not simply explain “why P?”, but “why P rather than Q?” (van Fraassen, 1980: pp. 
126–129; Lipton, 2004: pp. 33–37). Peter Lipton refers to P and Q as the fact and the foil, 
respectively. For instance, he notes that when we explain why the leaves turn yellow in 
November, we do not explain this fact tout court, but explain “only for example why they 
turn yellow in November rather than in January, or why they turn yellow in November 
rather than turn blue” (Lipton, 2004: p. 33). Hence, the information that is required in the 
explanation depends on which contrastive foil is selected. 
 Which contrastive foil is selected is guided by our explanatory interests and values. 
In the context of scientific explanation, these interests and values are not entirely 
arbitrary, but are shaped by the norms and aims of the field of enquiry. That is to say, 
certain sorts of contrastive question turn out to be conducive to achieving the goals of 
certain research programmes. In the context of the clinical consultation, it is supposed 
that the aim of medicine is to achieve the “the best medical outcome for the patient” 
(Whitbeck, 1981: p. 324), and that the ideas about what constitute good and bad medical 
outcomes are shaped by medical theory concerning “the pathological variants of the 
‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ processes” (Schaffner, 1986: p. 71). Hence, it makes sense that the 
sort of contrastive question that normally guides diagnosis is why the patient is presenting 
with medically abnormal symptoms rather than being in an acceptable healthy condition. 
Tomasz Rzepiński (2007) accordingly characterises a diagnosis as an answer to the 
following sort of contrastive question: 
 
“Why X1, X2, …, Xn, when it should be Y1, Y2, …, Yn?” where X1, X2, …, Xn 
account for a description of improper symptoms, while Y1, Y2, …, Yn account for 




Here, “improper” is construed to include any bit of patient data that is judged to be 
abnormal by medical standards and in need of further intervention. Rzepiński gives the 
examples of a quantitative investigation result such as increased plasma bilirubin 
concentration, an examination sign such as tenderness on palpation of the right iliac 
fossa, and a patient’s report of certain symptoms being present. The idea of “properly 
functioning” is construed to include physiological norms based on medical theory and 
statistical norms regarding quantitative reference ranges. 
While Rzepiński’s analysis is plausible, I argue that it is incomplete as it stands, 
because it is too restrictive with respect to what sorts of norm guide judgements about 
what is proper and improper regarding the patient’s clinical presentation. As noted above, 
Rzepiński suggests that these are informed by physiological and statistical norms based 
on knowledge from medical science. However, judgements about what is proper and 
improper regarding the patient’s clinical presentation are also informed by a variety of 
other norms and values, including the patient’s evaluation of certain sensations as 
distressing or disabling, expectations about performance ability relative to the patient’s 
usual baseline performance, and social conceptions of normality and deviance (Fulford, 
1989; Wakefield, 1992; Bolton, 2008). These are conspicuously missing from Rzepiński’s 
analysis, but I suggest they could easily be included.  
And so, we can construe the diagnostic question as a contrastive question of the 
sort “why P rather than Q?”, where P is the presence of certain symptoms in the patient 
which are deemed improper according to the above mentioned physiological, statistical, 
personal, and social norms, and Q is the counterfactual state where these symptoms are 
absent and which is considered more acceptable according to these norms. Of course, 
this is not to say that there cannot be other sorts of question in the clinical consultation 
which require different sorts of contrastive foil, such as questions about treatment 
response and individual differences. Nonetheless, the above construal reasonably 
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captures the contrastive fact that the physician is seeking to explain with a diagnosis when 
a patient presents to the clinical encounter with a set of symptoms. 
 
3.2.2 Functional and phenomenal concepts of symptom 
In addition to specifying the contrastive structure of the diagnostic question, I argue that 
we need to be clearer about precisely what feature of a symptom is being explained by the 
diagnosis. In addition to their observable behavioural manifestations, many symptoms are 
associated with subjective experiences. Obvious examples, to name a few, include pain, 
itch, fever, nausea, dizziness, fatigue, depressed mood, and hallucinations. To borrow an 
expression made famous by Thomas Nagel (1974), there is “something it is like” when 
one has a symptom. 
The subjective quality of experience might appear to present a problem for causal 
explanation of symptoms. This problem concerns the explanatory gap between physical 
facts and phenomenal facts (Kripke ([1972] 1980; Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 
1996). The general idea is that the physical facts, which are in terms of structures and 
dynamics, can yield only further facts about structures and dynamics, but do not 
encapsulate information about the subjective quality of experience (Chalmers, 1996: p. 
107). And so, given all the physical facts about the structures and dynamics of such a 
system, consciousness remains an extra fact to be considered. Some philosophers take the 
explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal to indicate an underlying 
metaphysical issue regarding the mind-body problem. For example, philosophers such as 
David Chalmers (1996), Laurence BonJour (2010), and Martina Fürst (2011) propose that 
physicalism is false, dualism is true, and consciousness is ontologically fundamental. Note 
that this is different from the picture suggested by René Descartes ([1641] 1996), where a 
non-physical res cogitans exerts its own influence on physical matter to generate behaviour. 
Chalmers (1996: pp. 124–125) concedes that the functional properties of the mind 
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responsible for the production of behaviour can be causally explained in terms of 
structures and dynamics. Rather, the ontological distinction he proposes is between the 
physical and the phenomenal, which he suggests are related via correlatory 
“supervenience laws” (Chalmers, 1996: p. 127). Other authors, such as Thomas Nagel 
(1974) and Joseph Levine (1983), do not make such metaphysical commitments, but 
nonetheless concede that the explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal 
is genuine. 
In light of this explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal, it would 
appear that if the explanation of a symptom involves the explanation of what it is like to 
experience that symptom, then information about causes and mechanisms is not wholly 
adequate for explaining the symptom. Even after one has elucidated the mechanisms 
responsible for pain, one has not explained the subjective quality of pain. One might be 
tempted to tackle this by assuming a view that denies the explanatory gap, but I suggest 
that this is unwarranted. I propose that there is no need to be drawn into the metaphysics 
of the mind-body problem to defend causal explanations of symptoms. Rather, one just 
needs to be more discerning with respect to the scope of the explanandum. Again, the 
work of Chalmers is relevant here. 
Chalmers (1996: p. 11–22) separates two different concepts of the mental. The 
psychological, or functional, concept of the mental is that which concerns the causal 
processes involved in the production of behaviour. The phenomenal concept of the 
mental is that which concerns the subjective quality of experience, or the “something it is 
like” of consciousness. These two concepts of the mental tend to co-occur. They are also 
often conflated in everyday language. For example, pain can be taken to mean a kind of 
functional state that normally results from actual or potential tissue damage and that 
normally produces aversive reactions, verbal reports of a part of the body hurting, 
increased sympathetic nervous system activity, and so on. However, it can also be taken 
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to mean the kind of phenomenal quality that normally accompanies this functional state. 
Irrespective of what the metaphysical relation between the functional and the 
phenomenal concepts of pain might be, there is at least a conceptual distinction between 
the two. Hence, one can separate trying to explain the functional concept of pain from 
trying to explain the phenomenal concept of pain. 
 I argue that for the purposes of causal explanation in medicine, we need only 
concern ourselves with explaining the functional concept of a symptom. For example, an 
adequate causal explanation of someone’s pain would be an explanation of why he or she 
is in such a functional state that is associated with aversive reactions, verbal reports of a 
part of his or her body hurting, increased sympathetic nervous system activity, and so on. 
It would not require the explanation of why this functional state is accompanied by the 
patient’s subjective experience of pain, or of what it is like for him or her to experience 
this pain. By restricting the scope of the explanandum to the functional concept of a 
symptom, the adequacy of the explanans no longer depends on any attempt to bridge the 
explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal. A causal explanation of 
symptoms that is in terms of mechanisms can still be adequate in the case that the gap is 
unbridgeable. 
And so, a diagnosis need not elucidate anything profound about phenomenology 
or the metaphysics of the mind-body problem to be a good explanation of a patient’s 
symptoms. The aim of diagnostic explanation is to explain the functional concept of a 
symptom and, while we can accept that there is a phenomenal concept associated with 
this functional concept, there is no need for the diagnosis to explain what this 
phenomenal concept is like. This is in no way saying that phenomenology is irrelevant to 
the understanding of disorders. The philosophy of psychiatry has a tradition of 
phenomenological approaches to psychopathology, which goes at least as far back as Karl 
Jaspers ([1913] 1997), and which has been continued by contemporary theorists (Fuchs, 
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2005; Ratcliffe, 2008). I do not claim that medicine and psychiatry are entirely exhausted 
by empirical science, and I accept that phenomenological research may help us to attain a 
richer understanding of the aspects of health and illness that are not covered by facts 
about causes and mechanisms. My claim is merely that the aim of diagnostic explanation 
is to understand the causes of symptoms from the outside. For this particular purpose, 
understanding of what phenomenal qualities are like from the inside is not required. A 
similar attitude is expressed by Dominic Murphy (2006: pp. 16–17) regarding explanation 
and classification in psychiatry. 
 
3.3 The explanans 
3.3.1 Covering law models 
Having clarified the explanandum in the diagnostic context, I now explore the nature of 
the explanans through examination of some prominent philosophical models of 
explanation. Among the most influential and widely discussed accounts of scientific 
explanation in the philosophical literature is Carl Hempel’s (1965a) covering law account, 
according to which a phenomenon is explained by subsuming it under a general law or 
regularity. A covering law explanation has the form of an argument, whereby the 
explanandum is concluded from a set of premises, of which at least one must be a general 
law that is necessary for the argument. The argument can be either deductive or 
inductive. The former kind, known as deductive-nomological explanation, has the 
following form when applied to diagnostic explanation, where S is a set of patient data, D 









For instance, according to the deductive-nomological model, a patient’s leg oedema 
would be explained by deducing it from the diagnosis of heart failure and the general law 
that links heart failure with leg oedema. 
Nonetheless, the deductive-nomological model has a serious limitation in the 
context of clinical practice. Many regularities in medicine are probabilistic rather than 
deterministic, and so do not enable sound deductions of the patient data from the 
diagnoses (Sadegh-Zadeh, 2012: p. 344). In the above mentioned example, the correlation 
between heart failure and leg oedema is not absolute, and it is possible to have heart 
failure without leg oedema. This suggests that the premise D → S is false and the 
deduction is not sound. Therefore, the deductive-nomological model is only applicable to 
a very limited number of cases of diagnostic explanation. 
Hempel concedes that the deductive-nomological model cannot account for cases 
of explanation that do not involve deterministic laws and introduces the latter kind of 
covering law argument, known as inductive-statistical explanation, to make up for these 
cases. According to this, to explain a phenomenon is to inductively infer it from a 
statistical generalisation about previously observed cases. Hempel uses the example of 
Jones’ recovery from a streptococcal infection being explained by his taking penicillin and 
the statistical generalisation that a high proportion of people who have streptococcal 
infections recover after taking penicillin. Applied to the example of heart failure, the 
patient’s leg oedema is explained by the fact that he or she has heart failure, along with 
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the statistical generalisation that a high proportion of people of patients with heart failure 
have leg oedema: 
 
Most observed Ps with D had S. 
x is a P with D. 
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ [makes very likely] 
x has S. 
 
The inductive-statistical model accommodates the fact that many relations between 
diagnosis and symptoms in medicine are probabilistic (Qiu, 1989: p. 203). Therefore, a 
charitable rendering of a covering law account of diagnostic explanation needs to allow 
inductive-statistical as well as deductive-nomological explanations. 
I accept that some instances of diagnostic explanation may be formulated as 
covering law arguments of the inductive-statistical kind. There is a certain feature of a 
diagnosis that permits such a formulation. Covering law explanations appeal to laws or 
regularities, which in turn depend on the presupposition of repeatable types that 
instantiate these laws or regularities. In medicine, diagnoses are often treated as such 
repeatable types (Sadler, 2005: pp. 419–420; Sadegh-Zadeh, 2012: p. 172). They are 
generalised categories, whose tokens are taken to share certain properties. For example, 
heart failure is considered to be a type characterised by the following: 
 
Heart failure is the state of any heart disease in which, despite adequate ventricular 
filling, the heart’s output is decreased or in which the heart is unable to pump 
blood at a rate adequate for satisfying the requirements of the tissues with function 




Individual cases of heart failure are tokens of this type that instantiate this feature. This 
characterisation of diagnoses as repeatable types enables them to support the kinds of 
regularity and inductive inference that feature in inductive-statistical explanations. 
 However, it has long been argued that the inductive-statistical model as it stands is 
too permissive to be a complete account of explanation. There are well-known 
counterexamples that fulfil the requirements of the inductive-statistical model, yet are not 
genuinely explanatory. One kind of counterexample concerns explanatory irrelevancies. 
Peter Achinstein (1983) gives the hypothetical case of Jones, who dies within a day of 
eating a pound of arsenic. Assume that the actual cause of Jones’ death had been an 
unrelated car accident. If this is the case, then his eating a pound of arsenic is 
explanatorily irrelevant to his dying. However, according to the inductive-statistical 
model, Jones’ death would still be explained by his eating a pound of arsenic, along with 
the statistical generalisation that a very large proportion of people who eat a pound of 
arsenic die within a day. To take another example, a significant proportion of patients 
diagnosed with left hemispheric stroke present with right-sided paralysis. Now, consider 
the case of a patient diagnosed with left hemispheric stroke, but who already has right-
sided paralysis for a different reason, such as cerebral palsy. In this case, the diagnosis of 
left hemispheric stroke is explanatorily irrelevant to the patient’s right-sided paralysis. 
Nonetheless, according to the covering law account, the patient’s right-sided paralysis 
would still be explained by his or her diagnosis of left hemispheric stroke, along with the 
statistical generalisation that a large proportion of patients diagnosed with left 
hemispheric stroke present with right-sided paralysis. 
Another kind of counterexample concerns spurious correlations. Wesley Salmon 
([1975] 1998) gives the example of a correlation between a falling barometer reading and 
a storm. Although there is a significant statistical regularity between these two event 
types, a falling barometer reading is not a legitimate explanation of a storm. Rather, both 
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have a common explanation, namely the preceding drop in atmospheric pressure. 
Applying this to a medical example, there is a statistical regularity between calf pain and 
pulmonary embolism, such that the probability of a patient having calf pain is higher if he 
or she also has pulmonary embolism than the probability of his or her having calf pain 
under any circumstance. However, in this case, the diagnosis of pulmonary embolism 
does not explain the patient’s calf pain. Rather, both the calf pain and the pulmonary 
embolism, as well as the statistical relation between the two, can be explained by the 
diagnosis of deep vein thrombosis. 
The above counterexamples show that genuine explanatory relations are 
underdetermined by covering law arguments. In the example of the patient with right-
sided paralysis, there are two possible explanations for the patient data, each supported 
by a different inductive-statistical argument. These are left hemispheric stroke and 
cerebral palsy, respectively. Here, the correct explanation cannot be determined by the 
inductive-statistical model on its own. Rather, confronted with two inductive-statistical 
arguments supporting different diagnoses, the physician has to make a choice, or an 
inference to the best explanation, based on some other criterion. Hence, the covering law 
account at best describes only a part of the relation between the actual diagnosis and the 
clinical data. 
What seems to be suggested by the above counterexamples is that a criterion that is 
required for the relation between the diagnosis and the patient data to be genuinely 
explanatory is causation. In the case of the patient with cerebral palsy, the reason why left 
hemispheric stroke does not explain his or her right-sided paralysis is because the right-
sided paralysis was caused by another condition, namely cerebral palsy. Also, in the case 
of the patient with deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, the reason why the 
former but not the latter explains his or her chest pain is because it is the former that had 
caused it. However, inductive-statistical relations are not specifically causal, and so on 
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their own cannot distinguish between diagnoses that genuinely explain the patient data 
and those that are merely correlated with the patient data. The upshot, then, is that while 
the covering law account as described above may capture a part of the relation between a 
diagnosis and the patient data, it fails to pick out specifically what it is that makes this 
relation genuinely explanatory. 
 
3.3.2 Causal explanation and actual causation 
The above considerations suggest that an adequate model of diagnostic explanation must 
take causation into account. Over the past half century, the causal model of explanation 
has attracted a large number of proponents in the philosophy of science, including 
Wesley Salmon ([1975] 1998), David Lewis (1986b), James Woodward (2003), and Peter 
Lipton (2004). The basic claim of the causal model is that to explain something is to 
provide information about its cause. This certainly has intuitive appeal with respect to 
diagnostic explanation, as it is commonly suggested that the aim of the diagnostic process 
is to search for the cause of the clinical manifestation (Whitbeck, 1981; Rizzi, 1994; 
Schwartz and Elstein, 2008). Furthermore, the model’s requirement of a causal 
connection between the explanandum and the explanans helps to avoid the over-
permissiveness of the covering law account. As noted in §3.3.1, physicians seeking 
explanations of patient data may be confronted with various factors that are correlated 
with the patient data, some of which may be causally irrelevant or spurious but 
nonetheless may satisfy the requirements for inductive-statistical explanations. Under the 
causal model of explanation, though, only those correlations which are genuinely causal 
would qualify as being explanatory. 
Against the causal model of explanation, it might be commented that we do not yet 
have a fully adequate analysis of causation. However, as argued by Lipton (2004: p. 31), 
this does not compel us to abjure the model. The notion of causation is indispensable to 
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philosophy, science, and ordinary life, and we know a lot about the relation even without 
a full metaphysical account. Hence, a causal model of explanation can appeal to the 
causal relation as it is without committing to a particular metaphysical account of 
causation. Accordingly, although I am interested in the role that causation has in 
explanation, I do not, in this chapter, say much about the large topic of the metaphysics 
of causation. 
Although the causal model of explanation is sometimes described as a reaction to 
the covering law account, some instances of causal explanation can be formulated as 
special cases of covering law explanation where the regularities appealed to are causal 
regularities, or “laws of succession” (Hempel, 1965a: p. 352). Physics and chemistry 
contain such examples. For example, one could explain why the ice cube in a glass of 
water melts by appealing more generally to the laws describing how high temperatures 
influence the hydrogen bonds between H2O molecules. As noted in §3.3.1, some 
instances of diagnostic explanation can be formulated as covering law arguments, which 
suggests that they could be considered cases of covering law explanation that appeal to 
causal, rather than merely statistical, regularities. 
Margherita Benzi (2011) notes that the causal regularities cited in covering law 
explanations hold between general types. We have already seen in §3.3.1 how a diagnosis, 
such as heart failure, is treated as a repeatable type. The covering law account also treats 
the symptom presentation as a repeatable type, such that a causal regularity is taken to 
hold between the type diagnosis “heart failure” and the type symptom “leg oedema”. In 
diagnostic explanation though, the explanandum is not a generality, but a particular fact. 
That is to say, in the case where the diagnosis of heart failure successfully explains leg 
oedema, what is being explained is not why leg oedema occurs in general at the total 
population level, but why this particular patient has leg oedema. To particularise the 
general regularity to the individual case, the covering law account treats the individual 
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case as a token of the general type to which the regularity applies. According to this 
approach, the individual case of leg oedema is explained by the diagnosis of heart failure, 
because it is a token of the type “leg oedema”, and there is a causal regularity between the 
type “heart failure” and the type “leg oedema”. 
Indeed, in many cases, the explanation of the individual as if it is a token of a 
homogeneous type would turn out to yield the correct diagnosis. If a particular type of 
condition is statistically the commonest cause of a type of symptom in the total 
population, then it follows that most individual cases of this symptom would be caused 
by this condition. However, Benzi (2011: pp. 367–368) argues that this does not capture 
all cases of diagnostic explanation. She draws on the observation by Gorovitz and 
MacIntyre (1975) that what is crucially important about individual cases in medicine is 
what is distinctive about them as particulars. Far from being tokens of a homogeneous 
type, the particular cases of a certain clinical presentation are affected by so many 
contingencies as to make each case unique. Given this uniqueness, the general causal 
regularity appealed to in a covering law argument may fail to pick out the actual causal 
relation in a given case. In other words, the likeliest cause of a clinical presentation in the 
relevant reference class may not be the actual cause of the clinical presentation in a 
particular patient. 
Consider Benzi’s (2011: p. 369) example of a patient presenting to primary care 
with a new onset of leg oedema, which in this particular case turns out to be caused by 
acute kidney disease. Also consider that this patient is also known to already have a 
longstanding history of heart failure. Under the covering law account, the leg oedema 
could be explained with appeal to a causal regularity between kidney disease and leg 
oedema. However, in the primary care population, leg oedema is more likely to be caused 
by heart failure than by kidney disease. Hence, the causal regularity between heart failure 
and leg oedema would also satisfy the requirements of a covering law explanation, despite 
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this not being the actual cause of the leg oedema for this particular patient. The upshot is 
that appealing to general causal regularities cannot discern the actual explanation from 
the spurious one in the particular case, and so fails to capture what it is that makes the 
relation between a diagnosis and a set of patient data genuinely explanatory. 
Benzi’s solution, then, is to propose that the relation between a diagnosis and the 
patient data is explanatory not in virtue of a general causal regularity, but in virtue of the 
actual cause of the patient data in the given case. That is to say, a diagnosis explains the 
patient data if it identifies the actual cause of that patient data. Hence, in the above 
mentioned example, heart failure may be a more common cause of leg oedema than 
kidney disease in the general population, but the correct explanation of leg oedema in the 
given patient is kidney disease, not heart failure, because kidney disease is the actual cause 
of the leg oedema in that particular case. 
The proponent of the covering law account might respond by suggesting that the 
relevant reference class to which the general causal regularity applies could be narrowed 
down by including the details of the contingencies emphasised by Gorovitz and 
MacIntyre (1975) in the description of the reference class. For example, the description 
of the relevant reference class would not simply be “leg oedema”, but something like “leg 
oedema, male, elderly, smoker, hypertensive, diabetic, proteinuria, raised serum 
creatinine, family history of kidney disease …”, which would strengthen the statistical 
relation between the reference class to which the patient belongs and the diagnosis of 
kidney disease. However, there are two problems with this suggestion. First, as argued by 
Nancy Cartwright (2005) and restated by Stefan Dragulinescu, (2012), a complete 
description that achieves absolute concordance between the reference class and the 
correct diagnosis may not be possible. Although we can include certain known risk 
factors in the description of a reference class, there are also many other contingencies for 
which we cannot account due to our ignorance of them (Gorovitz and MacIntyre, 1975: 
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p. 16). To paraphrase Cartwright (2005), there may be no available complete description, 
but simply individual variation. Second, even if, à la Laplace’s demon, we were able to 
specify all of the relevant contingencies and include them in a description, the sheer 
number of contingencies required to achieve absolute concordance between a reference 
class and a diagnosis would make the reference class so narrow that we can no longer 
claim that what we are appealing to in diagnostic explanations are “general causal 
regularities” rather than instances of singular causation. 
 And so, an adequate causal account of diagnostic explanation cannot be based on 
general causal regularities, but needs to appeal to the notion of actual causation in each 
individual case. As argued by Benzi (2011), the explanandum, or the patient’s clinical 
presentation, cannot be characterised as a token of a type, but as a distinctive particular. 
The explanans, or the diagnosis, explains by identifying the actual cause of the clinical 
presentation in the particular patient. This not only marks an ontological shift from 
Hempel’s (1965a) covering law account due to the commitment to actual causal 
connections rather than regularities, but also an epistemic shift due to the move away 
from the claim that explanations are necessarily arguments. 
What has been presented here is a descriptive account of what constitutes the 
explanatory relation between a diagnosis and the patient data, but it does have normative 
implications for how physicians should reason. It supports the idea, suggested by 
Dominick Rizzi (1994: p. 316), that while appeal to causal regularities is of relevance to 
the scientific understanding of what causes a condition in general, it is singular causation 
that is of relevance to the diagnostic process, where the goal is to ascertain the cause in 
the individual case. The importance of this is that one of the key functions of a diagnosis 
is to help determine the correct intervention for the given patient. Settling for the 
diagnosis of heart failure as an explanation of leg oedema on the grounds that it is 
normally the cause of leg oedema in general could have disastrous consequences for the 
83 
 
patient whose leg oedema is actually caused by a different condition. Of course, it may be 
that the precise identification of the actual cause in a given case is not immediately 
possible due to limitations of resources in the given setting, in which case the best that 
the physician can practically do may be to treat the patient as a token of a type and infer 
the most likely cause based on knowledge of causal regularities. I do not dispute that such 
reasoning may be justified, indeed likely to be successful, given the context. However, 
with respect to the epistemic status of the resulting relation between the conjectured 
diagnosis and the patient data, Benzi’s (2011) analysis suggests that this relation would 
only be genuinely explanatory if the inferred likeliest cause does indeed match the actual 
cause of the patient data in the given case. A diagnosis that cites the wrong cause of the 
patient data cannot be said to explain the patient data. 
 
3.3.3 Causes and mechanisms 
Benzi (2011) is correct to characterise medical diagnoses as causal explanations of 
symptoms based on particulars. In clinical practice, the diagnostic process is normally 
aimed at discovering the pathology that is causing a particular patient’s symptoms and 
signs. The diagnosis, which is the outcome of this process, often denotes this cause. For 
example, the diagnosis of acute appendicitis points to inflammation of the appendix as 
the cause of a patient’s abdominal pain and the diagnosis of myocardial infarction points 
to ischaemic necrosis of the heart muscle as the cause of a patient’s chest pain. 
 The above suggests that a diagnostic explanation assumes the form of a simple 
causal claim, “C causes E”, where C is the pathology picked out by the diagnosis and E is 
the patient data in need of explanation. This conforms to a variety of causal explanation 
described by David Lewis, who writes that “an explainer might give information about 
the causal history of the explanandum by saying that a certain particular event is included 
therein” (Lewis, 1986b: p. 219). Benzi (2011: pp. 369–370) appears to assume this 
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approach in some passages, such as her counterfactual analysis of a heart problem and a 
kidney problem as potential causes of a patient’s leg oedema. 
While I agree with this characterisation of a diagnosis as identifying C as the cause 
of E, I argue that its explanatory strength also depends on an understanding of how C 
produces E. In other words, knowledge of the causative pathology needs to be 
supplemented with some knowledge of the mechanisms by which this pathology causes 
the symptoms. For example, the diagnosis of heart failure may point to the failure of the 
heart to pump sufficiently to meet the body’s metabolic requirements as the cause of the 
patient’s leg oedema, but this is of limited explanatory value unless it is accompanied by 
knowledge of the mechanisms by which this failure of the heart to pump sufficiently 
produces the leg oedema. While Benzi does briefly mention mechanisms in her 
discussion, it is not made clear how they fit into the account of causal explanation 
presented. 
The role of mechanisms in explanation has recently received a lot of attention from 
philosophers of science. This is, to some degree, inspired by Wesley Salmon’s (1984) 
mechanistic conception of causation, which contrasts with the counterfactual conception 
of causation advocated by David Lewis (1986a). However, more recent philosophers are 
in disagreement over how the precise nature of a mechanism should be understood. 
Some authors take causes to be reducible to mechanisms. For example, Stuart Glennan 
(1996) argues that causal relations can be explained by mechanisms, while Machamer et al. 
(2000) suggest that the concept of “cause” is vague and can be replaced with more 
precise mechanistic concepts such as “push”, “carry”, “burn”, and so on. By contrast, 
James Woodward (2002) suggests that mechanisms are reducible to causes and can be 
analysed counterfactually. Nonetheless, despite these metaphysical disagreements, it is 
generally agreed that a mechanistic explanation for a phenomenon should include 
mention of component parts and their activities organised in such a way that they 
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produce the phenomenon. This is sufficient for my present analysis of medical 
explanation, and so the metaphysical debate regarding whether mechanisms can be 
reduced to causes or vice versa can be set aside. 
The mechanistic conception of causal explanation has had considerable success in 
the philosophy of medicine with respect to analyses of disease causation. Examples 
include the analysis of the relation between smoking and bronchial carcinoma by Russo 
and Williamson (2007), Mauro Nervi’s (2010) analysis of pathological processes, and 
Lindley Darden’s (2013) discussion of the genetic basis of cystic fibrosis. Theorists such 
as those mentioned above argue that explanations that appeal to mechanisms are 
desirable in the biomedical sciences, because they provide more detail than simple causal 
claims, offer justification for believing that a correlation is genuinely causal, inform 
predictions about outcomes, and identify targets for intervention. 
I argue that these also apply to the explanation of patient data in the clinical 
context. Knowledge of mechanisms makes the causal connection between a diagnosis 
and the patient data more intelligible. This is perhaps most obvious in the case where a 
pathological process located in one organ system produces symptoms and signs located 
in seemingly unrelated organ systems. For example, consider the case of a patient who 
presents with the recent onset of abdominal obesity, muscle weakness, and fragile skin, 
who is diagnosed with lung carcinoma. This may correctly identify the cause of the 
patient data, but it is of limited explanatory value on its own due to the apparent gap 
between cause and effect. However, the connection is more intelligible if we also know 
that a small cell lung tumour can secrete adrenocorticotropic hormone, which stimulates 
the adrenal glands to secrete cortisol, which in turn alters lipid and protein metabolism. 
Here, the presence of a plausible mechanistic story linking C and E provides justificatory 
support for the claim that C is the cause of E, thus substantiating the value of invoking C 
as a causal explanation of E. 
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Another reason this mechanistic knowledge is important is that it supports the 
prognostic and therapeutic aims of medicine. Holly Andersen argues that knowledge of 
mechanisms can “provide grounds for prediction about what would happen to a 
phenomenon of interest given specific interventions on it” (Andersen, 2010: p. 993). 
While identifying C as the cause of E may suggest that treatment ought to intervene on C 
or on somewhere along the causal chain from C to E, knowing the mechanisms by which 
C produces E allows us to isolate particular targets for intervention and, moreover, gives 
us an indication of how to intervene on these targets. This squares with the notion that 
the causal information required in an explanation is relative to our explanatory interests, 
which in clinical medicine are largely to inform prognosis, guide treatment, and 
prevention. Caroline Whitbeck, for example, argues that the diagnostic process aims for 
“whatever degree of identification is necessary to achieve the best outcome for the 
patient and to prevent the spread of disease” (Whitbeck, 1981: p. 322). For this purpose, 
it may not be enough merely to identify C as the cause of E, but we may also need to 
know further details of how C produces E. Conversely, the prognostic and therapeutic 
aims of medicine impose negative constraints on how much mechanistic detail is 
considered relevant in a causal explanation. As Mauro Nervi notes, refining a mechanistic 
account too much may yield “elementary biochemical events of little or no interest to the 
researcher” (Nervi, 2010: p. 227). Hence, details that do not aid prediction or 
intervention in any relevant way may be considered superfluous to the explanation. 
The above considerations highlight the importance of mechanistic knowledge in 
the clinical context of diagnosis. While Benzi (2011) is correct that the contribution of 
the diagnosis is to identify the actual cause of the patient data, further knowledge of the 
mechanisms linking this identified cause and the patient data is usually needed for this to 
be of explanatory value. In the following section, I examine more closely the sources of 
this mechanistic knowledge. 
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3.3.4 Mechanisms in a theoretical framework 
So far, I have argued that a diagnosis explains by identifying pathology C as the cause of 
the patient data E, but the explanatory value of “C causes E” also depends on 
understanding the mechanisms by which C produces E. This raises the question of 
whence this mechanistic knowledge comes. The account of actual causation presented in 
§3.3.2 would suggest that it is not explicitly contained in the diagnosis itself, which just 
identifies and denotes the causative pathology C. For example, the diagnosis of heart 
failure explicitly refers to the failure of the heart to pump sufficiently to meet the body’s 
metabolic requirements, but this description by itself does not provide information about 
the mechanisms by which leg oedema is produced. Therefore, in such a case, the 
knowledge of mechanisms must come from sources beyond what is explicitly contained 
in the diagnosis itself. I suggest that it comes from the broader theoretical framework in 
which the physician operates. 
Jeremy Simon (2008) presents a way of thinking about disease ontology that fits 
well with this idea. He argues that a model of a disease consists of an explicit description 
and an implicit addition. The explicit description is the specification of the intrinsic 
structure of an essential pathological feature. The implicit addition is relational, namely 
the assumption that this pathological feature is “embedded in an otherwise unspecified 
living human being, or, more precisely, in an abstract system representing the general 
physiological features of a living human being” (Simon, 2008: p. 360). For instance, he 
suggests that cystic fibrosis is defined, in essence, by an abnormal cystic fibrosis 
transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) ion transport system, but there is the 
implicit assumption that this abnormal CFTR ion transport system occurs within and 
influencing a broader physiological system. As noted by Simon, “[a] cell cannot have 
cystic fibrosis by itself” (Simon, 2008: p. 364). Although Simon’s account is presented as 
a metaphysical analysis of the ontological structures of diseases rather than an account of 
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causal explanation in medicine, it does have an important epistemic implication, namely 
that knowledge of diseases is embedded within a broader theoretical framework of 
pathophysiological principles. 
A useful way to think about the structure of this theoretical framework is provided 
by Kenneth Schaffner (1986). Drawing on Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) notion that scientific 
practices take place in the context of a disciplinary matrix, Schaffner suggests that 
physicians have at their disposal a matrix of theoretical knowledge consisting of a “series 
of overlapping interlevel temporal models” (Schaffner, 1986: p. 68). He writes: 
 
Clinicians bring to the examination of individual patients a repository of 
classificatory or nosological generalizations, as well as a grounding in the basic 
sciences of biochemistry, histology, physiology, and the pathological variants of the 
‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ processes. A theory in pathology can be construed as a family 
of models, each with ‘something wrong’ with the ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ processes. 
(Schaffner, 1986: p. 71) 
 
Schaffner suggests that the pathophysiological mechanisms in individual cases can be 
understood through application of the theoretical knowledge of the processes 
represented by these models. He argues that this does not involve the subsumption under 
universal laws as per Hempel’s (1965a) covering law account of explanation, but a sort of 
qualitative comparison which he calls “analogical extension of biological knowledge” (Schaffner, 
1986: p. 68). The reason for this is the variability between individuals. As noted in §3.3.2, 
individual patients are not tokens of a homogeneous type, but are unique particulars 
whose histories are influenced by various contingencies. Given this variability, Schaffner 




Such a set of overlapping or ‘smeared out’ models is then juxtaposed, often in a 
fairly loose way, with an overlapping or ‘smeared out’ set of patient exemplars. This 
dual ‘smearedness’ – one being in the basic biological models and the other in the 
patient population – typically requires that the clinician work extensively with 
analogical reasoning and with qualitative and at best comparative connecting 
pathophysiological principles. (Schaffner, 1986: p. 71) 
 
In other words, the pathophysiological mechanisms represented by the theoretical 
models at best map partially onto the processes going on in individual cases. 
However, Schaffner’s account is presented as a general account of how theoretical 
knowledge is applied to cases in the biomedical sciences, not specifically an account of 
the explanatory functions served by diagnoses. As such, he does not explicitly make clear 
the particular role that making a diagnosis has in relation to the theoretical knowledge 
represented by the above mentioned models. We are not told, for instance, whether he 
conceives a given diagnosis, such as heart failure, as corresponding to a particular model, 
a particular node or region in a model, or a process involving multiple models. 
When viewed in light of my above analysis of the respective contributions of causal 
claims and mechanistic causal knowledge, though, the relation between a clinical 
diagnosis and Schaffner’s matrix of theoretical knowledge is made clear. The contribution 
of the diagnosis is the identification of the actual cause C of the patient data E, such as 
the diagnosis of heart failure identifying the failure of the heart to pump sufficiently as 
the cause of the patient’s leg oedema. While this description of C does not explicitly 
contain information about the mechanisms by which leg oedema is produced, it is 
nonetheless implicitly contextualised within a broader matrix of theoretical knowledge 
consisting of overlapping models of pathophysiological mechanisms. The contribution of 
this matrix of theoretical knowledge, then, is to provide the background understanding of 
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the mechanisms that make the link between C and E intelligible. The upshot, then, is that 
the diagnosis explicitly identifies a pathology whose causal connection with the patient 
data is made intelligible in virtue of its being contextualised within a theoretical 
framework of mechanistic models. 
It is worth mentioning three additional points to further clarify the relation 
between a diagnosis and the theoretical models of pathophysiological mechanisms. First, 
the mechanisms linking a given diagnosis and the patient data may cross a number of 
these overlapping models. It is usually the case that a disease has sequelae that affect 
multiple organ systems and span multiple levels. For example, while cystic fibrosis is, in 
essence, an abnormality of the CFTR ion transport system at the molecular level, it 
produces histological abnormalities of the mucosal epithelium, which in turn result in 
anatomical and physiological abnormalities of the gastrointestinal, respiratory, and 
reproductive systems (Simon, 2008; Darden, 2013). Understanding these mechanisms, 
then, often requires us to invoke models at different levels and of different organ 
systems. In the case of cystic fibrosis, we need to invoke models of ion transport across 
the cell membrane, mucous stasis in the airways and pancreatic ducts, chronic 
inflammation, and so forth. 
Second, Schaffner describes the theoretical models each as representing 
“‘something wrong’ with the ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ processes” (Schaffner, 1986: p. 71), but 
I suggest that this is not the only way of characterising pathophysiological mechanisms. A 
recent analysis by Mauro Nervi (2010) suggests that the theoretical understanding of how 
C and E are linked can consist of knowledge about mechanism malfunction, knowledge 
about pathological mechanisms, or a combination of both. The mechanism malfunction 
conception involves laying out the details of a normal physiological mechanism and 
depicting the pathology as an impairment of this normal mechanism. This conception 
aligns with the theoretical knowledge of “pathological variants of the ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ 
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processes” described by Schaffner (1986: p. 71). For example, the mechanism of a 
cardiovascular problem can be explicated by laying out the physiological sequence of 
events that normally occur in a healthy circulatory system and showing how this sequence 
is interrupted (Nervi, 2010: p. 217). By contrast, the pathological mechanisms conception 
lays out the details of the pathological sequence of events without explicit reference to 
normal physiology. Although background knowledge of normal physiology is 
presupposed, the emphasis is on the progression of pathological processes. For example, 
the mechanism of diabetes insipidus can be characterised as decreased production of or 
sensitivity to antidiuretic hormone, lack of permeability of cells of the distal nephron, 
polyuria, dehydration, hypovolaemic shock, and cardiac arrest (Nervi, 2010: p. 219). 
Third, while I think Schaffner (1986) is correct to claim that the theoretical models 
of pathophysiological mechanisms only partially fit the goings on in actual cases because 
of the variability across individuals, I argue that the diagnosis itself can still be considered 
a repeatable type as suggested in §3.3.1. This is because it is often, though by no means 
always, the case that a diagnosis is explicitly defined by some essential feature that is 
necessary for a case to qualify as an instance of that diagnosis. As such, every case of that 
diagnosis must instantiate that feature. A previously mentioned example from Simon is 
that of cystic fibrosis, which is explicitly defined by the essential feature of an abnormal 
CFTR ion transport system, such that “regardless of the reason a patient had problems 
with the CFTR pump system we would consider him to have cystic fibrosis” (Simon, 
2008: p. 361) and that a person who does not have an abnormal CFTR does not, by 
definition, have cystic fibrosis. Similarly, heart failure is defined by the essential feature of 
the failure of the heart to pump blood at a rate adequate for satisfying the requirements 
of the tissues, such that only and all patients with heart failure instantiate this feature, 
despite any variability with respect to their symptoms, signs, and other physiological 
parameters. Hence, while different cases may deviate from the theoretical models of 
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pathophysiological mechanisms in varying respects and to different degrees, some 
diagnoses qua generalised categories can be taken to pick out certain repeatable processes 
embedded within the theoretical framework that are conserved across cases. 
To put some of the above considerations into context, let us look at a mechanistic 
account of how heart failure produces leg oedema from Davidson’s Principles and Practice of 
Medicine: 
 
In patients without valvular disease, the primary abnormality is impairment of 
ventricular function leading to a fall in cardiac output. This activates neurohumoral 
mechanisms that in normal physiological circumstances would support cardiac 
function, but in the setting of impaired ventricular function can lead to a 
deleterious increase in both afterload and preload. … Stimulation of the renin-
angiotensin-aldosterone system leads to vasoconstriction, salt and water retention, 
and sympathetic nervous system activation. This is mediated by angiotensin II, a 
potent constrictor of arterioles in both the kidney and the systemic circulation. … 
Salt and water retention is promoted by the release of aldosterone, endothelin-1 (a 
potent vasoconstrictor peptide with marked effects on the renal vasculature) and, 
in severe heart failure, antidiuretic hormone (ADH). … The onset of pulmonary 
and peripheral oedema is due to high atrial pressures compounded by salt and 
water retention caused by impaired renal perfusion and secondary 
hyperaldosteronism. (Newby et al., 2010: p. 544) 
 
The above account demonstrates some of the above mentioned features of how 
theoretical models of pathophysiological mechanisms relate to a diagnosis. First, it 
describes mechanisms occurring in different organ systems and at different levels, 
including haemodynamic mechanisms concerning the regulation of blood pressure and 
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cardiac output, hormonal mechanisms concerning the stimulation and actions of the 
renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system, renal mechanisms of salt and water reabsorption, 
and the hydrostatic mechanisms of oedema formation. This supports the claim that while 
a diagnosis may explicitly refer to a pathological process in a particular organ system, 
understanding the mechanisms by which this produces the patient data may require us to 
invoke models of several other systems. 
Second, in keeping with Nervi’s (2010) discussion of the different ways 
mechanisms can be characterised in medicine, this account includes both information 
about mechanism malfunction and information about pathological mechanisms. Parts of 
it characterise the leg oedema resulting from heart failure as being due to interruptions of 
normal physiological mechanisms, including the impairment of ventricular function. 
Other parts of it detail the progression of pathological processes leading from heart 
failure to leg oedema, including stimulation of the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system, 
salt and water retention, vasoconstriction, and raised atrial pressure. 
Third, in keeping with the notion presented in §3.3.3 that knowledge of 
mechanisms is useful for the therapeutic aims of clinical medicine, the above account of 
heart failure identifies potential targets for treatment interventions. For example, 
stimulation of the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system can be targeted by angiotensin-
converting-enzyme inhibitors, sympathetic nervous system activation can be targeted by 
β-adrenoceptor antagonists, and salt and water retention can be targeted by loop 
diuretics. And so, while the diagnosis of heart failure tells us what is causing the patient’s 
leg oedema, the importance of the theoretical understanding of the mechanisms by which 





This chapter has sought to clarify how diagnoses in clinical medicine provide 
explanations of patient data. I have argued that the covering law account is inadequate as 
a general account of diagnostic explanation, even if the general regularities appealed to 
are causal regularities, and endorsed Benzi’s (2011) proposal that diagnostic explanation 
needs to be conceived of as the explanation of particulars based on the notion of actual 
causation. That is to say, a diagnosis identifies pathology C as the actual cause of the 
patient data E in the particular case. However, this simple causal claim is of limited 
explanatory value without some understanding of the mechanisms by which C produces 
E. Drawing on and bringing together Simon’s (2008) work on disease ontology and 
Schaffner’s (1986) work on analogical reasoning from theoretical models, I argued that 
this mechanistic knowledge is not always explicitly contained in the diagnosis itself, but 
comes from the broader theoretical framework within which the causal knowledge 
provided by the diagnosis is implicitly embedded. 
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4. The Semantics of Diagnostic Terms* 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Throughout Chapter 3, I showed that diagnoses in medicine are often invoked to explain 
patients’ symptoms, and that they normally do so by indicating the causative pathologies 
responsible for producing the symptoms. In this current chapter, I return to the 
conceptual problem, introduced in Chapter 1, regarding whether diagnoses in psychiatry 
can also serve such explanatory roles. As previously noted, the language used in some 
clinical texts suggests that they do. However, this seems to be in tension with the latest 
editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), in which 
psychiatric diagnoses are defined by the clusters of symptoms themselves. Given that 
causes are distinct from their effects, it is a minimum requirement of a causal explanation 
that the explanans refers to something other than the explanandum. Hence, the fact that 
psychiatric diagnoses are defined in terms of their symptoms seems to suggest that they 
cannot legitimately be invoked as causal explanations of their symptoms in the ways that 
many medical diagnoses can. 
This chapter explores how theories of reference in the philosophy of language can 
help to resolve the tension between the uses of psychiatric diagnoses in clinical discourse 
and their definitions in the DSM. The general aim is to show that descriptive definitions 
of diagnostic terms based on symptoms do not necessarily preclude these terms from 
referring to the causal profiles underlying these symptoms. In §4.2, I revisit the two kinds 
of talk regarding psychiatric diagnoses. I consider Jennifer Radden’s (2003) distinction 
                                                          
 
 
* A version of this chapter has been published as: Maung, H. H. (2016c). “To What Do 
Psychiatric Diagnoses Refer? A Two-Dimensional Semantic Analysis of Diagnostic Terms”. 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 55: 1–10. 
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between descriptive and causal conceptions of diagnostic terms, and then examine the 
idea, endorsed by Carl Hempel (1965b) and Paul Thagard (1999), that the increasing 
scientific understanding of a disease involves a progressive change from the former to the 
latter conceptions. I discuss the worry that such a conceptual change implies semantic 
incommensurability between older and newer conceptions of a diagnostic term. 
In §4.3, I consider the causal theory of reference, developed by Saul Kripke ([1972] 
1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975a), as a more reasonable account of diagnostic terms that 
avoids the implication of semantic incommensurability. This also includes a discussion of 
Neil Williams’ (2011a) analysis of Putnam’s (1975b) disease kind essentialism and some 
required modifications to this model. Despite its merits, I argue that something more 
than the traditional causal theory of reference is required for an adequate analysis of 
diagnostic terms in psychiatry, on the grounds that the traditional causal theory of 
reference relegates the DSM diagnostic criteria to mere contingent features of the 
disorders rather than necessary conditions for applying the diagnoses. 
In §4.4, I put forward a solution based on the framework of two-dimensional 
semantics, as developed by Robert Stalnaker (1978), David Chalmers (1996, 2010), and 
Frank Jackson (1998), which allows the causal analyses of diagnostic terms in psychiatry, 
while taking seriously their descriptive definitions in the DSM. This framework provides 
one possible way of characterising the semantics of diagnostic terms that is able to 
accommodate the two different ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are used. However, 
as I concede in §4.5 and discuss in depth in the following chapters, whether psychiatric 
diagnoses actually do provide satisfactory causal explanations of individual patients’ 
symptoms is also dependent on empirical facts regarding whether there actually are 
sufficiently stable causal structures associated with the diagnostic categories. Hence, the 
claims I make about psychiatric diagnoses in this chapter are to be taken as linguistic 
claims about how certain expressions, namely diagnostic terms in psychiatry, operate. I 
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reserve ontological claims about the natures of the kinds denoted by these terms for 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.2. Descriptive and causal conceptions of diagnostic terms 
4.2.1 Two kinds of talk 
As we saw in Chapter 1, there are two kinds of talk going on regarding psychiatric 
diagnoses. Some clinical textbooks and health information resources use psychiatric 
diagnoses as if they refer to the underlying conditions that cause sets of symptoms. 
Further to the examples previously provided in §1.1.1, this kind of talk is somewhat 
prevalent in study guides and textbooks aimed at trainee psychiatrists, especially in the 
sections on differential diagnoses where psychiatric diagnoses are considered alongside 
medical diagnoses as referring to potential causes of syndromes: 
 
There is no doubt that this is a psychotic illness, but what is the cause? … [I]f the 
illness had a more insidious onset (days or weeks) then paranoid schizophrenia 
would be a likely candidate. (Green, 2009: p. 88, italics added) 
 
Depression and anxiety cause tiredness as do some somatization disorders. … 
Anaemia, liver failure, coeliac disease, cancer, Parkinson’s, alcohol overdose and 
rare disorders such as myasthenia gravis and motor neurone disease can also cause 
tiredness. (Wright et al., 2010: p. 152, italics added) 
 
[T]he symptoms of poor concentration and impaired memory may be due to 





Similarly, A Guide to Psychiatric Examination lists schizophrenia, mania, and depression 
alongside dementia and medical conditions as “common causes of psychoses” (Aquilina 
and Warner, 2004: p. 79), while Psychiatry: A Clinical Handbook lists schizophrenia, 
schizotypal disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and other psychiatric diagnoses as “causes 
of psychosis” (Azam et al., 2016: p. 44). These passages suggest that psychiatrists from 
early in their training are encouraged to think about diagnoses in psychiatry as being 
analogous to diagnoses in bodily medicine. 
However, this contrasts with the formal definitions of psychiatric diagnoses. 
According to the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-5, which is the dominant 
classification system in psychiatry in use today, psychiatric diagnoses are defined through 
their symptoms, as demonstrated by the passages previously quoted in §1.1.2. For 
example, it is stated that the presence of one or more delusions is the “essential feature” 
of delusional disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 92) and that panic 
disorder “refers to” unexpected panic attacks (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 
209). These definitions suggest that the meanings of psychiatric diagnoses are not 
determined by the underlying causes of symptoms, but by the clusters of symptoms 
themselves. 
From a sociological perspective, this conceptual unclarity is not entirely surprising. 
As argued by the feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger (2006), a term can express 
different concepts to fulfil different ideological functions in different contexts. For 
instance, Haslanger observes that “parent” is often defined as “immediate progenitor”, 
but used in some contexts to mean “primary caregiver”. She respectively terms these the 
manifest concept and the operative concept, and suggests that the divergences between 
the two can help reveal the ideological function of a term, as well as open up the manifest 
concept to normative critique. As I argued in Chapter 2, diagnoses typically serve a 
variety of epistemic, instrumental, and semiotic functions, including explaining 
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symptoms, guiding therapeutic interventions, mobilising resources, and legitimising 
sickness. The divergences between the definitions and uses of psychiatric diagnoses, then, 
might reflect the expectations for a diagnosis to function both as a label for certain kinds 
of behaviour and as a scientific explanation of certain distressing symptoms. 
However, from an epistemological standpoint, I argue that the conceptual unclarity 
regarding diagnostic terms is problematic. First, in the case of psychiatric diagnoses, the 
two kinds of talk are in tension. At least since David Hume’s ([1748] 2000) analysis of 
causation, it has generally been accepted in philosophy that causes are distinct from their 
effects. For example, David Lewis proposes that causation is to be analysed “in terms of 
counterfactual dependence between distinct events” (Lewis, 1986a: p. 191). Similarly, 
Marshall Swain states that for c to be called the cause of e, “then c and e must be distinct” 
(Swain, 1980: p. 155). This suggests that while it is possible, indeed common, for 
someone to be both the immediate progenitor and the primary caregiver of a child, a set 
of symptoms cannot be its own cause. Therefore, if psychiatric diagnoses are defined by 
clusters of symptoms as suggested by the DSM-5 definitions, then this seems to suggest 
that they cannot refer to the causes of these symptoms. 
Second, although it is certainly the case that terms can express different things in 
different contexts, the two kinds of talk regarding psychiatric diagnoses often occur 
within the same context. The term “parent” can be taken to mean “immediate 
progenitor” or “primary caregiver”, depending on whether one is defining the term in a 
biological context or whether one is a teacher writing parents’ evening invitations, but the 
same psychiatrist who uses a diagnosis to pick out a set of symptoms may also invoke it 
as a causal explanation of the symptoms within the same clinical encounter. These 





4.2.2 Ontological descriptivism 
A useful approach to characterising the different uses of diagnostic terms in psychiatry is 
provided by Jennifer Radden in “Is This Dame Melancholy? Equating today’s Depression 
and Past Melancholia” (2003). Radden proposes that there are descriptive and causal 
conceptions of disorders. A descriptive conception provides a definition of a disorder 
that consists of a description of its symptoms, without mention of the causal structure 
underlying these symptoms. As noted earlier, this is the approach used by the most recent 
editions of the DSM to define psychiatric diagnoses. Descriptive conceptions of disorders 
also occasionally feature in bodily medicine, particularly in what are called syndromic 
definitions of disorders. For example, as noted in Chapter 2, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention define chronic fatigue syndrome exclusively through its 
symptoms (Fukuda et al., 1994). Another example is chronic bronchitis, whose definition 
includes “cough and sputum expectoration occurring on most days for at least 3 months 
of the year and for at least 2 consecutive years” (Braman, 2006: p. S104). 
In contrast to a descriptive conception, a causal conception does not define a 
disorder through its symptoms, but in terms of the causal structure that normally 
produces these symptoms. Causal conceptions of disorders are very commonly used in 
bodily medicine. For example, as noted in Chapter 3, heart failure is not defined as the 
conjunction of shortness of breath, leg oedema, and other symptoms, but as the 
underlying state wherein “the heart’s output is decreased or in which the heart is unable 
to pump blood at a rate adequate for satisfying the requirements of the tissues” (Denolin 
et al., 1983: p. 445). Similarly, acute appendicitis is not defined as the conjunction of right-
sided abdominal pain and other symptoms, but as acute inflammation of the appendix. 
As noted earlier, some clinical textbooks and health information resources seem to 
assume causal conceptions of psychiatric disorders. 
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 Radden relates descriptive conceptions of disorders to a view she calls ontological 
descriptivism, according to which diagnostic terms refer solely to observable clusters of 
symptoms and not to any underlying causal structures. According to this view, the 
diagnostic term “major depressive disorder” refers to the conjunction of the patient’s low 
mood, loss of interest, and other associated symptoms. This is not to say that this 
conjunction of symptoms does not have a cause, but merely that the term “major 
depressive disorder” does not refer to any causes. Under ontological descriptivism, then, 
clinical textbooks and health information resources are wrong when they cite psychiatric 
diagnoses as referring to the causes of certain symptoms. Rather, psychiatric diagnoses 
refer to the symptoms themselves. 
 Assuming ontological descriptivism regarding psychiatric diagnoses has important 
implications. As Radden acknowledges, it suggests that psychiatric diagnoses describe, 
but do not explain, symptoms: 
 
Although not without predictive power, an account that is descriptive is not, as 
such, explanatory. It merely describes. In spite of the commonplace and seemingly 
irresistible tendency to see explanatory advantage in the assertion that the 
symptoms of depression are caused by depression, if we accept descriptivism, there 
is none. (Radden, 2003: p. 46). 
 
This recalls Thomas Szasz’s (1960) argument that psychiatrists are wrong to invoke 
mental illnesses as causal explanations of certain behaviours because they are only 
shorthand descriptions of these behaviours. Radden also argues that ontological 
descriptivism precludes cross-historical and cross-cultural equations of certain disorders, 
such as that of today’s depression and past melancholia, and of Western depression and 
Chinese depression. I return to this point in §4.2.4 in the context of incommensurability. 
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Further to the above points made by Radden, I argue that assuming ontological 
descriptivism has implications for how it is that symptoms constitute evidence in support 
of a diagnostic hypothesis. With a causal conception of a disorder, such as the term 
“acute appendicitis” being used to refer to acute inflammation of the appendix, the 
patient’s symptoms of right-sided abdominal pain and fever support the diagnosis insofar 
as they constitute empirical data that can be explained by acute inflammation of the 
appendix. In this case, the diagnosis of acute appendicitis is an inference to the best 
explanation about what disease is causing the symptoms. By contrast, with a descriptive 
conception of a disorder, such as the term “major depressive disorder” being used to 
refer to the conjunction of low mood, loss of interest, and other associated symptoms, 
the presence of this symptom cluster in a patient supports the diagnosis insofar as it 
makes it true by definition. In this case, the diagnosis of major depressive disorder is 
deductively entailed by the fulfilment of the symptom criteria. This has particular 
relevance to process of differential diagnosis, where the clinician assesses the available 
clinical data to select the most appropriate diagnosis from a list of possible diagnoses. 
With a causal conception this is the case of evaluating which disease best explains the 
data, while with a descriptive conception it is the case of which definition is fulfilled by 
the data. Hence, whether we assume a descriptive conception or a causal conception of a 
disorder has epistemic consequences for clinical practice. 
 
4.2.3 Conceptual change 
The notion that there can be descriptive and causal conceptions of disorders is further 
complicated by a historical dimension. It has been suggested that the historical 
development of a diagnostic term involves a progressive change from descriptive to 
causal conceptions. Carl Hempel (1965b) proposes that a scientific discipline proceeds 
from an early observational stage, when the aim is to describe the phenomena being 
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studied, to later theoretical stages, when the aim is to explain the phenomena with appeal 
to general laws and theories. He argues that the classification of psychiatric disorders will 
follow this trend from descriptive to progressively more theoretical language. 
Similarly, Paul Thagard (1999: pp. 118–134) proposes that disease understanding 
progresses from an early descriptive to later theoretical stages. He describes four stages of 
disease understanding, which are disease characterisation, cause specification, 
experimentation, and mechanism elaboration. Disease characterisation involves clustering 
together a set of associated symptoms and differentiating this cluster from the symptoms 
of other diseases, such as when the associated symptoms of weakness, swollen limbs, and 
bleeding gums in sailors were grouped together and characterised as the syndrome of 
scurvy. Cause specification involves observing factors that correlate with the disease and 
postulating them as possible aetiologies. In the case of scurvy, damp conditions, salted 
meat, and nutritional deficiency were observed to correlate with the syndrome, and so 
were postulated as possible causes. Experimentation involves the gathering of empirical 
evidence to support a causal hypothesis and disconfirm others, such as the experiments 
on animals that showed associations between nutrition and symptoms of scurvy. The 
final stage is the elaboration of the mechanisms linking the aetiology of the disease to its 
manifestations, such as the discovery that ascorbic acid deficiency leads to defective 
collagen synthesis, which produces the symptoms of scurvy. 
It is also worth noting that diagnostic terms can undergo other sorts of conceptual 
change in addition to the sort proposed by Hempel and Thagard. For example, there may 
be a change in the descriptive definition of the disorder, such as when the symptom 
criteria for schizophrenia were modified between the publications of DSM-IV (1994) to 
DSM-5 (2013). There may also be a change from one causal conception to another, such 
as when Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease went from being considered a disease caused by slow 
viruses to a disease caused by prions. 
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The image of disease understanding proposed so far suggests that diagnostic terms 
undergo conceptual changes throughout their histories. According to Hempel and 
Thagard, a diagnostic term normally begins as a descriptive concept that refers to a set of 
associated symptoms, or a syndrome. As the aetiology and mechanisms underlying these 
symptoms are discovered, it becomes a concept that refers to what normally causes these 
symptoms. This suggests that psychiatric diagnoses do not currently refer to the causes of 
their symptoms, but that there is hope that they will in the future, as our theoretical 
understanding of the disorders increases. 
 
4.2.4 Semantic incommensurability 
The move from descriptive to causal conceptions of diseases is largely positive, as it 
allows greater explanatory power, more accurate prediction, improved prevention, and 
the development of targeted treatments. However, this conceptual change further 
complicates the question of what states of affair diagnostic terms denote. As shown by 
the scurvy example, a diagnostic term can refer to a conjunction of symptoms at one time 
and refer to the condition that normally causes these symptoms at a later time. 
There is disagreement among philosophers over whether this conceptual change is 
harmless or whether it amounts to a more serious problem of semantic 
incommensurability. Thagard (1999) acknowledges that conceptual change does occur 
with changes in disease understanding, but presents this as being largely unproblematic. 
However, there are philosophers who propose that this kind of conceptual change 
implies radical incommensurability between the old and new concepts. Notably, Paul 
Feyerabend (1962) and Thomas Kuhn (1962, 2000) suggest that the gap of meaning 
between old and new conceptions of a term amounts to linguistic instability, thus 




Kuhn’s discussion of incommensurability first appears in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962), where he argues that scientific change follows a cyclical pattern of 
problem solving in normal science, accumulation of anomalies leading to a crisis, 
revolutionary replacement of the old paradigm with a new paradigm, a new phase of 
normal science, and so on. He initially presents incommensurability as quite a general 
notion which he defends on perceptual, social, and linguistic grounds. Central to this 
notion of incommensurability is the psychological claim that perception and observation 
are theory-laden. That is to say, because the observation of data is inevitably influenced 
by the paradigm within which one is operating, there is no common neutral standard with 
which one can evaluate hypotheses from different paradigms against each other. In his 
later thinking, Kuhn (2000) expands more specifically on the linguistic aspect of 
incommensurability, whereby the above scientific change is marked by untranslatability 
between the old and new uses of a term (Bird, 2002). 
In the same year as Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a version of the 
incommensurability problem is presented by Feyerabend in “Explanation, Reduction and 
Empiricism” (1962). According to Feyerabend, the meanings of scientific terms are 
bestowed by the theories to which they respectively belong. Therefore, when there are 
theoretical changes, there are also corresponding changes in the meanings of these terms. 
For example, he notes that the meanings of the terms “temperature” and “entropy” 
changed when phenomenological thermodynamics was replaced by kinetic theory, and 
that the meanings of “mass”, “length”, and “time” changed when classical mechanics was 
replaced by relativistic mechanics. 
Although the problem of semantic incommensurability is perhaps most commonly 
associated with Feyerabend and Kuhn, it be traced back even further. Its application to 
medicine goes at least as far back as Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific 
Fact ([1935] 1979). Using the example of syphilis, Fleck argues that new concepts of a 
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disease are not adequate substitutes for the old concepts. Throughout its history, 
“syphilis” had been defined as a disease that is treated by mercury, a set of characteristic 
symptoms, and then finally as Treponema pallidum infection. These different concepts have 
different extensions, and so cannot be equated. For example, “a disease that is treated by 
mercury” excludes treatment-resistant cases of T. pallidum infection and “a set of 
characteristic symptoms” excludes asymptomatic cases. 
 Radden (2003) reaches a similar formulation in her cross-historical comparison of 
pre-nineteenth century melancholia and today’s depression. Here, the comparison is 
between two descriptive conceptions of what is often assumed to be the same disorder, 
as the terms “melancholia” and “depression” are often thought to refer to the same 
thing. However, Radden argues that they cannot be equated. First, there are differences 
between the symptom profiles of melancholia and depression, which suggests that the 
two are not coextensive. For instance, Radden observes that some cases of modern 
schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder would also qualify as cases of 
melancholia. Second, if ontological descriptivism is assumed and the term “depression” 
refers exclusively to a set of symptoms, then depression and melancholia cannot be 
equated on causal grounds, because causal factors are not part of the meaning of the term 
“depression”. 
Semantic incommensurability challenges the intuition that there is continuity 
between the past and present concepts of a disease. As previously noted, the term 
“syphilis” had been defined as a certain set of characteristic symptoms before it was later 
defined as T. pallidum infection. If, after the discovery of T. pallidum, it turns out that 
some of the previous cases diagnosed as syphilis on the basis of their symptoms were not 
caused by T. pallidum, then there is an intuition that such cases were false positives and 
that it turned out that they were not actually cases of syphilis. We might say that the 
physicians who identified such cases as syphilis turned out to be wrong. However, the 
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incommensurability problem suggests that we could not claim that they were wrong, 
because they were using a different meaning of “syphilis”. With respect to their meaning 
of “syphilis”, they were right. 
This is untenable, because it seems to suggest that empirical discoveries in medical 
science do not actually increase our understanding of individual diseases. Joseph LaPorte 
(2004: p. 114) notes that what appears to be an increase in understanding of a term is 
actually a case of changing its meaning, so that it refers to a different state of affairs. 
Before the discovery of T. pallidum, “syphilis” used to refer to a set of characteristic 
symptoms. After the discovery of T. pallidum, it referred to T. pallidum infection. Let us 
call these concepts SYPHILIS-1 and SYPHILIS-2, respectively. Rather than resulting in 
an increase in the understanding of SYPHILIS-1, the discovery of T. pallidum resulted in 
“syphilis” being displaced from SYPHILIS-1 and attached instead onto SYPHILIS-2. 
Similarly, Howard Sankey (2009: p. 198) notes that if a later concept does not refer to the 
same phenomenon to which an earlier concept had referred, then the conceptual change 
does not constitute an increase in knowledge about the phenomenon to which the earlier 
concept had referred. 
The implication of incommensurability would not only make cross-historical 
comparisons of disorders problematic, but also cross-cultural comparisons. As noted by 
Radden (2003: p. 44), it is often reported that people with depression in China present 
with different symptoms from people with depression in the West. In particular, Chinese 
depression is said to present predominantly with somatic symptoms such as back pain 
and headache, rather than mood symptoms. Radden even notes that in some cases, there 
is no apparent commonality between the symptoms of Chinese and Western depression. 
Again, she argues that if descriptivism is assumed and “depression” is defined exclusively 
through its symptoms, then Chinese and Western depression cannot be equated because 
of this lack of commonality between their symptom profiles. 
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4.3 The causal theory of reference 
4.3.1 A solution to incommensurability 
In contemporary discussions (LaPorte, 2004; Sankey, 2009), semantic incommensurability 
is normally presented as being a problem for analyses of conceptual change that presume 
the descriptive theory of reference. The descriptive theory of reference, as advocated by 
Gottlob Frege ([1892] 1952) and Bertrand Russell (1905), states that the sense, or 
intension, of a term consists of a description. The reference, or extension, of the term is 
what satisfies this description. However, as disease understanding changes, so does the 
description associated with a diagnostic term. Under the descriptive theory, this change in 
description amounts to a change in reference, as is suggested by the above case of syphilis 
where the old and new descriptions are not coextensive. 
 The problem of semantic incommensurability has attracted different responses. 
Some have responded by suggesting that the descriptive theory of reference can still be 
preserved by narrowing down the theory dependence of terms. Alexander Bird (2000, 
2004) and Stefan Dragulinescu (2011) make the distinction between thick intensionalism 
and thin intensionalism. According to thick intensionalism, the term’s intension is highly 
dependent on the contents of theory to which it belongs, such that it includes a wide 
range of theoretical conditions and descriptions. According to thin intensionalism, the 
term’s intension is much narrower, such that only some theoretical conditions and 
descriptions are included in it. Dragulinescu (2011: pp. 252–253) argues that under thick 
intensionalism, where the term’s intension includes many theoretical conditions, 
theoretical change would be likely to result in a change in reference. Moreover, Bird 
(2000: p. 174) argues that if a scientific realist position is assumed, then thick 
intensionalism increases the chance of the term having no extension, because it is likely 
for at least some part of a sophisticated theory not to be true. Thin intensionalism, by 
contrast, is less likely to be significantly affected by incommensurability, because a narrow 
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intension that includes fewer theoretical conditions and descriptions confers enough 
stability of reference across theoretical change. However, while the above strategy may 
work for comparisons of terms across changes in the underlying theories, it is unclear 
whether it is applicable to cases such as Radden’s (2003) cross-cultural comparison of 
Chinese depression and Western depression, or the cross-historical comparison between 
DSM-IV schizophrenia and DSM-5 schizophrenia, where the differences in the 
intensions are not due to differences in the underlying theories, but differences in the 
explicit symptom-based descriptions. 
Another highly influential response to semantic incommensurability is the causal 
theory of reference, developed by Saul Kripke ([1972] 1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975a). 
This altogether denies that reference is determined by a description, and instead states 
that it is determined by the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and its causal 
relation with the speaker. Kripke describes the processes of reference fixing and 
reference borrowing. Reference fixing involves the initial ostensive dubbing of a 
paradigmatic sample of the phenomenon by a speaker or group of speakers, such as the 
disease associated with neurodegeneration and progressive dementia being dubbed 
“Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease” in the 1920s (Thagard, 1999: p. 123). Reference borrowing 
involves the transmission of the dubbed term between speakers in the linguistic 
community via communicative exchanges. 
 Because reference determination depends on the nature of the phenomenon being 
investigated and not on the speaker’s description associated with a term, the causal theory 
of reference offers a promising way around the problem of incommensurability. For 
example, the description associated with “syphilis” has changed over the years due to 
changes in disease understanding, but the term’s reference has not changed, because it is 
fixed by the initial ostensive dubbing of the sample. Hence, changes in disease 
understanding do not generally result in changes in the term’s meaning, but can result in 
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better knowledge of the same disease and of what correctly belongs in the extensions of 
the term. 
 This is not to say that it necessarily guarantees reference stability, as there are still 
conceivable scenarios where the referents of terms could change. Gareth Evans (1973) 
presents the example of “Madagascar”, which was originally used by its inhabitants to 
refer to mainland Africa, before European explorers used it to refer to the island after 
misunderstanding their interlocutors. Furthermore, Helen Beebee (2013: p. 161) presents 
a hypothetical example where a paradigm shift results in the entire classificatory 
framework of chemistry being replaced. Because such categories as element, catalyst, 
organic, and compound would no longer be recognised, we would no longer be able to 
point to two chemical samples and truthfully say that they are of the same compound. 
Nonetheless, while it may not on its own guarantee reference stability, the causal theory 
of reference at least shows how reference stability is possible, indeed likely, across 
scientific change of the appropriate sort. I suggest that some cases of changing disease 
understanding that do not involve the classificatory framework of medicine being 
overturned can reasonably be considered to fall under this sort of scientific change. 
 
4.3.2 Disease kind essentialism 
According to the causal theory of reference, a term’s extension is not determined by a 
description, but by the nature of the phenomenon in the external world. It is commonly 
supposed in the philosophical literature that the causal theory of reference implies, or at 
least is related to, a sort of essentialism, whereby a member of a kind has an essential 
property that is necessary for its identity as a member of the kind (Kripke, [1972] 1980; 
Ellis, 2001; Bird, 2004; Haukioja, 2015). Bird (2004: pp. 61–64) explicates the relation 
between the causal theory of reference and essentialism as follows. According to the 
causal theory of reference, a term such as “water” is a rigid designator that picks out the 
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same sort of substance in all circumstances. Through empirical discovery, it turns out a 
posteriori that this substance has a certain microstructure consisting of two hydrogen 
atoms and one oxygen atom, which is denoted with the chemical expression “H2O”. This 
chemical expression “H2O” is also a rigid designator that picks out this same kind in all 
circumstances. From the premises that water is H2O, and that “water” and “H2O” are 
rigid designators, it follows that “water = H2O” is necessarily true. This supports the idea 
that water has an essence, namely the microstructure H2O, as it shows that something 
cannot be water if it is not H2O. 
 It is worth noting here that a distinction can be made between intrinsic and 
relational essentialism. Intrinsic essentialism states that kind membership is determined 
by an intrinsic property of the phenomenon, such as its microstructure. For example, as 
noted above, the essence of water is its microstructure H2O, such that something must be 
H2O for it to be water. By contrast, relational essentialism states that kind membership is 
determined by a certain relation between the phenomenon and other phenomena, such as 
its causal history. For example, some philosophers argue that an organism’s membership 
of a biological species depends on its phylogenetic lineage (Millikan, 1999; LaPorte, 
2004). 
Putnam (1975b) assumes essentialism about disease kinds and, in doing so, 
supports robustly causal conceptions of diagnostic terms. His position is expounded in 
detail by Neil Williams (2011a). According to Williams, Putnam proposes that a disease 
has a relational essence, namely its cause. For example, the essence of polio is poliovirus 
infection, such that all and only instances of illnesses that involve infection by 
polioviruses are cases of polio. A case of an illness that resembles polio in its symptom 
profile but which is not caused by poliovirus infection would not be a case of polio 
(Putnam, 1975b: p. 329). Conversely, an instance of poliovirus infection with atypical 
symptoms would still be a case of polio. 
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Note that one does not require prior knowledge of the nature of the cause of a 
disease to support Putnam’s disease kind essentialism. The cause is discovered a posteriori, 
but this does not change the reference of the diagnostic term, which is fixed by the 
dubbing of the paradigmatic sample. Even before the discovery of poliovirus, one could 
still consider the essence of polio to be its hidden causal structure and postulate that all 
cases of polio share the same kind of causal structure. The subsequent empirical 
discovery of poliovirus elucidates the nature of this causal structure, and allows speakers 
to establish which cases have correctly and incorrectly been identified as cases of polio. 
Hence, “polio = poliovirus infection” is a necessary a posteriori fact. It is necessary because 
all and only cases of poliovirus infection are cases of polio, and it is a posteriori because 
this fact was discovered empirically (Kripke, [1972] 1980). 
Williams also offers an analysis of Putnam’s view on the causal relations between 
diseases and symptoms. First, Williams notes that Putnam rejects the descriptivist claim 
that a disease refers to a cluster of symptoms. For instance, Putnam states that “multiple 
sclerosis” does not mean “the simultaneous presence of such and such symptoms”, but 
“that disease which is normally responsible for some or all of the following symptoms 
…” (Putnam, 1975b: p. 329). Second, as noted above, Putnam claims that the essence of 
a disease is its cause, such as poliovirus being the essence of polio. Given that it is 
generally accepted in philosophy that causes are distinct from their effects, this suggests 
that although poliovirus is essential for something to count as a case of polio, it is 
nonetheless distinct from the disease state of polio itself. 
This disease kind essentialism, then, assumes a causal chain with three components, 
which are “the cause of the disease, the disease itself, and the symptoms of the disease 
(which are caused by the disease)” (Williams, 2011a: p. 167). For example, poliovirus 
causes polio, which in turn causes infantile paralysis. According to Williams’ reading of 
Putnam, the cause of the disease is a relational essence that is distinct from the disease 
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itself. This suggests that a disease term refers neither to the cause of the disease nor to 
the symptoms of the disease, but to an intermediate link in the causal chain. That is, 
“polio” refers to the disease, poliovirus infection, which is caused by poliovirus and 
which causes the symptoms of infantile paralysis. 
The distinctions between the three steps in this causal chain can be interpreted as 
paralleling the distinctions between aetiology, pathology, and clinical features that are 
assumed in clinical textbooks. Clinical features are the symptoms and signs with which 
the patient typically presents, pathology refers to the internal disease process that causes 
the clinical features, and aetiology refers to the more remote causal factors which are 
responsible for the pathology. For example, the entry on polio in A Synopsis of Children’s 
Diseases by Rendle-Short and Gray (1967: pp. 386–387) states that the aetiology is the 
infectious organism poliovirus, the pathology is central nervous system destruction and 
muscle atrophy, and the clinical features include fever, malaise, and paralysis. 
And so, an attraction of the three-step model is that it accommodates different 
kinds of causal explanatory talk in medicine. As noted above, the cause of the disease, the 
disease itself, and the symptoms of the disease are considered distinct nodes in a causal 
chain. This allows diseases to enter into causal explanations of symptoms, such as a case 
of infantile paralysis being explained by the diagnosis of polio and a case of paresis being 
explained by the diagnosis of syphilis. Moreover, it accounts for the way in which more 
general explanations of the diseases themselves appeal to their aetiologies, such as the 
disease polio being explained by poliovirus. 
 
4.3.3 Some modifications 
Although it has its merits, the analysis of disease terms presented here seems overly 
simplistic. As observed by Williams (2011a), the three-step model complements the germ 
theory of disease, according to which diseases are caused by pathogens and are classified 
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on the basis of pathogen species. While this remains relevant for such infectious diseases 
as polio and syphilis, it is unsuitable for diseases that do not have specific singular causes 
but result from multiple contributing factors. Hence, the three-step model as it stands 
does not offer the most charitable rendering of the causal theory as applied to diagnostic 
terms. I now consider two modifications that help to address this. 
The first modification involves relaxing the restrictions on the kinds of 
phenomenon to which a disease term can refer. Putnam suggests that diseases have 
relational essences, namely their aetiological agents. However, as noted above, many 
diseases do not have specific singular causes, and so are not classified on the basis of 
aetiological agents, but instead on the basis of their pathophysiological mechanisms. In 
some cases, this can be resolved by replacing relational essentialism with a kind of 
intrinsic essentialism, such that the essence of a given disease is its pathophysiology. For 
example, the essence of bronchial carcinoma is uncontrolled cell growth in lung tissue 
and the essence of appendicitis is inflammation of the appendix. Hence, while different 
cases of bronchial carcinoma may result from different sets of aetiological factors, every 
case of bronchial carcinoma involves a particular pathophysiological mechanism, namely 
uncontrolled cell growth in lung tissue. 
However, this may not be quite enough in other cases where the 
pathophysiological processes are more complex. As noted by Beebee and Sabbarton-
Leary (2010: p. 19), there is no guarantee that a linguistic category that follows Kripke’s 
semantics marks out a metaphysically distinctive category. In other words, there is no a 
priori reason to suppose that the paradigmatic sample to which a term is attached makes 
up an essentialistic kind. In “Arthritis and Nature’s Joints” (2011b), Williams examines 
the category of rheumatoid arthritis. According to the diagnostic criteria for rheumatoid 
arthritis, a diagnosis can be made if a patient displays at least four of seven anatomical, 
pathological, and radiological features. Each individual criterion is neither sufficient nor 
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necessary for a diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis. Moreover, different cases of rheumatoid 
arthritis may fulfil different combinations of criteria. In light of this, Williams suggests 
that rheumatoid arthritis does not have a simple essence. Rather, using a notion coined by 
the philosopher of biology Richard Boyd (1999), he proposes that rheumatoid arthritis is 
best conceived as a homeostatic property cluster. Under Boyd’s account, members of a 
given kind do not have to share a single necessary property, but can share clusters of 
similarities that are causally connected. For example, Boyd suggests that biological species 
are homeostatic property clusters. Members of a species share a number of common 
properties, but there is significant variation within the species that no single property is 
essential for membership within that species. Similarly, Williams proposes that there is a 
cluster of properties that can be satisfied to varying degrees for something to be a case of 
rheumatoid arthritis, but it is neither sufficient nor necessary for any particular one of 
these properties to be satisfied. This potentially allows for more variability between the 
members of a kind, as different combinations of the properties may be satisfied for kind 
membership. 
Although Williams’ suggestion that some diagnostic terms are determined by 
homeostatic property clusters rather than simple essences is plausible, it is worth noting 
that such a move may not be necessary in his given example of rheumatoid arthritis. 
While there is indeed heterogeneity with respect to its clinical features, the 
pathophysiology of rheumatoid arthritis is somewhat tidier than Williams acknowledges, 
being characterised by the autoimmune reaction to autoantigens expressed in the joints 
(Boissier et al., 2012). Therefore, the essentialist could justifiably claim that the essence of 
rheumatoid arthritis is the erosion of the joint surfaces by autoantibodies. Later in 
Chapter 5, I examine in more detail recent attempts to conceptualise some psychiatric 
disorders as homeostatic property clusters. 
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The second modification involves expanding the three-step causal chain into a 
more complex causal network. As noted by Thagard (1999), disease causation is usually a 
complex process with multiple interacting factors. Not only can there be numerous risk 
and protective factors that influence the development of the disease, but the disease itself 
can be a causal factor that influences the development of other diseases. This suggests 
that disease causation cannot be adequately modelled by a simple linear chain. Rather, a 
more complex causal network is needed to acknowledge the multifactorial aetiologies of 
some diseases. For example, myocardial infarction can result from the interactions of 
various causes, such as hypertension, obesity, smoking, and psychological stress, and 
itself can cause other diseases, such as congestive heart failure, arrhythmia, and cerebral 
embolism. Again, this is fully compatible with a causal conception of the diagnostic term. 
The term “myocardial infarction” still refers to the pathology that causes a patient’s 
clinical features. However, rather than just being the intermediate link in a linear causal 
chain, the model acknowledges that myocardial infarction is embedded within a broader 
causal network and has complex causal connections with other diseases. 
 According to Thagard (1999: p. 114), the causal relations in such a network are 
intended to map onto the actual causal relations in individual cases of the disease. 
However, not every feature of the network has to be present in every instance of the 
disease. Thagard states that the causal relations in the model are not deterministic, but 
statistical. Hence, different instances of myocardial infarction may result from different 
combinations of aetiological factors. This seems to support the homeostatic property 
cluster theory, but is also consistent with the sort of intrinsic essentialism where the 
essence of the disease is its pathophysiology. For instance, it could be claimed that the 
essence of myocardial infarction is necrosis of the myocardium from prolonged 




 While the above modifications deviate from Putnam’s (1975b) disease kind 
essentialism, I argue that they are compatible with the causal theory of reference and can 
permit causal conceptions of diagnostic terms. Reference fixing and reference borrowing 
of diagnostic terms can still proceed as described by Kripke ([1972] 1980), as can the 
scientific endeavour of discovering the causal structures of the kinds to which the terms 
refer. However, as well as accounting for disease kinds whose causal structures are 
determined by specific aetiological agents, the semantic framework can now also 
accommodate those that turn out to have other sorts of causal structure, including 
homeostatic property clusters and pathophysiological processes that are embedded within 
more complex causal networks. 
 
4.3.4 Strengths of the causal theory of reference 
To summarise this section, I presented the causal theory of reference as an account of 
how the reference of a diagnostic term is determined. According to this theory, it is not 
determined by a description, but by the actual nature of the disease and the causal 
relations between speakers who use the term. For Putnam (1975b), it is not the 
symptoms of a disease, but its cause that is essential for the individuation of meaning. 
The resulting essentialism implies a disease model consisting of three parts, namely the 
cause of the disease, the disease itself, and the symptoms of the disease. However, I 
argued that this model is too simplistic and suggested two modifications that allow a 
more permissive rendering of the causal theory. One modification, after Williams 
(2011b), is to allow homeostatic property clusters as well as simple essences as 
determinants of reference. The other modification, after Thagard (1999), is the expansion 
of the three-step chain into a more complex causal network. 
 The causal theory of reference supports a robustly causal conception of diagnostic 
terms, according to which diagnostic terms do not refer to sets of symptoms, but to the 
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disease processes that cause the symptoms. This is so even before the natures of these 
disease processes are fully known, as these can be discovered a posteriori. As noted in 
§4.3.1, this can help to avoid the problem of radical incommensurability that affects the 
descriptive theory of reference. Because reference is not determined by a description, the 
change in description that results from changing disease understanding do not normally 
amount to a change in reference. Hence, “syphilis” did not go from referring to a set of 
characteristic symptoms to referring to T. pallidum infection, but has referred to the same 
disease from the outset. The subsequent discovery of T. pallidum simply increased our 
knowledge of the nature of this disease. 
In addition, these causal considerations explain why certain collections of 
symptoms are characterised by physicians and scientists into distinct syndromes. As 
noted by Williams (2011b), such actions are those of people who consider the associated 
symptoms to be connected by a unifying causal structure. In such case as syphilis, it turns 
out that the symptom cluster is actually the result of a singular kind of pathology. In 
other cases, it turns out that there are multiple different pathologies, each of which can 
cause the observed cluster of symptoms. For example, “dropsy” had been used for many 
centuries to refer to the alleged disease associated with fluid retention. However, it turned 
out that there are multiple different pathologies that could underlie cases of dropsy, and 
so the term was discarded and replaced by more specific diagnostic terms, such as 
“nephrotic syndrome”, “congestive heart failure”, and “cirrhosis of the liver” (Peitzman, 
2007). 
 If we assume the account presented in this section, a diagnostic term in psychiatry, 
such as “major depressive disorder”, does not refer to a cluster of symptoms, but to the 
disease process that causes these symptoms. This accounts for the way in which clinical 
texts use diagnostic terms in psychiatry to refer to the causes of symptoms, as noted in 
§4.2.1. Furthermore, it provides a possible solution to problem of cross-cultural 
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incommensurability presented by Radden’s comparison of Chinese depression and 
Western depression in subsection §4.2.4. If “depression” is taken to refer to the putative 
disease process that produces various symptoms, then this accommodates the possibility 
of Chinese depression being considered the same disorder as Western depression, based 
on the assumption that they both involve this same disease process despite their having 
different symptom profiles. 
However, in spite of these attractions, I argue that a pure causal theory has 
significant shortcomings regarding psychiatric diagnoses. In particular, I argue that by 
supporting robustly causal conceptions of psychiatric disorders, it downplays the 
important functions of their symptom-based diagnostic criteria in the DSM. In §4.4, I 
examine this in more detail and propose a two-dimensional semantic framework that 
preserves the core features of the causal theory while taking the descriptive diagnostic 
criteria seriously. 
 
4.4 Two-dimensional semantics 
4.4.1 Diagnostic criteria in psychiatry 
As noted in §4.3, a key premise of the causal theory of reference as put forward by 
Kripke ([1972] 1980) and Putnam (1975a) is that the reference of a term is not 
determined by a description of superficial properties. Accordingly, Putnam (1975b) 
argues that descriptions of symptoms are not necessary to the meanings of diagnostic 
terms. Rather, descriptions of symptoms constitute stereotypes, which provide 
conventional ideas of what the disorders look like but are not analytically tied to their 
associated diagnoses. This does seem to be plausible for some of the medical diagnoses 
mentioned throughout this chapter, where the symptoms appear to be contingent 
properties of the diseases. For instance, a painless case of inflammation of the appendix 
is still a case of appendicitis. However, diagnostic terms in psychiatry, such as “panic 
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disorder” and “delusional disorder”, do seem to allude to their symptoms in ways that 
suggest more fundamental connections between the symptoms and the disorders. It 
seems oxymoronic to claim that a person could have panic disorder without having panic 
attacks, or that a person could have delusional disorder without having delusions. 
In response, the causal theorist could appeal to the difference between connotation 
and denotation. Kripke ([1972] 1980: p. 26) uses the example of the town, Dartmouth. 
The name may have the connotation of a location at the mouth of the River Dart, but 
this is not its denotation. According to Kripke, the town could still retain the name 
“Dartmouth”, even if the River Dart changes its course, and so the connection between 
Dartmouth and its location at the mouth of the River Dart is contingent. Similarly, one 
might claim that the term “panic disorder” has the connotation of certain symptoms, but 
denotes the underlying disease that usually causes these symptoms. 
However, this analogy is not wholly accurate. What it does not acknowledge is that 
the symptom-based definitions in DSM-5 are not just descriptions of disorders, but 
necessary conditions for applying the diagnostic terms. While Dartmouth may still retain 
its name if the River Dart changes course, DSM-5 precludes a diagnosis of panic disorder 
unless panic attacks are present. The symptom criteria in DSM-5 set the conditions that 
something must satisfy for it to qualify as an instance of the diagnosis. Hence, an analysis 
of the reference of such a diagnostic term as “panic disorder” would need to account for 
the fact that the presence of the relevant symptom cluster is necessary for the correct 
application of the diagnostic term. Again, this is unlike the case of a medical diagnosis 
such as acute appendicitis, where the presence of the stereotypical symptoms is not 
necessary for the diagnosis to be applied. 
Interestingly, the same problem faces the response to Szasz’s (1960) argument 
offered by Tim Thornton (2007: p. 18). Thornton draws on the work of Donald 
Davidson ([1967] 2001), who notes that events are frequently described in terms of their 
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effects, whilst actually referring to the causes of them. For example, the event, “firing a 
gun”, can also be described as “the cause of the death of the president”. The proposition, 
“firing a gun caused the death of the president”, states a causal connection. However, if 
one describes “firing a gun” as “the cause of the death of the president”, then the 
proposition becomes “the cause of the death of the president caused the death of the 
president”, which states a necessary connection. Therefore, a causal connection appears 
to become a necessary connection due to the way in which it is expressed. Thornton 
proposes that Davidson’s analysis can be applied to psychiatric diagnoses. Although 
psychiatric diagnoses may be described in terms of their effects, they actually refer to 
their causes.  
Again, I argue that this analogy is not accurate, because the connection between 
“firing a gun” as “the cause of the death of the president” is itself contingent in a way 
that the connection between “panic disorder” and “recurrent unexpected panic attacks” 
is not. While the act of firing a gun may have been the cause of the death of the president 
in this world, it is conceivable in another possible world that it may not have been. For 
example, the gun may have fired but the president may have survived. However, the 
same cannot be said about the relation between panic disorder and panic attacks. 
According to DSM-5, panic attacks are essential to the diagnosis of panic disorder, and so 
it does not seem to make sense to say that a patient can have panic disorder without 
having panic attacks. Therefore, there is a necessary connection between the diagnosis of 
panic disorder and having panic attacks which is not present between firing a gun and the 
death of the president. 
The above considerations suggest that a pure causal theory of reference is not 
adequate for the analysis of diagnostic terms in psychiatry, because it relegates the 
symptom-based diagnostic criteria to mere contingent features of the disorders. This 
contradicts the important functions of these symptom criteria as necessary conditions for 
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applications of the diagnostic terms. In what is to follow, I show how the framework of 
two-dimensional semantics can overcome this challenge. 
 
4.4.2 An overview of two-dimensional semantics 
Before I consider its application to psychiatric diagnoses specifically, I want to lay out the 
motivations for two-dimensional semantics in more detail. I do so by considering a 
scientific term that has featured extensively as a standard example in the literature on 
two-dimensional semantics, namely “water”. Not only is this the example which has 
received perhaps the most detailed analysis by proponents of two-dimensional semantics 
(Chalmers, 1996; Jackson, 1998), but it is an example that has been used to demonstrate a 
problem with the causal theory of reference similar to the problem I suggest is presented 
by certain diagnostic terms. As I note in §4.4.1, the presence of panic attacks seems to be 
closely connected to the meaning of “panic disorder”, such that it is counterintuitive to 
think of a case of panic disorder without panic attacks. Similarly, it has been argued that 
notwithstanding the causal theory of reference, the superficial properties of water are still 
somehow relevant to the meaning of “water”. For instance, David Barnett (2000), makes 
the case that if we were to encounter extremely toxic mushroom-like items on a distant 
planet, it would be counterintuitive to say that these are “water”, even if they turned out 
to be composed of unfamiliar configurations of H2O molecules. Hence, although my 
application of two-dimensional semantics is intended to be a particular solution for the 
problem of psychiatric diagnoses, my aim in this section is to explicate the framework by 
presenting a familiar paradigm case where it has been applied and from which parallels 
can be drawn to the cases of diagnostic terms. 
As previously noted, the causal theory of reference states that the reference of a 
term such as “water” is not determined by a description of water’s superficial properties, 
but by what turns out to be its essence, namely the microstructure H2O. According to the 
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causal theory of reference, then, “water” has a single intension, which rigidly designates 
H2O. This is taken to apply across all possible worlds, such that “water = H2O” is 
necessarily true. However, as noted by Chalmers (1996), there remains an intuition that 
“water” and “H2O” differ in some aspect of meaning. The two are not epistemically 
equivalent. For instance, one could know that the potable liquid found in rivers is water, 
and not know that it is H2O. Furthermore, although the potable liquid found in rivers 
which speakers had dubbed “water” actually did turn out to be H2O in our world, we can 
still entertain a hypothetical scenario in which this liquid we call “water” was discovered 
to be something else. 
These intuitions suggest that there is more to the meaning of “water” than having 
the microstructure H2O. In the literature (Chalmers, 1996; Jackson, 1998), this is 
normally explicated in modal terms with a retelling of Putnam’s (1975a) Twin Earth 
thought experiment. Twin Earth is indistinguishable from Earth in almost every way. 
Like Earth, its rivers contain a colourless, tasteless, and potable liquid, which its 
inhabitants call “water”. The difference between the two worlds is that the stuff we call 
“water” on Earth was discovered to have the microstructure H2O, whereas the 
corresponding stuff on Twin Earth that is called “water” by its inhabitants was 
discovered to have the microstructure XYZ. According to the causal theory of reference 
put forward by Kripke and Putnam, this Twin Earth liquid is not water. Because “water” 
designates rigidly and has been shown by chemistry to pick out H2O on Earth, “water = 
H2O” is a necessary truth that holds across all worlds. Hence, Twin Earthlings are wrong 
to claim that “water = XYZ”. However, if a causal theorist from Twin Earth were to 
apply the same standards, then he or she would arrive at the opposite conclusion and 
claim that we Earthlings are wrong to call our liquid “water”, because the liquid that Twin 
Earthlings had dubbed “water” was shown by chemistry to be XYZ. This suggests that if 
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the world had turned out to be like Twin Earth, then “water” would refer to XYZ instead 
of H2O. 
The above brings out the tension between the causal theorist’s claim that “water” 
necessarily refers to H2O and the intuition that it could have referred to something else 
had the world turned out to be different in the relevant way. Two-dimensional semantics 
resolves this tension. This is a formal framework developed by Robert Stalnaker (1978), 
and later championed by David Chalmers (1996, 2010) and Frank Jackson (1998). It 
proposes that the meaning of “water” is not only dependent on a posteriori facts about the 
world, but also on which possible world we assumed to be the actual world in which the 
reference is fixed. In the framework of Kripke and Putnam, only Earth is taken to be 
actual, while all other possible worlds are taken to be counterfactual. Hence, in this 
scenario, “water” only picks out the substance that was discovered to be H2O. However, 
if one assumes Twin Earth to be the actual world that one inhabits, then “water” would 
pick out the substance that was discovered to be XYZ. 
Two-dimensional semantics, then, proposes that a given term, such as “water”, is 
taken to express two intensions. Different authors use different names for these two 
intensions, but here I follow the terminology of Chalmers (1996). The primary intension 
of a term is what the term would pick out in a chosen world if that world is imagined to 
be the actual world in which the reference is fixed. Given that the reference fixing occurs 
before the discovery of the underlying essential nature of the phenomenon in question, 
the primary intension roughly approximates to the phenomenon’s pre-theoretical mode 
of presentation. Chalmers (1996: pp. 56–65) initially suggests that the primary intension 
may be determined by a description of its referent. However, he later concedes that this is 
not the case for all primary intensions, as there may be some terms that cannot be 
adequately encapsulated in descriptions (Chalmers, 2002: pp. 143–149). Instead, he 
suggests that primary intensions can be taken as capturing what the extensions of terms 
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would be in different epistemic possibilities about how the world could turn out. While 
these may sometimes be captured by descriptions, this need not always be the case. For 
instance, the primary intension of “water” (1-WATER) roughly corresponds to the 
colourless, tasteless, and potable liquid found in rivers. As mentioned above, this liquid 
that was dubbed “water” turns out to be H2O in the scenario where Earth is imagined to 
be the actual world in which the reference is fixed, but turns out to be XYZ in the 
scenario where Twin Earth is imagined to be actual. 
The secondary intension of a term is what the term picks out if we fix our world as 
actual and then evaluate other worlds as counterfactual relative to it. The secondary 
intension of “water” (2-WATER) only picks out H2O, because water was discovered to 
be H2O in our world. This identity is taken to be necessary, such that “water” refers to 
H2O across all counterfactual worlds. Note that the secondary intension corresponds to 
the reference of a term as per the causal theory of reference. The reference of 2-WATER 
is not determined by a cluster of descriptions, but by the microstructure H2O. Therefore, 
two-dimensional semantics assimilates the causal theory of reference. Along with it, I 
argue that it can assimilate the modifications to the causal theory of reference presented 
in §4.3.3, such that homeostatic property clusters as well as simple essences may be the 
determinants of secondary intensions. 
 The above modal story accounts for the way in which there can be two dimensions 
of a term’s meaning, one which is dependent on the pre-theoretical mode of presentation 
of the phenomenon associated with the term and another which is dependent on what 
the underlying nature of this phenomenon a posteriori turns to be. It also has implications 
for the notions of necessity and contingency. These implications are useful for 
understanding the conceptual relations between a term and its associated concepts. For 
example, the sorts of relation that “water” has with “H2O” and with “potable liquid 
found in rivers” depend on whether we assume 1-WATER or 2-WATER. If 1-WATER 
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is assumed, then “water = potable liquid found in rivers” is necessarily true, because it is 
defined by this mode of presentation, while “water = H2O” is contingently true, because 
the potable liquid that was dubbed “water” in another world could have turned out to be 
something other than H2O. On the other hand, if 2-WATER is assumed, then “water = 
H2O” is necessarily true, because the liquid that was dubbed “water” in our world a 
posteriori turned out to be H2O, while “water = potable liquid found in rivers” is 
contingently true, because H2O could have had a different form in a counterfactual 
world. 
This can be captured by the idea that there are two sorts of necessity and two sorts 
of contingency. These correspond to the necessity and contingency when the primary 
intension of a term is assumed, respectively 1-necessity and 1-contingency, and to the 
necessity and contingency when the secondary intension of the term is assumed, 
respectively 2-necessity and 2-contingency (Chalmers, 2010: p. 167). Hence, “water = 
potable liquid found in rivers”, is 1-necessary but 2-contingent, whereas “water = H2O” 
is 2-necessary but 1-contingent. The relation of 1-necessity can be thought of as 
corresponding to the definitional relation between a term and a description, while 2-
necessity corresponds to Kripke’s ([1972] 1980) a posteriori necessity as per the causal 
theory of reference. As I shall show in the following subsection, this offers a way of 
analysing the conceptual relations between psychiatric diagnoses, DSM-5 symptom 
criteria, and the pathological processes purported to cause these symptoms. 
And so, the two-dimensional semantic framework presented here can be thought 
of as one way of synthesising the causal theory of reference with descriptivist 
considerations to capture different aspects of a term’s complex semantic value that have 
useful epistemic roles (Chalmers, 2010: p. 563). In virtue of a term’s secondary intension, 
a causal theorist can accept Chalmers’ account of how the reference of that term is 
determined. However, while the causal theorist might consider this to constitute the 
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entire meaning of the term, for Chalmers it only constitutes one aspect of its meaning. 
The term also has a primary intension that corresponds to its mode of presentation. An 
implication of this is that the two-dimensional semantic theorist can reject the causal 
theorist’s claim that a definition based on superficial properties is not relevant to the 
reference of a term. A definition is not merely a stereotype, but is a genuine aspect of a 
term’s meaning. As we shall see, this makes two-dimensional semantics better suited than 
a pure causal theory for the analysis of diagnostic terms in psychiatry. 
 
4.4.3 A two-dimensional semantic account of diagnostic terms 
I propose that two-dimensional semantics can make sense of terms whose applications 
necessitate the presence of certain superficial properties despite the terms being used by 
speakers to refer to the causes of these properties. This is particularly relevant to 
psychiatry, where the meanings of diagnostic terms are necessarily tied to descriptions of 
symptoms despite the terms being invoked to refer to the causes of these symptoms. 
Although this particular issue is not so obviously a problem for many diagnoses in 
somatic medicine, the framework can nonetheless accommodate the analysis of medical 
diagnoses as well. 
In §4.4.2, I explicated the principles of the framework with appeal to the classic 
example of the term “water”. I suggest that diagnostic terms are amenable to the same 
kind of analysis. Like the term “water”, a diagnostic term has a pre-theoretical mode of 
presentation that characterises the primary intension, and an underlying structure that is 
discovered a posteriori and determines the secondary intension. In the case of the term 
“water”, the mode of presentation is roughly the colourless, tasteless, and potable liquid 
found in lakes and rivers, whereas the a posteriori discovered underlying structure is H2O. 
In the case of a diagnosis, the mode of presentation is the clinical manifestation and the 
underlying structure is the disease process that is responsible for the clinical 
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manifestation. For example, the primary intension of the term “polio” is roughly the 
transmissible condition presenting with infantile paralysis, whereas the secondary 
intension is poliovirus infection. 
In psychiatry, the clinical manifestations for diagnoses are codified in the DSM-5 
definitions. A DSM-5 definition, then, captures the primary intension of a diagnosis. For 
example, the primary intension of “delusional disorder” includes “the presence of one or 
more delusions that persist for at least 1 month” (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013: p. 92) and the primary intension of “panic disorder” includes “recurrent 
unexpected panic attacks” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 209). As 
previously mentioned, these definitions serve as necessary criteria for the diagnoses, 
which squares neatly with Chalmers’ (2002: p. 143) suggestion that the role of a 
description is to provide conditions that give speakers ways to identify the extension of 
the term. The secondary intensions of diagnoses are whatever turn out to be their 
respective underlying pathological processes, as per the causal theory of reference. 
 It is worth noting here that the primary intensions may change across time, as 
demonstrated by the changes in the criteria for schizophrenia from DSM-IV (1994) to 
DSM-5 (2013) mentioned in §4.2.3. This is compatible with Chalmers’ account, as he 
accepts that certain kinds of conceptual change involve changes in an expression’s 
primary intension (Chalmers, 2012: p. 210). However, there is at least the possibility of 
semantic incommensurability being avoided here by the assumption that the secondary 
intension is sufficiently invariant. Hence, although DSM-IV schizophrenia and DSM-5 
schizophrenia have different primary intensions, they are assumed to have the same 
secondary intension in virtue of their being posited to refer to the same causative 
pathology. This highlights the point made in §4.2.3 that diagnostic terms also go through 
sorts of conceptual change other than the changes from descriptive to causal conceptions 
suggested by Hempel (1965b) and Thagard (1999). In particular, they can undergo 
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changes in the descriptive definitions, which amount to changes in their primary 
intensions. 
Furthermore, Chalmers also suggests that it is possible at a given time for concepts 
to have different primary intensions but the same secondary intension. For example, 
“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have different primary intensions, as the former picks out 
the evening star and the latter picks out the morning star, but they have the same 
secondary intension, as both refer to the planet Venus (Chalmers, 1996: p. 65). I suggest 
that this can be applied to Radden’s cross-cultural discussion of Chinese depression and 
Western depression. The differences in the symptom profiles of Chinese depression and 
Western depression can be taken to constitute different primary intensions, but there is 
the possibility that the two can be equated on the basis of the assumption that they have 
the same secondary intension, hence potentially avoiding the implication of cross-cultural 
semantic incommensurability. Of course, whether they can actually be equated depends 
on the empirical question of whether they turn out to share the same kind of underlying 
causal structure. 
Analysing diagnostic terms in psychiatry as having primary intensions and 
secondary intensions allows us to take their descriptive definitions in DSM-5 seriously as 
necessary criteria making the diagnoses, yet still talk about the diagnoses as referring to 
the causes of the symptoms that make up these definitions. Let us consider, for example, 
the connection between “panic disorder” and the DSM-5 description “recurrent 
unexpected panic attacks”. If the primary intension of “panic disorder” is assumed, then 
the connection is necessary, because the primary intension is defined through this DSM-5 
description. This 1-necessity reflects the way in which the DSM-5 symptom criteria are 
explicitly required for the diagnosis to be made. A diagnosis of panic disorder, for 
instance, cannot be made unless panic attacks are present. Therefore, unlike a pure causal 
theory of reference, two-dimensional semantics does not relegate the DSM-5 symptom 
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criteria to contingent features of the disorder, but acknowledges they are necessarily tied 
to the diagnosis in virtue of the diagnostic term’s primary intension. 
If the secondary intension of “panic disorder” is assumed, then the term refers to 
whatever turns out to be the pathology that normally causes recurrent unexpected panic 
attacks. The connection between the secondary intension of “panic disorder” and 
“recurrent unexpected panic attacks” is contingent, because it is counterfactually 
conceivable that the pathology picked out by the secondary intension could be present 
without it being accompanied by recurrent unexpected panic attacks, just as it is 
conceivable for inflammation of the appendix to be present without it being 
accompanied by abdominal pain. This 2-contingency reflects the way in which the 
diagnostic term is used in medical textbooks and health information resources to refer to 
what is causing a set of symptoms, such as panic disorder being invoked as the cause of a 
patient’s panic attacks. 
A two-dimensional semantic analysis, then, provides one possible way of resolving 
the tension between the DSM-5 definitions of psychiatric diagnoses as symptom clusters 
and their uses in other clinical texts as terms that refer to the causes of these symptom 
clusters. Under this framework, a diagnostic term does not have a single intension, but a 
complex semantic value involving a primary intension and a secondary intension. These 
two intensions have different epistemic roles that capture the two kinds of talk 
mentioned above. In virtue of their primary intensions, diagnostic term are defined 
through their symptoms, thus capturing their symptom-based definitions in DSM-5. In 
virtue of their secondary intensions, they refer to the pathologies that normally cause 
these symptoms, thus capturing their uses as explanations of patients’ symptoms in 
textbooks and health information resources. This suggests, pace Szasz (1960), that 
although a psychiatric diagnosis is defined through its symptoms, this does not 
necessarily preclude it from being invoked as a causal explanation of these symptoms. 
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4.4.4 Other implications of two-dimensional semantics 
As well as resolving the tension between the two kinds of talk regarding psychiatric 
diagnoses, two-dimensional semantics has further strengths as a framework for the 
analysis of diagnostic terms more generally. First, its semantic pluralism helps to 
characterise the different kinds of information conveyed by diagnostic terms in the 
communicative exchanges of clinicians. A diagnosis normally provides both information 
about a patient’s likely clinical presentation and information about the underlying disease 
process, which respectively correspond to the primary intension and secondary intension 
of the diagnostic term. For example, “chronic bronchitis” not only informs the clinician 
that the patient is likely to be presenting with cough and sputum expectoration, but also 
that the underlying disease process is inflammation of the bronchi. 
Second, two-dimensional semantics not only provides a way of interpreting 
changes in disease understanding that does not imply radical incommensurability, but also 
has the added advantage of taking seriously the different epistemic possibilities 
entertained by scientists in the early stages of disease understanding. Before the nature of 
the underlying pathology is understood, speakers rely on the primary intension of the 
disease term. For example, before poliovirus was discovered by Karl Landsteiner and 
Erwin Popper in 1909, doctors applied the term “polio” to cases of infantile paralysis, 
while aiming to elucidate the underlying causal structure. This primary intension analysis 
allows for the intuition that the condition presenting with infantile paralysis that was 
dubbed “polio” could have turned out to be caused by something else had the world 
been different in the relevant way. In actuality, polio turned out to be caused by 
poliovirus, which indicates that “polio = poliovirus infection” is 2-necessary. However, 
before poliovirus was discovered, Landsteiner and Popper had initially tried to look for a 
responsible bacterial agent for polio (Skern, 2010: p. 1372). This suggests that they had 
entertained the epistemic possibility that polio could have turned out not to be poliovirus 
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infection. If this epistemic possible world had turned out to be our actual world, then the 
condition presenting with infantile paralysis that was dubbed “polio” would have turned 
out to be a sort of bacterial infection, just as the liquid that was dubbed “water” would 
have turned out to be XYZ if Twin Earth had turned out to be our actual world. This 
scenario can be captured with the analysis that “polio = poliovirus infection” is 1-
contingent. 
Once the nature of polio’s underlying pathology was discovered to be poliovirus 
infection, speakers could then utilise the secondary intension, which is determined by 
rigidifying this evaluation so that “polio” refers only to poliovirus infection across all 
worlds. Because the secondary intension fixes the reference of “polio” across all worlds, 
it establishes which cases of infantile paralysis are cases of polio and which ones are not. 
Hence, cases of infantile paralysis in the past that were not caused by poliovirus infection 
were not actually cases of polio. It is this secondary intension that is central to the aims of 
further scientific research into prevention and treatment. When Jonas Salk and Albert 
Sabin were developing vaccines for polio, they were developing vaccines specifically to 
prevent poliovirus infection. 
The above suggests that the move from descriptive to causal conceptions of a 
diagnostic term involves the change in emphasis from the term’s primary intension to its 
secondary intension. This does not involve the semantic incommensurability permitted 
by the descriptive theory of reference, because the determination of a diagnostic term’s 
reference follows the same processes of reference fixing and borrowing as proposed by 
the causal theory of reference. The secondary intension of the term rigidly designates 
what the causal structure of a disease turns out to be, which maintains reference stability. 
Hence, “polio” denotes only genuine cases of poliovirus infection. Nonetheless, the 
primary intension accounts for the epistemically possible scenarios where the condition 
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that was dubbed “polio” had turned out to be caused by other kinds of agent instead of 
poliovirus. 
 
4.4.5 Objections and replies 
I now address some challenges to generalised two-dimensional semantics. Some of these 
are objections found in the literature, while others are potential challenges that could be 
raised. Although my own application of two-dimensional semantics is restricted to 
analysing diagnostic terms, it is nonetheless worthwhile answering these challenges to the 
framework as a more general theory. 
The first challenge is an objection by Diego Marconi (2004), who argues that 
generalised two-dimensional semantics is implausible because it suggests that all ordinary 
expressions are ambiguous. If a term has both a primary intension and a secondary 
intension, then it could refer to either one of two different things. Of course, Marconi 
concedes that there are some ordinary terms which express different things in different 
contexts. An example already considered in §4.2.1 is the term “parent”, which Haslanger 
(2006) observes could be interpreted as the immediate progenitor or the primary 
caregiver of a child. However, according to Marconi, not all ordinary expressions are 
obviously ambiguous in this way, and so two-dimensional semantics cannot provide a 
general framework to analyse ordinary expressions. 
In reply, I argue that two-dimensional semantics does not entail that terms are 
ambiguous. Rather, as noted by Chalmers (2010: p. 563), two-dimensional semantics 
states that a term has a complex semantic value involving a primary intension and a 
secondary intension, and it has this complex semantic value in all contexts. Furthermore, 
for a given term, the primary intension and the secondary intension may be coextensive 
in the actual context of utterance. Consider, for example, the term “water”. At first 
glance, the suggestion that 1-water roughly picks out the potable liquid found in lakes and 
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rivers while 2-water picks out H2O might seem to suggest that the term “water” is 
ambiguous. However, on Earth, it is an empirical fact that the potable liquid found in 
lakes and rivers is H2O. Hence, on Earth, the term “water” refers only to the substance 
that has the molecular structure H2O, regardless of whether 1-water or 2-water is 
assumed. The primary intension and secondary intension of “water” only come apart 
when different modal possibilities are considered, such as scenarios involving Twin Earth 
or other distant worlds. This suggests that “water”, in our ordinary usage of the term in 
the actual world, is not ambiguous, because the primary intension and secondary 
intension refer to the same thing on Earth, even though they are associated with different 
modal relations when other possible worlds are considered. I argue that the same sort of 
analysis could also be applied to diagnostic terms. 
The second challenge is an objection by Scott Soames (2005), who argues that two-
dimensional semantics vindicates internalism about meaning. Internalism is the view that 
meaning is individuated by the internal psychological state of a speaker. This is contrasted 
with externalism, which states that it is at least partly individuated by the speaker’s 
external environment. Indeed, some proponents of two-dimensional semantics, including 
Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1998), suggest that primary intensions are determined by 
the internal states of speakers. Soames objects to this on the basis that it contravenes the 
important externalist consequences of the causal theory of reference developed by Kripke 
([1972] 1980) and Putnam (1975a). 
In reply, I argue that Soames’ objection is not applicable to all varieties of two-
dimensional semantics, as not all proponents of two-dimensional semantics favour an 
internalist account of primary intensions. For example, Stalnaker’s (1978) interpretation 
of two-dimensional semantics assumes externalism about intensions. Even Chalmers 
(1996: pp. 58–59) concedes the possibility that primary intensions might be determined 
by appropriate causal relations between the referents and the speakers, as per the causal 
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theory of reference. I propose that my own restricted application of two-dimensional 
semantics to psychiatric diagnoses is compatible with externalism, as the descriptions that 
express the primary intensions of the terms are not determined by internal states of the 
speakers, but are codified in an external resource, namely DSM-5. 
A third potential challenge is that it is not clear why there should be only two 
dimensions of meaning. There may be other ways to break down the meaning of a term, 
and it is plausible that there are other aspects of a term’s semantic content that are not 
captured by a primary intension and a secondary intension. Therefore, the worry is that 
two-dimensional semantics is too narrow a framework to completely capture the full 
meanings of terms. 
In response to this, I emphasise that the two-dimensional semantic framework I 
have presented is not to be taken as providing an exhaustive account of the meanings of 
terms. Rather, as noted by Chalmers (2010: p. 556), two-dimensional semantics is 
compatible with semantic pluralism, which allows a term to be associated with a number 
of different semantic relations. The primary intension and secondary intension of the 
term do not exhaust the meaningful content of the term, but are ways of capturing two of 
the aspects of a term’s complex semantic value. These are not two arbitrary aspects, but 
two aspects whose semantic relations have useful modal and epistemic roles. Indeed, 
there may be other aspects of its meaning that are not captured in terms of a primary 
intension and a secondary intension, but which might be captured by another sort of 
analysis. However, this can be taken as complementing rather than challenging the two-
dimensional semantic analysis presented here. Different sorts of analysis provide ways of 
capturing different aspects of meaning that are useful for different purposes. 
A fourth potential challenge is the worry that the two-dimensional semantic 
framework I present does not offer an account of the social processes that also influence 
the semantic practices surrounding psychiatric diagnoses. One such account of these 
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processes in the literature on philosophy of psychiatry is Ian Hacking’s (1999) theory of 
dynamic nominalism. Using the example of childhood autism, Hacking (1999: pp. 114–
115) proposes that psychiatric disorders are interactive kinds. That is to say, categorising 
disorders results in looping effects that alter the natures of the disorders in question. He 
argues that since the diagnostic term “childhood autism” was coined, the ideas about the 
disorder that became prevalent in society have influenced the sorts of behaviour with 
which new cases present. This suggests that there is an aspect of the meaning of the term 
“childhood autism” that changes in response to social processes. 
Again, in response, I propose that this complements rather than challenges the 
two-dimensional semantic framework I have presented. In fact, Hacking (1999: pp. 119–
124) himself is sympathetic towards the use of the causal theory of reference endorsed by 
Kripke ([1972] 1980) and Putnam (1975a) as a tool to analyse the semantics of diagnostic 
terms. For example, he considers the term “childhood autism” being used to designate 
the putative pathology P (Hacking, 1999: pp. 119–124). This suggests that childhood 
autism is an interactive kind with respect to its prototypical symptoms, but is presumed 
to be an indifferent kind with respect to P. I argue that this is consistent with the analysis 
that the changes that result from looping effects are with respect to the primary intension 
of “childhood autism”, whereas the secondary intension is posited as remaining stable in 
virtue of P. Of course, it may turn out that P is associated with a range of pathologies 
rather than a single definite pathology, but this might be accommodated with the analysis 
that the secondary intension of “childhood autism” is disjunctive. Nevertheless, 
Hacking’s important observations highlight that there are social dynamics working at the 
level of classification that are not specifically expounded by the theories of reference 





This chapter has explored how philosophical theories of reference apply to diagnostic 
terms, with the aim of resolving the conceptual problem regarding the tension between 
the descriptive definitions of psychiatric diagnoses in DSM-5 and their causal 
conceptions in other clinical resources. After looking at descriptive and causal theories of 
reference, I sketched how a two-dimensional semantic framework that assimilates the 
causal theory of reference with descriptive considerations accommodates the two 
seemingly contradictory ways in which diagnostic terms are used in psychiatry. The 
framework I have presented suggests that invoking psychiatric diagnoses as causes of 
patients’ symptoms is not necessarily precluded by the fact that they are defined through 
symptoms. This partly addresses Szasz’s (1960) argument that a mental illness cannot 
explain behaviour because it is just a shorthand label for this behaviour. However, an 
important concession must be made, which I now consider. 
While the two-dimensional semantic framework I have presented allows a 
diagnostic term to refer to the causal profile that normally produces a set of symptoms 
despite being defined through these symptoms, whether or not the diagnosis actually 
provides a satisfactory explanation of a patient’s symptoms also depends on the empirical 
fact regarding the nature of this causal profile associated with the diagnostic category. For 
some disorders, there are doubts about whether the underlying causal profiles will turn 
out to be sufficiently stable and repeatable for their respective diagnostic categories to be 
considered epistemically useful. In other words, it may turn out that the symptoms 
associated with a given diagnostic category can be produced in many different ways and 
that there is no unifying set of mechanisms that is shared by every instance of the 
diagnosis. Such a diagnosis would be like the case of dropsy mentioned in §4.3.4, where 
the secondary intension refers to a disjunction of several different pathologies. In a more 
extreme scenario, it may turn out that a given diagnosis may not be associated with any 
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discernible regular causes at all, such that every case turns out to have a different causal 
profile. This is also of relevance to the cross-historical and cross-cultural comparisons of 
disorders discussed by Radden (2003). I noted in §4.4.3 that a two-dimensional semantic 
framework accommodates the conceptual possibility of equating Chinese depression and 
Western depression based on the assumption that their secondary intensions are the 
same. However, whether it is actually correct to equate Chinese depression and Western 
depression is ultimately dependent on whether their secondary intensions do indeed turn 
out to refer to the same kind of causative pathology. This is something that must be 
ascertained empirically. 
In summary, the framework of two-dimensional semantics shows that it is possible 
for diagnostic terms to be defined descriptively through their symptoms, yet refer to the 
causal processes that produce these symptoms. However, in order to answer the question 
of whether or not psychiatric diagnoses provide causal explanations of patients’ 
symptoms, we need to examine the empirical facts regarding the causal profiles associated 
with the diagnostic categories. This will be the focus of Chapter 5. 
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5. The Causal Profiles of Psychiatric Disorders 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Having addressed the conceptual problem surrounding the definitional connections 
between psychiatric diagnoses and their symptom criteria, I now turn to the ontological 
problem regarding the natures of the causal profiles associated with the diagnostic 
categories in psychiatry. The two-dimensional semantic framework I put forward in 
Chapter 4 suggests that psychiatric diagnoses can still be taken to refer to the causal 
structures that produce sets of symptoms, even though they are formally defined through 
these sets of symptoms. However, we also need to examine what we know from 
empirical research about the causal profiles of psychiatric diagnoses to assess whether 
they are stable enough to support causal explanations in individual cases. And so, this 
chapter reviews the current empirical evidence pertaining to the causal profiles of some 
psychiatric disorders and the implications of this evidence for theoretical 
conceptualisations of the disorders.  
 As noted in Chapter 3, although diagnoses qua categories are generalisations, the 
causal profiles respectively associated with many, though certainly not all, of these 
diagnostic categories in bodily medicine are invariant in the appropriate respects for them 
to indicate, with reasonable specificity, the actual causal processes producing the 
symptoms in individual cases. Despite the various constitutional and biographical 
differences between individuals, every case of cystic fibrosis involves an abnormal cystic 
fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) system (Simon, 2006: pp. 360–
362) and every case of heart failure involves the inability to pump blood at a rate 
adequate for satisfying the requirements of the tissues (Denolin et al., 1983: p. 445). 
Historically, this reflects a form of essentialistic thinking regarding such diagnoses in 
medicine, which has been referred to as the “disease entity” model (Hucklenbroich, 
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2014). For instance, the essential feature of cystic fibrosis is the abnormal CFTR ion 
transport system, such that a person whose phenotype does not involve an abnormal 
CFTR ion transport system does not, by definition, have cystic fibrosis. This essentialistic 
model has perhaps had the most success with respect to infectious diseases and genetic 
disorders, which have distinctive pathologies and singular aetiologies. However, it could 
also be applied to some diseases with multifactorial aetiologies, such as heart failure and 
myocardial infarction, which are still constituted by distinctive pathological processes, 
although these processes themselves may result from multiple contributory aetiological 
factors. Every case of myocardial infarction, for example, involves a distinctive 
pathological process, namely ischaemic necrosis of the myocardium, but this process 
might itself result from different combinations of aetiological factors in different cases. 
As we shall see in this chapter, while essentialism may have had some success with 
respect to a number of diagnoses in bodily medicine, it is not an appropriate model for 
many diagnoses in psychiatry.  I proceed as follows. In §5.2, I review the findings from 
scientific research into the causal profile of major depressive disorder, which is one of the 
commonest psychiatric conditions. I have chosen major depressive disorder as a 
paradigmatic example, not only because it is a common disorder, but also because it 
exemplifies some of the salient features that are found to different degrees in the causal 
profiles of many psychiatric disorders, such as high degrees of heterogeneity and complex 
interactions of diverse variables across multiple levels of organisation. In §5.3, I look at 
how theoretical models of psychiatric disorders might accommodate these problematic 
features. After arguing that simple essentialism is inadequate, I critically examine recent 
attempts in the philosophy of psychiatry to conceptualise psychiatric disorders as 
homeostatic property clusters. Finally, in §5.4 I explore to what extent the considerations 




5.2 Major depressive disorder 
5.2.1 Symptom criteria 
In the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), major depressive disorder is described as a syndrome 
characterised by the following nine symptoms: 
 
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day … 2. Markedly diminished 
interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day 
… 3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain … or decrease or 
increase in appetite nearly every day … 4. Insomnia or hypersomnia … 5. 
Psychomotor agitation or retardation … 6. Fatigue or loss of energy … 7. Feelings 
of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) … 8. 
Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness … 9. Recurrent 
thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a 
specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide. 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013: pp. 160–161). 
 
A diagnosis of major depressive disorder requires a minimum of five out of the above 
nine symptoms, at least one of which must be depressed mood or diminished interest. 
These must be present for at least two weeks, result in clinically significant distress or 
impairment, and must not be attributable to the physiological effects of a substance or 
another medical condition. 
This diagnostic process based on the fulfilment of a minimum number of criteria 
from a longer list allows for many different combinations of criteria to qualify for a 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Zimmerman et al. (2015) note that there are 
theoretically 227 different ways in which one can be diagnosed with major depressive 
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disorder based on the above criteria. Fried and Nesse (2015) also note that three of the 
diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder are disjunctive. These are “weight loss 
when not dieting or weight gain”, “insomnia or hypersomnia”, and “psychomotor 
agitation or retardation”. This not only increases the number of possible symptom 
combinations to over 1,000, but it means that different patients with major depressive 
disorder can have no symptoms in common, given that no single symptom is necessary 
or sufficient for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Moreover, because the 
disjunctive diagnostic criteria encompass opposite features, two patients with major 
depressive disorder could present with contrasting symptoms. For example, one patient 
may be diagnosed with major depressive disorder on the basis of depressed mood, weight 
loss, insomnia, and psychomotor agitation, while another may be diagnosed on the basis 
of diminished interest, weight gain, hypersomnia, and psychomotor retardation. Again, 
this suggests that the symptoms associated with major depressive disorder are highly 
heterogeneous, with the diagnosis being met by widely varying clinical presentations. 
 
5.2.2 Genetics 
Heterogeneity regarding the symptoms of a disorder is not by itself problematic, as many 
disorders in medicine are known to present in different ways. One example is syphilis, 
which is notorious for its protean manifestations. These can include ulceration, rash, 
malaise, weight loss, gastric dysmotility, hepatitis, meningitis, cardiovascular disease, and 
general paresis. Here, the many different manifestations are unified by a singular cause 
that is stable across cases, namely Treponema pallidum infection. This allows syphilis to be 
amenable to an essentialistic analysis, despite the heterogeneity at the level of its 
symptoms. 
Following the discovery that T. pallidum infection is the defining cause of general 
paresis of the insane, it was hoped that other psychiatric disorders might also be 
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constituted by singular causative pathologies (Bolton, 2012: p. 9). One field where the 
search for singular causes has taken place is that of psychiatric genetics. This has had 
some success with respect to a small number of disorders. For example, the defining 
feature of Huntington’s chorea was discovered to be the expansion of the CAG repeat on 
chromosome four. There are also uncommon forms of early-onset Alzheimer’s disease 
involving the genes presenilin one, presenilin two, and amyloid precursor protein (Cowen 
et al., 2012: p. 328). However, such instances are rare in psychiatry. For the majority of 
major psychiatric disorders, genetic research has failed to find genes of even moderate 
effect size (Kendler, 2006). In the case of major depressive disorder, data from family, 
twin, and adoption studies indicates a heritability of approximately thirty-seven percent 
(Sullivan et al., 2000). While this indicates that there are genetic factors that increase 
vulnerability to major depressive disorder, environmental factors remain aetiologically 
more important. 
Regarding the heritable component of vulnerability to major depressive disorder, 
linkage and association studies have been used to search for specific genes. One genetic 
variation that has received attention is a polymorphism in the promotor region of the 
serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR). A study by Caspi et al. (2003) suggested that 
people with one or two copies of the short allele of 5-HTTLPR have a higher risk of 
developing major depressive disorder in response to stressful life events than people 
homozygous for the long allele. However, a subsequent meta-analysis found no 
significant association between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and the occurrence of 
major depressive disorder (Risch et al., 2009). In general, data from association studies 
indicates that the heritable component of vulnerability to major depressive disorder is not 
attributable to one or a small number of genes, but to the combined effect of a vast 
number of genes, each with a small effect size (Shyn and Hamilton, 2010). 
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The above considerations indicate that a singular defining feature of major 
depressive disorder is not to be found at the level of genetics. However, it could be 
argued that heterogeneity with respect to distal causes such as genes is not necessarily a 
problem for disease explanation, because many medical disorders that have been 
successfully modelled are known to have multiple risk factors. For example, distal causes 
for myocardial infarction include genetic vulnerabilities, hypertension, obesity, smoking, 
and psychological stress, which vary significantly across cases. Nonetheless, these all 
converge onto a singular proximal cause, ischaemic necrosis of the myocardium, which is 
the determining property of every case of myocardial infarction. This suggests that we 
also need to look at whether the proximal causes associated with major depressive 
disorder are heterogeneous. 
 
5.2.3 Neurochemistry 
Regarding the proximal causes associated with major depressive disorder, a lot of 
attention has been paid to the investigation of neurobiological processes in the brain. 
Perhaps the most popular neurochemical hypothesis throughout the latter half of the 
twentieth century has been the monoamine hypothesis. Monoamines are a class of 
neurotransmitters that include noradrenaline, dopamine, and serotonin. It was observed 
by Edward Freis (1954) that patients who were treated for hypertension with reserpine, a 
monoamine antagonist, suffered the side effect of depressed mood. This then led to 
theorists, such as Joseph Schildkraut (1965) and Alex Coppen (1967), to hypothesise that 
the underlying pathology of major depressive disorder is underactive monoamine 
neurotransmission, particularly serotonin neurotransmission. To this day, the 
recommended pharmacological treatments for major depressive disorder are drugs that 
elevate serotonin neurotransmission. 
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 However, since the monoamine hypothesis was first conjectured, the 
neurobiological features of major depressive disorder have been discovered to be far 
more complicated than initially anticipated. First, some studies have found no indication 
of reduced levels of monoamine metabolites in the cerebrospinal fluid or urine of 
patients with major depressive disorder compared to controls (Shaw et al., 1973; Coppen 
et al., 1979). Second, while reducing levels of serotonin by depleting its precursor 
tryptophan reduces antidepressant efficacy in a proportion of cases, it neither induces 
depressive symptoms in healthy volunteers, nor worsen symptoms in unmedicated 
patients with major depressive disorder (Delgado, 2011). Third, the drug tianeptine has 
been shown to be effective for the treatment of major depressive disorder, despite it 
actually reducing monoamine transmission (Wilde and Benfield, 1995). 
These findings suggest that underactive monoamine neurotransmission is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of major depressive disorder. Based on the 
figures for antidepressant response, Belmaker and Agam (2008) estimate that the 
mechanism of major depressive disorder may not related to monoamines in up to two 
thirds of cases. In fact, based on data from rodent studies and the poor responses of a 
number of patients with major depressive disorder to conventional antidepressants, it has 
been hypothesised that monoamine neurotransmission may actually be elevated in some 
cases of major depressive disorder, rather than reduced (Fitzgerald, 2013). Therefore, 
although underactive monoamine neurotransmission is a factor associated with some 
cases of major depressive disorder, it cannot be taken as constituting the defining feature 
of the diagnosis. 
 More recent neurochemical hypotheses have acknowledged the role that stress has 
in the aetiology of major depressive disorder (Massart et al., 2012; Palazidou, 2012). One 
of these hypotheses is that major depressive disorder involves alterations in the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Arborelius et al., 1999). The HPA axis is a 
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neuroendocrine system that is activated in response to stress. The hypothalamus 
increases its secretion of corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH), which stimulates the 
anterior pituitary gland to secrete adrenocorticotropin (ACTH), which in turn stimulates 
the adrenal cortex to secrete cortisol into the systemic circulation. Negative feedback 
occurs at each step, such that cortisol inhibits further ACTH and CRH secretion, and 
ACTH inhibits further CRH secretion. Activation of the HPA axis results in various 
adaptive physiological changes, including the mobilisation of glucose and amino acids, 
and the inhibition of inflammation. It also results in neuroplastic changes in the 
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex (Massart et al., 2012). 
 It has been suggested that major depressive disorder involves HPA axis overactivity 
and impaired negative feedback due to a combination of severe stress and genetic 
vulnerability (Massart et al., 2012; Palazidou, 2012). Evidence supporting this hypothesis 
includes the increased levels of CRH found in the cerebrospinal fluid of suicide victims 
who had major depressive disorder (Nemeroff et al., 1988), and the increased levels of 
salivary and plasma cortisol in depressed patients (Goodyer et al., 1996). The neurotoxic 
effects of elevated cortisol have also been suggested as an explanation for the reductions 
in hippocampal volume found in patients with major depressive disorder (MacQueen et 
al., 2003). 
 However, HPA axis dysregulation is far from a universal finding in cases of major 
depressive disorder. A study by Strickland et al. (2002) not only failed to find increased 
levels of salivary cortisol in depressed patients, but also found increased rather than 
decreased serotonin responsivity. These findings run counter to both the HPA axis 
hypothesis and the monoamine hypothesis. Belmaker and Agam (2008) note that 
although HPA axis dysregulation occurs in some cases of major depressive disorder, 
most people treated for major depressive disorder have no evidence of HPA axis 
dysregulation, just as most patients have no evidence of impaired monoamine 
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neurotransmission. Another author estimates the prevalence of HPA axis dysregulation 
in major depressive disorder as around fifty percent (Palazidou, 2012). 
As with impaired monoamine neurotransmission, then, HPA axis dysregulation 
appears to be an important factor associated with some cases of major depressive 
disorder. A particular strength is that it offers a promising account of how stress might 
produce changes at the neurobiological level in such cases. However, it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the development of major depressive disorder, and so cannot 
be considered to be a defining feature of the diagnosis. These findings support the notion 
that major depressive disorder is heterogeneous with respect to its neurochemistry.  
 
5.2.4 Brain circuitry 
A recent trend in neuroscientific research into major depressive disorder has been to look 
for mechanisms at the level of brain circuitry. Using positron emission tomography 
(PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques, some people with 
major depressive disorder have been found to exhibit changes in the activation of the 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), which is an area of the brain that constitutes 
part of a circuit purported to be associated with emotional processing (Drevets et al., 
1997; Groenewold et al., 2013). Moreover, these changes in sgACC activation were shown 
to normalise following treatment. These results suggest that altered activity of the brain 
circuitry involved in emotional processing is associated with some of the affective 
symptoms of major depressive disorder. 
While this is a significant finding, there is still room for heterogeneity at the level of 
these neural mechanisms. A review by Drevets et al. (2008) notes that patients with major 
depressive disorder who had first-degree relatives with mania, alcoholism, or sociopathy 
did not differ from healthy controls with respect to sgACC glucose metabolism or 
volume. Similarly, a review by Roiser et al. (2012) suggests that some patients with major 
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depressive disorder have abnormal sgACC activation during emotional processing while 
other patients have normal baseline sgACC activation, with the former group showing 
most improvement with pharmacological treatment and the latter showing most 
improvement with psychological therapy. While this has potential prospects for treatment 
selection, it rests on the finding that there is variability of brain mechanisms among 
patients with major depressive disorder. A meta-analysis by Graham et al. (2013) 
implicates a variety of other brain areas associated with major depressive disorder, 
including the occipital cortex, insula, supplementary motor cortex, and the cerebellum, as 
well as finding contradictory data regarding the activity of the right amygdala, again 
highlighting the variability of brain mechanisms across cases. Another review suggests 
differences in the neurobiological correlates of different groups of people with major 
depressive disorder (Baumeister and Parker, 2012). 
Another concern is that it is contested whether conceptualising major depressive 
disorder exclusively at the level of neural circuitry is sufficient for understanding some of 
the key features of its psychopathology. It has been claimed that neural mechanisms are 
of utmost interest because they are the proximal causes of behaviour (Roiser, 2015). 
However, there is no a priori reason to suppose that disorders must be defined by their 
most proximal causes. I argue that applying this neurocentrism universally can lead to 
trivial conclusions. For example, consider a patient presenting with a cough. Strictly 
speaking, the proximal cause of the cough qua behaviour is a neural mechanism, namely 
the stimulation of the medulla oblongata by afferent fibres in the vagus nerve leading to 
the subsequent firing of efferent fibres that innervate the respiratory muscles. While this 
may be true, it is too trivial to be of explanatory significance in the clinic. Rather, we want 
a diagnosis to capture the causal process, albeit a less proximal one, that is perpetuating 
this neural mechanism. That is to say, we want the diagnosis to tell us whether the cough 
reflex is being perpetuated by a tumour, an infection, an inflammatory condition, or 
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pulmonary oedema from heart failure, partly because this would tell us where we can 
therapeutically intervene. Similarly, in the case of major depressive disorder, the 
symptoms may indeed be mediated by proximal neural mechanisms, but conceptualising 
the disorder exclusively at the level of these neural mechanisms risks explanatory 
triviality, because it leaves out crucial information regarding the joint contribution of 
other causal processes on which the maintenance of these neurological mechanisms is 
contingent and, moreover, on which it may be possible to intervene. As with the cough 
example, it could be argued that an explanatory model of major depressive disorder 
would need to capture these processes to be of clinical value. 
 
5.2.5 Psychology 
In addition to attempts to characterise major depressive disorder at biological levels, 
numerous psychological theories of major depressive disorder have been proposed. 
Rather than focusing on biological phenomena such as genes, neurochemicals, and neural 
circuits, these theories aim to capture regularities at the level of intentional processes, 
although these processes may be realised by biological systems involving genes, 
neurochemicals, and neural circuits (Radden, 2003). Psychological accounts of major 
depressive disorder include psychodynamic, behavioural, and cognitive theories. 
 Psychodynamic theories explain personality and behaviour in terms of interactions 
of motivational drives, particularly unconscious drives, and how these are modified by 
childhood events. One of the earliest psychodynamic accounts of depression is Sigmund 
Freud’s ([1917] 1946) theory that it is linked to early negative experiences, such as loss or 
rejection. He proposed that the repressed anger towards the person whom one has lost 
becomes inwardly directed, producing depression, or melancholia. Melanie Klein ([1957] 
1984) further developed this idea and characterised depression as a state of intrapersonal 
confusion, whereby the conflicting unconscious drives within the person produce feelings 
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of a divided self. One of the purposes of psychodynamic therapy, then, is to increase 
insight into these unconscious operations underlying the symptoms, allowing the person 
to gain control over his or her behaviour. 
 In contrast to psychodynamic theories, behavioural theories focus on observable 
behaviour and the environmental conditions that influence the learning of this behaviour, 
rather than on intrapsychic drives. According to this approach, learned maladaptive 
behaviour has a crucial role in the onset and maintenance of depression. Charles Ferster 
(1973) and Peter Lewinsohn (1974) proposed that depressive symptoms are maintained 
through decreased positive reinforcement of healthy behaviour, increased reinforcement 
of passive behaviour, and punishment of healthy behaviour. Martin Seligman (1975) 
suggested that depression is a state of learned helplessness, whereby the person learns 
that he or she has a lack of control over the outcomes of situations after enduring 
inescapable aversive stimuli. More recent research has found empirical support for the 
role of avoidance behaviour in the development and persistence of major depressive 
disorder (Carvalho and Hopko, 2011). 
 Cognitive theories of depression go beyond overt behaviour, and focus on the 
content and processing of thoughts. Perhaps the most prominent cognitive theorist of 
depression is Aaron Beck (1967), who proposed that depression consists of maladaptive 
cognitive processes. While he acknowledges that adverse life events have important roles 
in the production and maintenance of these maladaptive cognitive processes, he 
considers the cognitive processes themselves to be the central features of depression. 
Beck’s theory suggests that a depressed person has negative thoughts about the self (“I 
am worthless”), the world (“my life is terrible”), and the future (“things won’t get 
better”), otherwise known as Beck’s cognitive triad. The formation of these negative 
thoughts is influenced by deeply entrenched dysfunctional beliefs and cognitive biases, 
such as overgeneralisation, dichotomous thinking, and selective thinking. The negative 
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thoughts are purported to have causal connections with emotions, behaviours, and 
physiological processes, thus accounting for the other symptoms of major depressive 
disorder. In recent years, researchers have focused more specifically on the roles of 
negative cognitive biases in depression (Robinson and Sahakian, 2008; Gotlib and 
Joorman, 2010). Cognitive-behavioural therapy, which aims to challenge and modify the 
maladaptive cognitive and behavioural processes, has been shown to be effective as a 
treatment for major depressive disorder (Whitfield and Williams, 2003). 
 Attempts to conceptualise major depressive disorder at a psychological level, then, 
have yielded a diverse mix of theories that emphasise different features. As discussed 
above, psychodynamic theories emphasise motivational drives and negative early life 
experiences, behavioural theories emphasise learned maladaptive behaviours, and 
cognitive theories emphasise negative thoughts and cognitive biases. Whether or not 
these theories can ultimately be unified into a single theory is currently unclear, although 
there has been some attempt to integrate concepts from different theoretical perspectives 
(Street et al., 1999). 
 As with the biological factors discussed earlier, there is significant variability with 
respect to the particular psychological factors associated with the development of major 
depressive disorder. Contrary to Beck’s (1967) original hypothesis that there is a certain 
sort of depressive cognitive style that is characteristic of major depressive disorder, 
empirical studies suggest that episodes of major depressive disorder can be associated 
with a variety of different cognitive styles. For example, in a longitudinal study looking at 
inpatients with unipolar major depressive disorder without psychotic symptoms, 
Hamilton and Abramson (1983) report that the patients exhibit heterogeneity with 
respect to their cognitive patterns, which include their attributional styles, dysfunctional 
attitudes, and measures of hopelessness. Moreover, they report that around fifty percent 
of the cognitive styles exhibited by the depressed patients approximate the cognitive 
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styles of healthy individuals. In a later paper, Abramson et al. (1989) not only report that 
major depressive disorder can be associated with different attributional styles, but also 
that this is dependent on the differential responses of people with different attributional 
styles to different sorts of adverse life event. These studies indicate that major depressive 
disorder is not characterised by a singular kind of cognitive pattern, but can be associated 
with several different cognitive patterns that interact with various situational factors in 
different ways. 
 Another psychological measure that has been investigated in relation to major 
depressive disorder is personality. In particular, the personality style of neuroticism has 
been hypothesised, from both psychodynamic (Freud, [1917] 1946; Klein, [1957] 1984) 
and cognitive (Beck, 1967) perspectives, to be a central to the development of the 
depressive syndrome. Empirical research has yielded some support for an association 
between neuroticism and major depressive disorder, but there are also significant 
anomalies. For example, Kendler et al. (2006) report that high neuroticism is associated 
with the development of major depressive disorder in general, but also report that there is 
an inverse correlation between neuroticism and major depressive disorder in the subset 
of patients with melancholic features. These results support the idea of major depressive 
disorder as a psychologically heterogeneous category with different clinical variants 
having associations with different personality styles. 
 The psychological heterogeneity of major depressive disorder is also reflected by 
the differential responses of patients to different kinds of psychological intervention. In a 
recent randomised clinical trial, Driessen et al. (2016) examine the associations between 
the psychological profiles of patients with major depressive disorder and their responses 
to cognitive-behavioural therapy and psychodynamic therapy. These two kinds of therapy 
assume different theoretical frameworks and target different psychological processes, 
with cognitive-behavioural therapy targeting cognitive biases and avoidance behaviours, 
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and psychodynamic therapy targeting the interactions of partly unconscious motivational 
drives. The authors report different responses to the two kinds of therapy in different 
subsets of patients with major depressive disorder. Patients with high anxiety and shorter 
episode durations achieved better improvement of their depressive symptoms with 
cognitive-behavioural therapy, while patients with low anxiety and longer episode 
durations achieved better improvement with psychodynamic therapy. While it is 
acknowledged that there are many possible hypotheses that could account for these 
observations, the authors suggest that the results are likely to be attributable to the 
different subsets of patients having different cognitive styles and personality structures 
underlying their depressive episodes. For example, longer episode durations may indicate 
depressive episodes that are related to more pervasive personality structures that are 
more amenable to psychodynamic interventions, while high anxiety may indicate negative 
thought patterns that are more amenable to cognitive-behavioural interventions. There 
are also similar studies which report differential responses to cognitive-behavioural 
therapy and interpersonal therapy in different subsets of patients with major depressive 
disorder, again supporting the possibility that the psychological structures underlying 
depressive symptoms are heterogeneous (McBride et al., 2006; Joyce et al., 2007). 
 
5.2.6 Social context 
As noted in §5.2.2, it is understood that environmental factors have important roles in 
the development of major depressive disorder. In a classic study, Brown and Harris 
(1978) surveyed a sample of 458 women to investigate the connections between 
depressive episodes and social circumstances. Of the thirty-seven participants who had 
suffered from depression in the previous year, ninety percent had endured adverse life 
events or stressful social circumstances, compared to only thirty percent of the 
participants who had not suffered from depression in the previous year. Three kinds of 
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factor were identified, namely (i) provoking factors that trigger depression, such as 
bereavement or being in an abusive relationship, (ii) vulnerability factors that increase the 
risk of depression, such as maternal loss before the age of eleven and lack of a confiding 
relationship, and (iii) protective factors that decrease the risk of depression, such as 
employment and intimacy with one’s spouse. 
Of course, the claim that social factors are distal causes that contribute to the 
aetiology of major depressive disorder is not particularly contentious. After all, it is 
recognised that social factors are important contributors to the aetiologies of many 
medical disorders, including coronary heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, type II 
diabetes mellitus, and even several kinds of cancer (World Health Organisation, 2003). 
However, there are theorists who endorse the stronger claim that some cases of major 
depressive disorder are not merely caused by, but are partly constituted by social 
processes. In the philosophy of psychiatry, this is associated with externalism about 
psychiatric disorder, whereby the locus of a disorder is not confined within the body, but 
extends into the social sphere (Zachar and Kendler, 2007; Broome and Bortolotti, 2009; 
Fuchs, 2012; Davies, 2016). 
Different arguments for externalism are on offer. Recall my argument in §5.2.4 that 
a clinically useful conceptualisation of a disorder cannot consist solely of its most 
proximal mechanism, but must capture the joint contribution of other causal processes 
on which the maintenance of this mechanism is contingent and on which it may be 
possible to intervene. Thomas Fuchs (2012: pp. 336–337) suggests that such causal 
processes need not be restricted to internal physiological processes, but could also 
include external social processes on the grounds that they may be processes that are 
actively perpetuating the patient’s condition. He proposes that psychopathology cannot 
be understood as being detached from the interpersonal context, because the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal processes involved are continually intertwined in relations 
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of “horizontal circular causality”. Other theorists suggest that the proximal mechanisms 
of psychiatric disorders themselves must be thought of as being partly constituted by 
interpersonal processes. For example, Broome and Bortolotti (2009) argue that unlike 
many symptoms of medical disorders, psychopathology often has intentional content 
whose meaning is supervenient on the social context in which the patient is situated. 
Hence, a description which is exclusively in terms of neural processes cannot account for 
the variance in intentional content across cases. 
 There is empirical evidence consistent with the idea that situational factors are 
partly responsible for the variance in depressive psychopathology. First, interpersonal 
therapy, which focuses on the interactions between symptoms and social stressors, has 
been shown to be an effective treatment for major depressive disorder (Klerman et al., 
1974; Weissman et al., 1981). Second, in a study of 4,856 individuals with symptoms of 
major depressive disorder, Keller et al. (2007) reported that different sorts of social 
stressor were associated with different symptom profiles. For example, chronic stress was 
found to be associated with fatigue and hypersomnia, while bereavement and romantic 
longing were found to be associated with sadness, anhedonia, appetite loss, and guilt. 
These associations were shown not only to hold across different individuals with singular 
episodes, but also across different episodes within the same individual. And so, the above 
considerations suggest that there are good reasons to consider social contextual factors as 
partly determining the natures of depressive episodes. Moreover, they indicate that the 
ways in which these factors contribute to the various permutations of major depressive 
disorder are heterogeneous. 
 
5.2.7 Summary 
The evidence reviewed in the above paragraphs highlights two important features of 
major depressive disorder. The first feature is heterogeneity. The diagnostic category of 
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major depressive disorder does not correspond to a unitary kind of causal state, but 
subsumes a varied range of possible causal states. Moreover, this heterogeneity seems to 
be exhibited at every level of analysis, including genetics, neurobiology, psychology, and 
social context. The concern, then, is that major depressive disorder may lack unity as a 
diagnosis, as it is possible for different patients with major depressive disorder to 
instantiate very different causal structures (Poland et al., 1994; Murphy, 2006; Hyman, 
2010). 
 The second feature is complexity. Instances of depressive psychopathology are not 
generally attributable to singular causes acting individually, but to the complex 
interactions of several causal factors in varying combinations. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, these causal factors belong to different levels of analysis, from the molecular to 
the interpersonal. The implication of this complexity is that there is no single privileged 
level at which major depressive disorder can be aetiologically defined (Kendler, 2012). 
Rather, a comprehensive understanding of the disorder requires the consideration of the 
various biological, psychological, and social processes that interact across levels. 
 
5.3 Conceptualising psychiatric disorders 
5.3.1 The limits of simple essentialism 
A philosophical implication of the heterogeneity and complexity of major depressive 
disorder is that the diagnosis is not amenable to a simple essentialistic analysis. That is to 
say, there is no essential property that is instantiated by every case of major depressive 
disorder in the way that T. pallidum infection is instantiated by every case of syphilis or in 
the way that the abnormal CFTR ion transport system is instantiated by every case of 
cystic fibrosis. Couched in the two-dimensional semantic framework presented in 
Chapter 4, then, it turns out a posteriori that the secondary intension of “major depressive 
disorder” does not refer to an essentialistic kind that is determined by an invariant causal 
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structure, but to a heterogeneous kind that includes a variety of different causal 
structures. Moreover, in virtue of the heterogeneity of its symptoms and the multiple 
possible ways of satisfying the diagnostic criteria, it is also the case that the primary 
intension is not uniform, but disjunctive. 
 Nonetheless, the failure of simple essentialism regarding major depressive disorder 
does not entail that the category is arbitrary. Major depressive disorder may indeed be 
associated with a diverse range of factors, but these factors do seem to cluster together in 
statistically significant ways. With respect to symptom criteria, Zimmerman et al. (2015) 
note that of the 227 theoretically possible combinations that meet the diagnostic 
threshold, nine account for over forty percent of the actual observed cases. With respect 
to causes, there are statistical correlations between some of the factors discussed 
throughout §5.2. For example, HPA axis dysregulation has associations with chronic 
stress, altered serotonin receptor binding, and neuroplastic changes in areas of the brain 
purported to be associated with emotional processing (Drevets et al., 2008; Palazidou, 
2012). There are also plausible theoretical mechanisms for how some of these factors 
might be connected. Therefore, while the relations between the various factors are highly 
contingent, far from universal, and likely to vary across cases, there are good reasons to 
suppose that they are not merely accidental, but might reflect causal processes. 
 
5.3.2 Homeostatic property clusters 
In light of the above, there has recently been a move in the philosophy of psychiatry to 
conceptualise some psychiatric disorders as homeostatic property cluster kinds (Beebee 
and Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; Kendler et al., 2011; Tsou, 2013; Kincaid, 2014). We 
previously encountered the concept of the homeostatic property cluster in Chapter 4. As 
noted in §4.3.3, it was developed by the philosopher of biology Richard Boyd (1999) to 
describe how the members of a biological species resemble each other. The members of 
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the species Canis lupus, for example, tend to share common properties, such as having 
four legs, two eyes, tails, prominent snouts, and sensitive olfaction (Ereshefsky, 2010: p. 
259). However, there is significant variation within C. lupus, such that its members do not 
have to instantiate all of these properties and no single property is necessary or sufficient 
for membership of the species. For example, Pembroke Welsh corgis are sometimes born 
without tails and British bulldogs tend to have flat snouts. 
 Importantly, the associations between the properties proposed by Boyd are not 
accidental, but are due to homeostatic causal mechanisms. The properties tend to cluster 
together because they are contingently connected by causal processes. For example, the 
members of C. lupus breed with each other, have a common phylogenetic heritage, and 
are exposed to similar environmental influences. These processes sustain the stability of 
the cluster of similarities across the members of the species. However, as mentioned 
above, the connections between the properties in the cluster are contingent, and so an 
individual member may not fulfil all of the properties. 
 Applying this to major depressive disorder, a homeostatic property cluster 
conceptualisation accommodates the idea that the disorder is not determined by a single 
essential property, but involves multiple properties that tend to cluster together due to 
causal processes. Individual patients with major depressive disorder need not instantiate 
all of these properties and no single property is necessary for the development of the 
condition. Hence, different combinations of properties may be instantiated by different 
patients with the diagnosis. 
Kendler et al. (2011: p. 1147) present two approaches to conceptualising psychiatric 
disorders as homeostatic property clusters, which I respectively call the aetiological 
property cluster approach and the symptom network approach. According to the 
aetiological property cluster approach, the various causal factors that produce the 
symptoms of a disorder interact and sustain each other in a stable cluster. For example, 
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Jonathan Tsou (2013) characterises major depressive disorder as an aetiological property 
cluster involving mostly neurobiological properties that tend to occur together due to 
causal relations between them. However, this may not be sufficient. As noted in §5.2.5 
and §5.2.6, depressive psychopathology is highly contingent on psychological variables 
and social contextual factors in addition to neurobiological properties for its development 
and maintenance. Hence, if we are to conceptualise the causal profile of major depressive 
disorder as an aetiological property cluster, then we would need to include social and 
psychological, as well as biological, variables in the cluster. According to Kendler et al., 
these would include “genes, cell receptors, neural systems, psychological states, 
environmental inputs and socio-cultural variables” (Kendler et al., 2011: p. 1147). What 
this suggests is that the causal relations between the variables cross different levels of 
organisation, from the molecular to the social. 
This approach presented by Kendler et al. has a number of strengths as a strategy 
for conceptualising major depressive disorder. First, it acknowledges the diverse range of 
causal factors that have been shown to contribute to the production of depressive 
symptoms, thus offering a more complete aetiological account of the disorder than a pure 
neurobiological account. Second, it accommodates the causal heterogeneity seen at many 
levels in major depressive disorder. Third, it offers an account of why, despite this 
heterogeneity, these diverse properties at various levels tend to cluster together in 
statistically significant ways. The associations between them are not accidental, but due to 
causal processes. Therefore, according to the aetiological property cluster approach, 
major depressive disorder is not an aetiologically neutral or arbitrary category, but one 
that is informed by causal considerations. 
 A different approach to conceptualising psychiatric disorders as homeostatic 
property clusters is the symptom network approach pioneered by the psychologist Denny 
Borsboom (2008). This focuses on the causal relations between the symptoms 
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themselves, rather between any underlying causes and the symptoms. It conceives a 
psychiatric disorder as consisting of a set of symptoms that causally reinforce each other 
in a stable cluster. Cramer et al. (2010) present such a symptom network model for major 
depressive disorder. In this model, “fatigue may lead to a lack of concentration, which 
may lead to thoughts of inferiority and worry, which may in turn lead to sleepless nights, 
thereby reinforcing fatigue” (Cramer et al., 2010: 140–141). This accounts for why, in 
spite of there being numerous possible combinations of symptoms in major depressive 
disorder, certain symptoms tend to cluster together in statistically significant ways. Major 
depressive disorder is not just an arbitrary collection of symptoms, but a dynamic process 
in which causal mechanisms between various symptoms sustain the aggregation of these 
symptoms. 
 Furthermore, the symptom network model is presented by Cramer et al. (2010) as a 
way of accounting for the high degrees of comorbidity between different psychiatric 
disorders. Instead of postulating latent variables as common causes of the different 
disorders, they suggest that certain symptoms of one disorder may also have causal 
relations with certain symptoms of another disorder. For example, they propose that 
there are bridge symptoms shared by both major depressive disorder and generalised 
anxiety disorder, such as insomnia, fatigue, and diminished ability to concentrate. These 
bridge symptoms not only have causal connections with the other symptoms of major 
depressive disorder, but also with the other symptoms of generalised anxiety disorder, 
hence explaining why the two disorders tend to be associated. 
 Borsboom’s (2008) idea that the tendencies of certain symptom clusters to recur 
may be due to causal relations between the symptoms is novel. Importantly, it challenges 
the traditional attitude that the clustering together of certain symptoms must imply 
commonalities with respect to their underlying causes. Nonetheless, as noted by Kendler 
et al. (2011), there is a way to interpret the symptom network approach as being a 
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homeostatic property cluster approach. As with the aetiological property cluster 
approach, the associations between the various properties in the network are not 
accidental, but causal. Moreover, these causal relations are statistical rather than 
deterministic, and so patients with the disorder do not have to instantiate all of the 
symptoms, but may have varying combinations of different symptoms. 
 The symptom network model of major depressive disorder is presented by Cramer 
et al. (2010) as being a stand-alone model. However, it could also be argued that the 
aetiological property cluster model and the symptom network model do not contradict, 
but complement, each other. As noted by Danks et al. (2010), the claim that the 
symptoms causally influence each other is entirely compatible with the claim that the 
factors that cause these symptoms sustain each other in clusters. Similarly, in the model 
suggested by Kendler et al. (2011: p. 1147), it is suggested that a series of psychological 
and biological causes interact with each other to produce the clinical features, and that in 
turn these clinical features causally interact with each other. Therefore, it may in principle 
be possible, indeed perhaps desirable, to integrate aetiological property cluster and 
symptom network approaches into a more comprehensive homeostatic property cluster 
model of the disorder. 
 It seems at least plausible that major depressive disorder could turn out to be 
characterisable as a homeostatic property cluster, as long as the properties include 
biological, psychological, and social variables, as well as the observable clinical features. 
However it should be acknowledged that such a conceptualisation currently remains 
promissory. While the empirical research reviewed throughout §5.2 has yielded 
knowledge of an array of causal variables associated with major depressive disorder, we 
are far from understanding the precise natures of the relations between many of these 
variables. Accordingly, attitudes among theorists in the philosophy of psychiatry towards 
the homeostatic property cluster model of major depressive disorder currently range 
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from optimistic (Tsou, 2013; Kincaid. 2014) to sceptical (Haslam, 2014). Nonetheless, as 
argued by Kendler et al., (2011), a good reason to take the theory seriously, aside from its 
plausibility, is that it directs research towards the practical goal of articulating the causal 




In spite of its plausibility, there still remain some challenges to a conceptualisation of 
major depressive disorder as a homeostatic property cluster that involves causal variables 
at different levels of organisation. The first challenge concerns how we make sense of the 
causal relations that cross different levels of organisation. The development of a unified 
theoretical model of a disorder can be relatively straightforward where the processes and 
mechanisms involved fall under a single explanatory perspective, but it is problematic in 
psychiatry where disorders are purported to involve interactions between different kinds 
of process that require different theoretical perspectives. For example, the processes 
involved in some bodily disorders such as myocardial infarction and acute appendicitis 
can be understood with a biological explanatory perspective, but understanding the 
different kinds of process involved in major depressive disorder requires a combination 
of biological, psychological, and social explanatory perspectives. The difficulty is how to 
integrate these different kinds of process. 
One suggestion might be to try to reduce the higher-level processes to lower-level 
phenomena. In his work on the visual system, David Marr (1982) proposes that the same 
process can be viewed from three different levels of explanation, namely (i) computation, 
or what the system does in terms of problems and goals, (ii) algorithm, or how the system 
does what it does in terms of information inputs and outputs, and (iii) implementation, or 
how the system is realised by neurons in the brain. Given that these three levels are 
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supposed to represent the same process, we might expect that the higher-level cognitive 
generalisations could ultimately be replaced by lower-level facts about neurons, genes, 
and molecules. 
However, Dominic Murphy (2008) argues that there are limits to this reductive 
approach in psychiatry. Whereas Marr’s different levels are supposed to describe the 
same process, the processes described in higher-level terms in psychiatry are often 
different from the processes described in lower-level terms. For example, poor social 
relations and negative self-reinforcement are radically different kinds of process from 
underactive serotonin neurotransmission. Therefore, major depressive disorder presents a 
scenario where higher-level processes are not reduced to lower-level processes, but where 
different kinds of process from different levels causally influence each other. 
Kendler and Campbell (2009) advocate a particular philosophical account of 
causation that accommodates the possibility of causal relations between radically different 
kinds of process, namely the interventionist theory of causation developed by James 
Woodward (2003). Broadly speaking, the interventionist theory of causation states that 
for X to count as a cause of Y is for there to be a regular response of Y on an 
intervention on X in at least some background circumstances. For example, if we want to 
know whether the drug fluoxetine causes remission of depressive symptoms, we can 
undertake a randomised controlled trial where the independent variable is the 
administration of fluoxetine, the dependent variable is the presence of depressive 
symptoms, and placebo control helps to ensure that the observed causal effect of the 
intervention flows through the pharmacological action of fluoxetine rather than through 
a different variable. This accomplishes the important task of distinguishing between 
merely correlatory and genuinely causal relations. Consider that variations in X are 
correlated with variations in Y and with variations in Z. Now consider that intervening on 
Z does not result in any changes in X or Y, intervening on Y does not result in any 
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changes in X or Z, but X results in regular responses in both Y and Z. It can be inferred 
from this that Y does not cause Z and vice versa, but X is the common cause of Y and Z. 
The attraction for Kendler and Campbell of the interventionist theory is its 
permissiveness. It does not place restrictions on the kinds of variable that are allowed to 
feature in the characterisation of a disorder. There are no requirements for a variable to 
belong to a particular biological level of organisation, or even for variables to belong to 
the same level of explanation. In fact, in another publication, John Campbell (2008) 
argues that because no particular kind of variable is granted privileged status over other 
kinds, we can give up talk of hierarchical “levels of explanation” altogether and instead 
think of the characterisation of a disorder as being “many-sorted”. And so, a homeostatic 
property cluster conceptualisation of major depressive disorder can include biological, 
psychological, and social variables, without considering any kind of variable to be more 
fundamental than the others. There is also no requirement for the specific mechanisms 
involved in the causal processes to be fully understood (Kendler and Campbell, 2009: p. 
884). The inference that X causes Y is supported by the observation that intervening on 
X results in a regular response of Y, even if we do not know of a mechanism linking X 
and Y. For example, we can establish that social and psychological variables causally 
influence biological variables, and vice versa, even though we may not have clear ideas 
about precisely how they do so. 
The interventionist theory of causation, then, accommodates the conceptualisation 
of major depressive disorder as a homeostatic property cluster involving different kinds 
of variable that are connected via causal relations. Because the theory avoids 
preconceptions about what kinds of thing can constitute causes and what sorts of 
mechanism are involved, it permits legitimately causal relations between biological, 
psychological, and social variables, even though we may currently be in the dark about 
what some of the mechanisms linking these variables might look like. A significant 
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implication of this is that the interventionist theory offers one way around the 
dichotomy, put forward by Karl Jaspers ([1913] 1997), between meaningful 
understanding and causal explanation in psychiatry. Under the interventionist theory, 
intentional states that contain particular meanings qualify as genuine causes of a variable 
if interventions on these states are shown to result in regular responses of the variable. 
Indeed, Woodward (2008: pp. 157–158) notes that this is precisely what happens in 
cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
However, a problem with assuming the interventionist theory of causation is that it 
does not, on its own, seem to be adequate for satisfying the requirements for 
paradigmatic cases of causal explanation in medicine. As mentioned above, the 
interventionist theory does not require knowledge of mechanisms to establish the 
presence of a causal relation. In Chapter 3, though, I argued that a medical diagnosis 
explains a set of patient data E by specifying its cause C, but also that the intelligibility of 
the explanation also depends on theoretical knowledge of the mechanisms by which C 
produces E. Hence, if we are to assume the interventionist theory for the purposes of 
accounting for causation in psychiatry, then we would need to concede that causal 
explanation in psychiatry does not meet the standard of causal explanation in bodily 
medicine. 
There are two ways of responding to this objection. One response is that the 
interventionist theory could be complemented by knowledge of mechanisms. This is the 
approach advocated by Kendler (2014), who suggests that a research programme can use 
the interventionist theory to establish the presence of a causal relation between variables, 
which in turn can be complemented by a further research programme aimed at specifying 
at least some of the mechanisms involved in this causal relation. Hence, according to this 
view, a mechanistic approach is not a challenge to the interventionist theory of causation, 
but a supplementation of it (Kendler and Campbell, 2008: p. 883). The other response, 
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which draws from Woodward (2002), is that that mechanisms can be reducible to causes 
and analysed counterfactually according to the interventionist theory. For example, we 
might establish whether the mechanism of angiotensin II production is causally relevant 
in the pathway by which heart failure causes leg oedema by intervening on this 
mechanism with an angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitor. According to this view, 
then, knowledge of the mechanisms linking C and E would amount to knowledge of a 
finer succession of causes between C and E. It may be that these sorts of response would 
not be particularly relevant to an interventionist like Campbell (2006), for whom part of 
the point of assuming an interventionist theory of causation is to circumvent altogether 
the desire for mechanistic knowledge. Furthermore, it may be that for some observed 
causal relations, especially those between variables at different levels of organisation, we 
may not be able to specify stable mechanisms. Nonetheless, the above responses do show 
that the interventionist theory of causation does not preclude a complementary research 
programme that is aimed at attaining knowledge of at least some of the mechanisms 
involved in some of the causal relations. 
Before we move on to the second challenge to the homeostatic property cluster 
model of major depressive disorder, it is also worth acknowledging another rather 
different philosophical account of causation between biological and psychological states. 
The sophisticated account developed by Bolton and Hill (2004) develops the idea that 
nature does not just contain patterns exemplified by non-intentional causation, but also 
patterns exemplified by intentional causation. The former refers to causation according to 
the dynamics described by the laws of physics and chemistry, whereas the latter is 
characterised by its informational content. Bolton and Hill note that intentional causes 
are often invoked in biological explanations. For example, the regulation of blood 
pressure depends on the informational content encoded by the frequency of firing by 
arterial baroreceptors. They also argue that psychological explanations that involve 
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meanings are also intentional causal explanations, thus making them continuous with 
biological explanations. The authors broadly follow the view of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1953) that meaning is not reducible to a symbolic representation in the brain, but 
pertains to the guidance of activity that is embedded in social practices. Moreover, they 
suggest that a non-intentional causal process can interfere with an intentional causal 
process, such as when structural damage to the brain disrupts the comprehension of 
speech. The theory presented by Bolton and Hill, while more metaphysically ambitious 
than Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation, does offer another possible 
framework for understanding how different sorts of causal factor can be integrated in the 
conceptualisation of a psychiatric disorder. The general upshot of the above discussion, 
then, is that there are appropriate philosophical theories of causation that can make sense 
of the idea of causal relations between biological and psychological factors. 
 The second challenge to the homeostatic property cluster model of major 
depressive disorder is conceptual and concerns where we draw the limits as to what can 
justifiably be called a homeostatic property cluster. As noted in §5.2.6 and §5.3.2, there is 
evidence indicating that social contextual factors have important roles in maintaining 
depressive psychopathology, and so a conceptualisation of major depressive disorder that 
meets the structural requirements for a homeostatic property cluster would need to 
include these social contextual factors as well as individual biological and psychological 
factors. This potentially expands the set of things that qualify as homeostatic property 
clusters, which is a worry for those who support the view that homeostatic property 
clusters are natural kinds. Such a point is made by Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary (2010: p. 
22), who appeal to Paul Griffiths’ (1999) observation that even a social convention like 
money could arguably be considered an homeostatic property cluster, because there are 
causal processes in society that sustain it as a stable phenomenon. However, in response, 
I argue that this is not so much a problem for the claim that major depressive disorder 
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can be conceptualised as a homeostatic property cluster, but rather a problem for the 
claim that it should be considered a natural kind. As I have stated in §5.1, this latter claim 
is not required for a clinically useful conceptualisation of major depressive disorder. It is 
possible to conceptualise major depressive disorder as involving a cluster of causal factors 
that sustain each other, while at the same time acknowledging that it is highly social. 
The third challenge is epistemological. Even if we are able to conceptualise major 
depressive disorder as a homeostatic property cluster, such a conceptualisation may still 
be too broad for the diagnostic category to be explanatorily useful with respect to 
individual cases. Again, this is related to the contention that the development and 
maintenance of depressive psychopathology depend on highly contingent facts about 
individual constitution and environmental context, and so an aetiological 
conceptualisation of the disorder which meets the structural requirements for a stable 
homeostatic property cluster would need to include an extensive and diverse range of 
biological, psychological, and social factors. Rather than looking like a tight cluster of 
properties held together by robust processes, then, such a conceptualisation could look 
more like a loose network of diverse variables that are only probabilistically connected by 
highly contingent causal relations. Therefore, a homeostatic property cluster 
conceptualisation may not be enough to compensate for the causal heterogeneity of 
major depressive disorder in a manner that is clinically useful. Due to the looseness of the 
model, the diagnostic category could still subsume a vast array of different possible causal 
pathways that could result in the symptoms of major depressive disorder. I discuss 
further implications of this in Chapter 6. 
In summary, a homeostatic property cluster conceptualisation of major depressive 
disorder seems plausible, although many of the details remain promissory. However, it is 
only plausible if social as well as biological and psychological factors are accommodated 
in the conceptualisation, and if we assume a philosophical attitude towards causation that 
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makes sense of causal relations between these different kinds of factor. A significant 
worry, though, is that even if the disorder does turn out to be characterisable as a 
homeostatic property cluster, there is no guarantee that this will significantly increase its 
epistemic utility, as the cluster may turn out to be too loose for the diagnostic category to 
be explanatorily valuable with respect to individual cases. 
 
5.4 Other psychiatric disorders 
5.4.1 Schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder 
So far, I have examined major depressive disorder as a paradigmatic example of a 
diagnostic category in psychiatry that is causally heterogeneous at multiple levels of 
analysis. Of course, major depressive disorder may not be representative of all psychiatric 
disorders, and so it is important to consider to what degree the above considerations are 
applicable to other diagnoses in psychiatry. This will be the focus of what is to follow. As 
we shall see, psychiatric disorders constitute a varied group of conditions that exhibit the 
attributes of causal heterogeneity and complexity to different degrees.  
Current empirical evidence suggests that the above issues regarding major 
depressive disorder also apply to some of the more common major psychiatric disorders. 
Three of these are schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder. 
Schizophrenia, which is typically associated with delusions, hallucinations, disorganised 
speech, catatonic behaviour, and diminished emotional expression, is heterogeneous with 
respect to both symptoms and causal factors. As with major depressive disorder, 
different combinations of symptoms can satisfy the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, 
with a minimum of two out of five being required (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013: p. 99). Genetic factors increase the risk, but these likely involve a complex array of 
genes with small effect sizes (Kendler, 2006). Research suggests that dopamine 
dysregulation is associated with the disorder, but the evidence has been inconsistent and 
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only accounts for some aspects of the psychopathology (Guillin et al., 2007). Correlates at 
the level of neural circuitry are also varied, with neuroimaging revealing a diverse range of 
structural connectivity alterations (Wheeler and Voineskos, 2014). Certain social 
circumstances are associated with increased incidence, including urbanicity and migration 
(van Os, 2004; Cantor-Graae and Selten, 2005). Moreover, a recent study suggests that 
social and cultural factors do not merely influence the contents of delusions and 
hallucinations, but the structural forms of the clinical presentations (McLean et al., 2014). 
Bipolar disorder, which is associated with alternating episodes of mania and 
depression, has a similar sort of profile. The causal factors associated with the disorder 
are summarised in a review by Maletic and Raison (2014). Although heritability is high 
with monozygotic twin concordance estimated between forty and seventy percent, this is 
again due to a vast and heterogeneous array of common genetic variants and epigenetic 
changes, each with small effect size. Research on the neurobiological correlates of bipolar 
disorder has yielded equivocal results with respect to neurochemistry and neural circuitry. 
Interestingly, fMRI results are among the least consistent. The authors make the bold 
conclusion that “from a neurobiological perspective, there is no such thing as bipolar 
disorder” (Maletic and Raison, 2014: p. 16). Rather, they suggest that the category of 
bipolar disorder subsumes many somewhat similar, but subtly different, causal structures. 
Generalised anxiety disorder, which is associated with excessive anxiety in 
conjunction with various physiological and cognitive symptoms, also exhibits similar 
degrees of heterogeneity and complexity with respect to neurobiological, psychological, 
and social factors. However, heritability is estimated to be somewhat lower and stressful 
events are reported to be particularly significant. Moreover, the causal factors that have 
been implicated do not appear to be specific to generalised anxiety disorder, but have 
been shown to be associated with a range of anxiety and affective disorders (Cowen et al., 
2012: pp. 179–186). 
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Like major depressive disorder, then, the diagnostic categories of schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder do not respectively reflect invariant 
causal structures, but each category subsumes a range of possible causal pathways 
involving combinations of biological, psychological, and social variables that tend to 
cluster in statistically significant ways. We can put the above in terms of the two-
dimensional semantic framework presented in Chapter 4. It a posteriori turns out that the 
secondary intensions of “schizophrenia”, “bipolar disorder”, and “generalised anxiety 
disorder” do not refer to essentialistic kinds, but correspond respectively to 
heterogeneous kinds that include many different possible causal structures. 
 
5.4.2 Dementias 
It should be acknowledged that such causal heterogeneity may not be exhibited by all 
psychiatric disorders and that there are at least some diagnostic categories that reflect 
distinctive kinds of biological causal structure that are stable across cases. The dementias 
are neurodegenerative disorders that include Alzheimer’s disease, vascular dementia, 
dementia with Lewy bodies, and frontotemporal dementia. They are associated with 
progressive and generally irreversible cognitive and neurological decline. The clinical 
presentations and risk factors can vary, but in all cases the symptoms are caused by 
distinctive kinds of neurodegenerative process. For example, in Alzheimer’s disease they 
are caused by the accumulation of β-amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles in the 
cerebral cortex, in vascular dementia they are caused by cumulative focal areas of 
ischaemic necrosis due to the occlusion of cerebral vasculature, in dementia with Lewy 
bodies they are caused by the abnormal aggregation of α-synuclein protein in cortical and 
subcortical areas, and in frontotemporal dementia they are caused by atrophy of the 
frontal and temporal lobes (Cowen et al., 2012: pp. 326–333). In virtue of these 
determining properties, the different categories of dementia can be considered to 
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represent repeatable causal types, although it should be recognised that patients can 
exhibit features of more than one kind of dementia. Hence, the secondary intensions of 
“Alzheimer’s disease”, “vascular dementia”, “dementia with Lewy bodies”, and 
“frontotemporal dementia” refer respectively to the above mentioned neurodegenerative 
processes.  
 
5.4.3 Panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder 
For some other disorders, there may be high degrees of causal heterogeneity at lower 
biological levels, but more stable causal regularities may be observed to emerge at higher 
psychological levels. Examples arguably include panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Panic disorder, which is associated with recurrent and unexpected panic attacks, 
is highly complex and variable with respect to genetics, neurochemistry, and brain 
circuitry. Heritability is estimated at forty percent, although again this appears to be the 
result of combinations of genes whose effect sizes are small and contingent on other 
constitutional parameters. Several chemical abnormalities have been associated with the 
disorder, including serotonin dysregulation, noradrenaline hypersensitivity, γ-
aminobutyric acid attenuation, and lactate hypersensitivity, but no single abnormality or 
particular combination of abnormalities has been shown to be present across all cases. 
Furthermore, neuroimaging has suggested changes in the amygdala and cingulate cortex, 
but the findings are not consistent (Cowen et al., 2012: pp. 195–198). 
However, a more stable pattern can be observed to emerge at a psychological level. 
David Clark (1986) proposes a cognitive model of panic disorder. The model posits 
causal connections between (i) a trigger stimulus (internal or external), (ii) perceived 
threat, (iii) apprehension, (iv) body sensations, and (v) interpretation of sensations as 
catastrophic (Clark, 1986: p. 463). The interpretation of sensations as catastrophic results 
in further perceived threat, and thus these variables reinforce each other in a cycle. 
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Clark’s model describes a higher-level psychological process that is supposed to be 
instantiated by every case of panic disorder, while remaining neutral with respect to the 
lower-level biological processes in which these higher-level psychological processes could 
be grounded. Therefore, while panic disorder may lack unity with respect to its biology, it 
is characterised by a more stable causal structure at the level of its psychology. 
A similar case could arguably be made regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Again, a number of neurobiological correlates have been discovered, including serotonin 
dyregulation, increased basal ganglia volume, and decreased orbitofrontal cortex volume, 
but the findings are not wholly consistent (Cowen et al., 2012, pp. 199–204). At the 
psychological level, though, there appears to be a more stable causal pattern. An 
obsessional thought is purported to result when an intrusive thought is erroneously 
appraised as being salient or threatening due to the cognitive biases of overinflated 
responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985) and thought-action fusion (Rachman, 1993). Compulsive 
behaviour temporarily reduces the discomfort from the obsessional thought and is 
purported to be maintained via the process of negative reinforcement, as well as by 
strengthening the belief that the discomfort would have increased had the compulsion 
not been performed. This model is supported by evidence for the effectiveness of 
cognitive therapy in conjunction with exposure and response prevention, which are 
supposed to intervene on the above processes, for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (Veale, 2007). 
And so, panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder provide examples of 
psychiatric diagnoses that are biologically heterogeneous, but whose symptoms could 
nonetheless be explained by more stable causal regularities that emerge at psychological 
levels. In terms of two-dimensional semantics, it a posteriori turns out that the secondary 
intensions of “panic disorder” and “obsessive-compulsive disorder” correspond to stable 
underlying psychological processes, albeit psychological processes that can each be 
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realised by a range of different biological states. It is reasonable to suggest that this might 
also apply to some other monosymptomatic diagnoses in psychiatry, such as specific 
phobias and impulse control disorders. 
 
5.4.4 Personality disorders 
This brings us to a final group of disorders. While major depressive disorder, 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety are causally heterogeneous at 
multiple levels of organisation, we at least have evidence that the various causal factors 
involved in these disorders are likely to be loosely held together by contingent causal 
relations, and so we can be confident that the categories are not entirely causally arbitrary. 
However, for some other disorders, the symptoms may be the products of so many 
contingent circumstances that we may not be able to locate explanatorily relevant causal 
regularities that generalise even modestly across cases. This might apply to some of the 
personality disorders. 
 The personality disorders are typically characterised by persistent and pervasive 
patterns of behaviour that are problematic for the patients and for others around them. 
As with major depressive disorder, the diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder 
consists of a list of symptoms, of which a minimum number must be fulfilled. For 
example, a diagnosis of histrionic personality disorder requires at least five out of the 
following eight features: 
 
1. Is uncomfortable in situations in which he or she is not the center of attention. 
2. Interaction with others is often characterized by inappropriate sexually seductive 
or provocative behaviour. 3. Displays rapidly shifting and shallow expression of 
emotions. 4. Consistently uses physical appearance to draw attention to self. 5. Has 
a style of speech that is excessively expressionistic and lacking in detail. 6. Shows 
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self-dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated expression of emotion. 7. Is 
suggestible (i.e., easily influenced by others or circumstances). 8. Considers 
relationships to be more intimate than they actually are. (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013: p. 667) 
 
Because only five out of eight features are required for a diagnosis, different patients with 
histrionic disorder may exhibit different combinations of symptoms. Hence, as with 
major depressive disorder, the clinical presentations associated with histrionic personality 
disorder are heterogeneous. Interestingly, it has been suggested that this reflects the fact 
that personality traits are continuously distributed, which also accounts for why the 
boundaries between the different categories of personality disorder are so poorly defined 
(Cowen et al., 2012: p. 135). Accordingly, prior to the publication of DSM-5 (2013), the 
psychologist Thomas Widiger (2007) argued that a more appropriate way to classify 
personality disorders would be with a dimensional system, where the patient’s personality 
would be assessed along several continuous dimensions rather than being placed into one 
of several distinct categories. However, the categorical system was ultimately retained in 
DSM-5. 
 As diagnostic categories, the personality disorders are notoriously controversial. 
First, as we shall see, there are doubts over whether they reflect distinctive kinds of causal 
process. Second, the categories are heavily shaped by moral and political values. Louis 
Charland (2004) argues that the personality disorders encompass behaviours considered 
in society to be morally bad that have been inappropriately medicalised as mental 
disorders. Peter Zachar notes that this marks a worry about a sort of psychiatric 
emotivism whereby “personality disorder is considered a name for unlikeable people who 
are highly neurotic” (Zachar, 2014: p. 197). Moreover, Nancy Potter (2004) proposes that 
some of the purported features of personality disorders, such as emotionality and 
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manipulativity, are influenced by misogynistic cultural assumptions regarding gender 
attributes. I do not spend more time on the second of these two issues in this chapter, 
instead focusing on the first. 
 It must be acknowledged that it is plausible that there are some personality 
disorders which are associated with certain causal factors in statistically significant ways. 
For example, antisocial personality disorder has been shown to be partly attributable to 
the effects of poor parental bonding and childhood physical abuse on social 
development, with the behavioural factor being associated with poor maternal care and 
the affective factor being associated with poor care from both parents (Gao et al., 2010). 
Similarly, the development of borderline personality disorder, which is associated with 
affective lability, impulsivity, and interpersonal instability, has been partly attributed to 
the effect of childhood sexual abuse on the ability to modulate emotion (Winston, 2000). 
These two disorders also have associations with some genetic vulnerabilities and subtle 
neuroimaging changes in the areas of the brain purported to be involved in affective 
processing (Cowen et al., 2012: pp. 144–145). 
However, for other personality disorders, there may not be such statistically 
significant causal factors. A summary of evidence in the Shorter Oxford Textbook of 
Psychiatry suggests that this might be so for paranoid personality disorder, schizoid 
personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder. 
The authors report that research into these disorders has generally failed to reveal causal 
factors that generalise even modestly across cases and that the results of studies have 
been inconsistent at best (Cowen et al., 2012: pp. 143–146). Therefore, it is possible that 
at least some personality disorder diagnoses are not associated with any stable causal 
regularities. 
Note that this is not to say that the symptoms of these disorders are uncaused, as it 
could arguably be contended that all behaviours have causes (Morse, 1999). Rather, it is 
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to say that while the symptoms of an individual patient with a given diagnosis may indeed 
be caused by a particular state of affairs, there may not be stable causal factors that are 
shared to even modest degrees by other patients with the same diagnosis. Hence, the 
scepticism is not about the presence of singular causation in the individual case, but 
about whether there are generalisable causal factors associated with the diagnostic 
category. There is a real possibility that the clinical features of the above mentioned 
personality disorders are not the products of repeatable causal processes, but of highly 
contingent combinations of circumstances that differ significantly across cases. In short, 
there may be many idiosyncratic reasons why people develop the kinds of personality 
they do. As I suggest later in Chapter 7, it may in principle be possible to discern some of 
these reasons via narrative exploration of the particular case, but the point is that these 
reasons may not be generalisable to other cases. 
The above considerations, then, suggest that some diagnostic categories in 
psychiatry fail to correspond to even modestly repeatable causal types. Rather, it is 
possible that the clinical features associated with some of the personality disorders result 
from complex and highly contingent sets of circumstances that vary across cases. Due to 
the absence of such generalisable causal factors, it is unlikely that these disorders can be 
characterisable even as loosely construed homeostatic property cluster kinds. 
Couched in the two-dimensional semantic framework presented in Chapter 4, the 
secondary intensions of “paranoid personality disorder”, “schizoid personality disorder”, 
“histrionic personality disorder”, and “avoidant personality disorder” do not pick out 
characteristic causal structures. This suggests that these categorical diagnoses do not 
convey anything significantly informative regarding what might be causing the clinical 
features of patients. Because they are not particularly informative regarding causes, it 
appears that these diagnostic terms are little more than descriptive labels for sets of 
symptoms. That is to say, their useful semantic roles are in virtue of their primary 
178 
 
intensions. According to David Chalmers (1996: p. 62), it could be supposed that for 
such descriptive terms, as with other descriptive expressions like “doctor” and “square”, 
the secondary intensions are simple copies of the primary intensions. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the empirical data from scientific research into the causal 
structures of some psychiatric disorders and explored some of the philosophical 
implications for theoretical conceptualisations of these disorders. Major depressive 
disorder presents a paradigmatic example of a psychiatric diagnosis that does not reflect 
an invariant causal type, but subsumes a heterogeneous range of possible causal 
structures that could produce the symptoms. Moreover, these causal structures involve 
combinations of diverse biological, psychological, and social factors that interact in 
complex ways. 
An implication of such heterogeneity and complexity is that major depressive 
disorder cannot be captured with an essentialistic model. Instead, I considered the 
prospect of conceptualising major depressive disorder as a homeostatic property cluster. 
While it is plausible that the various factors associated with major depressive disorder 
tend to reinforce each other via probabilistic causal relations, I argued that the diversity 
of the factors involved and the highly contingent natures of the causal relations could 
make such a conceptualisation too loose to be of causal explanatory value as an 
undifferentiated diagnostic category. 
I then examined how applicable these considerations are to other psychiatric 
diagnoses. I argued that some other major psychiatric diagnoses, such as schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder, are likely to have causal profiles that 
exhibit degrees of heterogeneity and complexity comparable to that of major depressive 
disorder. However, a few diagnoses, such as the dementias, are characterised by 
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distinctive kinds of biological pathology. A few other diagnoses, such as panic disorder 
and obsessive-compulsive disorder, are heterogeneous and complex with respect to 
biological factors, but may be associated with more stable causal patterns that emerge at 
psychological levels. Finally, there are diagnoses, such as some of the personality 
disorders, whose symptoms are the products of so many contingent circumstances that 
we may not be able to locate stable causal factors or regularities that are generalisable 
across cases. For such conditions, it may be that the diagnostic terms are little more than 
descriptive labels for the sets of symptoms. 
180 
 
6. How Psychiatric Diagnoses Explain* 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The empirical data reviewed in Chapter 5 suggests that many of the current diagnostic 
categories in psychiatry are causally heterogeneous at every level of analysis. In this 
current chapter, I examine the implications of this for the explanatory statuses of 
psychiatric diagnoses. I shall argue that despite the problems of complexity and 
heterogeneity, some psychiatric diagnoses can still provide explanatory information that 
can be valuable for clinical purposes. Moreover, while these other sorts of explanation do 
not fit the standard model of causal explanation presented in Chapter 3, whereby a 
diagnosis specifies a distinctive cause C as being responsible for producing the patient 
data E via intelligible mechanisms, I shall show that they are nonetheless causal in 
satisfying ways. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin in §6.2 by distinguishing two kinds of 
explanatory question, which are the explanation of a syndrome in general and the 
explanation of the clinical presentation of a particular patient with appeal to a diagnosis. I 
explore the potential challenges that psychiatric disorders pose for these explanatory 
questions. While philosophers of psychiatry have offered promising approaches to the 
first kind of explanation that handle the challenges of heterogeneity and complexity, these 
problems continue to affect the second kind. Nonetheless, I argue in §6.3 that even 
though psychiatric diagnoses may not correspond to invariant causal types, there are 
other ways in which they can offer causal explanatory information. I suggest that some 
                                                          
 
 
* A version of this chapter has been published as: Maung, H. H. (2016a). “Diagnosis and Causal 




diagnoses can provide negative information that excludes certain causes, some diagnoses 
can provide disjunctive information about causal possibilities, and some diagnoses can 
provide information about the causal relations between the symptoms themselves. 
6.2 Two kinds of explanatory question 
6.2.1 Disease explanation 
I had briefly noted earlier in Chapter 1, §1.2.2, that it is important to distinguish two 
kinds of explanatory question regarding diagnoses in medicine (Qiu, 1989: pp. 199–200; 
Thagard, 1999: p. 20). The first kind, which I call disease explanation, belongs to 
empirical research. This is related to the sort of scientific endeavour discussed in Chapter 
5, where the explanandum is a given clinical syndrome in general, and the explanans 
involves developing a generalised model that brings together the relevant causal factors 
and mechanisms responsible for the syndrome in general. For example, the disorder 
characterised by swollen limbs and bleeding gums known as scurvy is explained by 
defective collagen synthesis due to ascorbic acid deficiency (Thagard, 1999: pp. 120–122). 
The second kind, which I call diagnostic explanation, occurs in clinical practice. This is 
the kind of explanation described in Chapter 3, where a patient presents to the clinical 
encounter with a set of symptoms and the clinician invokes a diagnosis to explain this set 
of symptoms. For example, the diagnosis of scurvy might be invoked as an explanation 
of an individual patient’s symptoms of swollen limbs and bleeding gums. Here, the 
explanandum is not the clinical syndrome in general, but the clinical presentation of the 
particular patient, while the explanans is the diagnosis. 
These two explanatory questions are connected. In diagnostic explanation, where a 
diagnosis is invoked to explain a patient’s symptoms, the understanding of the condition 
denoted by the diagnosis comes from the generalised model that is constructed through 
disease explanation. For example, disease explanation informs us that myocardial 
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infarction in general involves rupture of an atherosclerotic plaque and thrombus 
formation leading to occlusion of a coronary artery and ischaemic necrosis of the 
myocardium, and it is in virtue of this knowledge that the diagnosis of myocardial 
infarction provides a causal explanation of the occurrence of chest pain in a particular 
patient. In other words, the diagnosis of myocardial infarction informs us that the 
particular patient instantiates the causal processes represented by the generalised model. 
This squares neatly with the proposal in Chapter 3 that the condition denoted by a 
medical diagnosis is often taken to be a repeatable type, of which individual cases are 
tokens. Hence, what the general model of a disorder looks like has implications for the 
explanatory function of the diagnosis in the particular case. 
 Much of the philosophical literature on explanation in psychiatry has focused on 
disease explanation, rather than diagnostic explanation. The high degrees of heterogeneity 
and complexity raised in Chapter 5 strongly suggest that most psychiatric disorders 
cannot be modelled essentialistically, and so may need to be conceptualised differently. 
For example, we considered in §5.3.2 the possibility of conceptualising some psychiatric 
disorders as homeostatic property clusters. However, there remains the methodological 
challenge of how to go about constructing such a generalised model of such a disorder 
given the problems posed by causal heterogeneity and multilevel complexity. Theorists in 
the philosophy of psychiatry have proposed idealisation (Murphy, 2006) and explanatory 
pluralism (Mitchell, 2008; Kendler, 2012) as solutions to these two problems, 
respectively. 
In response to the problem of heterogeneity, Dominic Murphy (2006) suggests 
what when we try to explain a syndrome in general, what we are aiming to explain is an 
exemplar, which is an idealised theoretical representation of the syndrome. An exemplar 
qua idealisation is abstracted away from the idiosyncrasies of individual patients. Given 
the high degree of variability between cases of a given diagnosis, different patients may 
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resemble the exemplar in different respects and to varying degrees. According to Murphy, 
to explain a syndrome is to model the various causal relations and mechanisms that have 
been shown to contribute to the development of the idealised syndrome described in the 
exemplar. Again, such a model represents an idealised scenario, abstracted away from the 
actual happenings in particular cases. There may not be a single causal factor in the model 
that is instantiated by every case of the disorder and there may not be an actual case that 
instantiates all of the causal relations described in the model. 
In response to the problem of multilevel complexity, Sandra Mitchell (2008) 
endorses a view called integrative pluralism, according to which a satisfactory explanation 
of a complex system like a psychiatric disorder requires the integration of causal 
components at multiple levels of organisation. As noted by Murphy (2008), these 
variables at different levels do not correspond to the same phenomenon described in 
different ways, but correspond respectively to different phenomena. Hence, it is 
insufficient to look for deterministic regularities exclusively at a single level, because 
whatever influence the variables at this level may have is heavily contingent on the joint 
contribution of variables at other levels. In the case of major depressive disorder, we 
might need to include information about genetic susceptibilities, neurochemical 
abnormalities, brain circuits, psychological vulnerabilities, and the ways in which these 
interact. 
Similarly, Kenneth Kendler (2012) endorses an empirically-based pluralism. Given 
the diverse range of causal variables involved, he argues that there is no single privileged 
level at which a psychiatric disorder like major depressive disorder can be aetiologically 
defined. Rather, constructing a general model of the disorder requires the incorporation 
of research from different disciplines. Kendler (2014) suggests two philosophical 
approaches to causation that can guide this project. The first, visited earlier in Chapter 5, 
§5.3.3, is James Woodward’s (2003) interventionist theory of causation, which 
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conceptualises causal factors as difference makers, without placing ontological 
restrictions on the kinds of variable that can be such difference makers. This allows the 
inclusion of different causal factors regardless of the explanatory levels to which they 
belong. The second, previously discussed in Chapter 3, §3.3.3, is the mechanistic 
approach to causation advocated by theorists such as Machamer et al. (2000), which 
focuses on specifying the mechanisms via which the identified difference makers interact 
to produce the clinical features of the disorder. According to Kendler (2014: pp. 934–
935), it may even be possible to specify some, though perhaps not all, of the mechanisms 
that link causal factors from different levels, such as those between psychological stress 
and neurochemical changes in major depressive disorder. However, he acknowledges that 
this is likely to be a very challenging task, because the causal pathways that cross levels 
are often not linear, but bidirectional, recursive, and complex.  
And so, with respect to disease explanation in psychiatry, there is recognition 
among contemporary theorists in the philosophy of psychiatry that general explanatory 
models of disorders are idealisations abstracted away from the heterogeneity of actual 
cases and that they involve the integration of diverse kinds of causal variable from 
different levels of organisation. However, significantly less has been written in the 
philosophical literature about diagnostic explanation in psychiatry. This is the focus of 
what is to follow. 
 
6.2.2 Diagnostic explanation 
Idealisation and explanatory pluralism are promising strategies for disease explanation in 
psychiatry. When we want to understand what causes depressive symptoms in general, we 
can conjure up an idealised general representation of the syndrome and model the causal 
factors that are known to contribute to the phenomenon described in the representation. 
The resulting model can be helpful for illuminating statistical generalisations and causal 
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regularities at a population level, in spite of the high degrees of heterogeneity seen in 
individual cases. However, I argue that heterogeneity remains problematic for diagnostic 
explanation, where the explanandum is not an idealised generalisation but a particular case. 
As we saw in Chapter 3 the paradigmatic case of diagnostic explanation in bodily 
medicine consists of a diagnosis indicating the cause of the patient’s symptoms and this 
causal relation being made intelligible by background theoretical knowledge of the 
mechanisms involved. In such a case, the diagnosis qua category constitutes a successful 
causal explanation partly because it specifies a distinctive and stable kind of causal 
process which corresponds, with reasonable accuracy and precision, to the process 
occurring in the particular patient. The worry with a causally heterogeneous diagnostic 
category is its ambiguity or vagueness, that is, it does not provide such specification of a 
cause. 
 Of course, it must be conceded that there are some psychiatric diagnoses that are 
not beset by causal heterogeneity to such worrying degrees. In §5.4.2, I briefly mentioned 
the dementias, which are associated with distinctive kinds of neurodegenerative process. 
Hence, we can reasonably say that such diagnoses do serve as explanations of symptoms 
in the manner that a paradigmatic medical diagnosis explains a set of symptoms. For 
example, the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease explains a patient’s clinical presentation by 
indicating that it is caused by the accumulation of β-amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary 
tangles in the cerebral cortex, while the diagnosis of vascular dementia explains a patient’s 
clinical presentation by indicating that it is caused by cumulative focal areas of ischaemic 
necrosis due to the occlusion of cerebral vasculature (Cowen et al., 2012: pp. 326–333). In 
§5.4.3, I mentioned panic disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder, which are 
heterogeneous at the lower biological levels of genetics, neurochemicals, and neural 
circuits, but are associated with more stable causal regularities at higher psychological 
levels. Therefore, such diagnoses arguably do explain patients’ symptoms by specifying 
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the processes that are causing them, although the stable causal processes that are 
represented by the diagnostic categories in these cases are psychological, rather than 
biological. For example, the diagnosis of panic disorder explains a patient’s clinical 
presentation by indicating that it is caused by a psychological process consisting of a 
trigger stimulus, perceived threat, apprehension, body sensations, and interpretation of 
sensations as catastrophic (Clark, 1986: p. 463). Similarly, the diagnosis of obsessive-
compulsive disorder explains a patient’s clinical presentation by indicating that it is caused 
by an intrusive thought being erroneously appraised as salient or threatening due to 
cognitive biases and maintenance of a behaviour via negative reinforcement (Salkovskis, 
1985; Rachman, 1993; Veale, 2007).  
However, such diagnoses are relatively rare in psychiatry. As noted in Chapter 5, 
most psychiatric diagnoses, including major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder, are causally heterogeneous at every level of 
analysis. That is to say, they are variable with respect to the biological, psychological, and 
social processes involved. Hence, Murphy notes that the symptoms in different cases of 
major depressive disorder may be produced by different sets of causes: 
 
It seems unlikely that the same underlying causes explain an irritable adolescent 
who sleeps late, diets frantically, and lies around the house all day threatening to 
commit suicide on the one hand, and a sad middle-aged man who can not settle 
down to any of his normal hobbies, hardly sleeps, eats more and more, can not 
make love to his wife, and feels worthless.  (Murphy, 2006: p. 329) 
 
Similarly, Mitchell (2008: p. 30) suggests that there may be different routes leading to the 
same symptoms in different individuals. A general model of major depressive disorder, 
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then, would need to represent the multiple causal pathways that could be responsible for 
the development of depressive symptoms. 
 This has implications for what sort of causal information a psychiatric diagnosis 
like major depressive disorder conveys when a patient who presents to the clinic with 
mood symptoms is given the diagnosis. It would suggest that the diagnosis does not 
unequivocally specify a distinctive “disease entity” (Hucklenbroich, 2014) that is 
responsible for the patient’s symptoms in the particular case. Rather, it subsumes a range 
of possible causal structures that could be instantiated by the patient. Another way to 
interpret this is to say that major depressive disorder is a disjunctive category. Take C1, C2 
… Cn to be the diverse causal variables that have been implicated in its pathophysiology. 
These may interact in different combinations to produce different underlying 
pathological states, S1 = {C1 … Cx}, S2 = {C2 … Cy} … Sn = {Cn … Cz}, each of which 
can produce the clinical syndrome that satisfies the diagnosis of major depressive 
disorder. Diagnosing a particular patient with major depressive disorder, then, indicates 
that the underlying state responsible for the patient’s symptoms could be S1 or S2 … Sn, 
but does not provide further causal discrimination beyond this. 
 Furthermore, different cases of major depressive disorder may need to be 
understood with different theoretical frameworks. As noted in §6.2.1, the problem of 
multilevel complexity suggests that a general model of the disorder needs to integrate 
different kinds of causal variable (Mitchell, 2008; Kendler, 2012). With respect to 
individual cases, it is possible that the different combinations of variables instantiated by 
different patients with major depressive disorder may require different explanatory 
perspectives. For example, cognitive, psychodynamic, and social explanatory perspectives 
may be of more value for a patient with adverse social circumstances and a history of 
emotional trauma, while more emphasis may be placed on a neurobiological explanatory 
perspective for a patient with late-onset depression characterised by melancholic features. 
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This supports the contention that a psychiatric diagnosis like major depressive 
disorder lacks unity (Poland et al., 1994). Not only can different patients diagnosed with 
major depressive disorder instantiate different underlying causal structures, but these 
different causal structures may need to be understood with appeal to different theoretical 
frameworks. Jeffrey Poland (2014) argues that this lack of unifying invariance makes the 
diagnostic categories in psychiatry poor tools for clinical practice. He suggests that a 
psychiatric diagnosis does not effectively contribute to serving important clinical 
functions because it “leaves most of the important clinical assessment work undone” 
(Poland, 2014: p.35). By subsuming different patients with diverse pathologies under the 
same category, a diagnosis masks information about individual variation that could be 
important for treatment selection and prognosis. For example, the undifferentiated 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder does not discriminate between the patient with a 
dramatic onset of melancholic symptoms, for whom a tricyclic antidepressant and 
electroconvulsive therapy may be warranted, and the patient with a history of emotional 
trauma, for whom psychotherapy may be more appropriate. Both patients would be 
subsumed under the same category of major depressive disorder. 
 The above criticism paints a rather pessimistic picture of psychiatric diagnoses. 
However, while I agree that the above mentioned problems significantly impact the 
clinical roles of diagnoses in psychiatry, I do not go as far as to say that the diagnoses 
contribute little or nothing of epistemic value to the clinical process. In §6.3, I argue that 
while most psychiatric diagnoses may not pick out specific causes, there are still ways in 




6.3 Other sorts of diagnostic explanation 
6.3.1 Negative causal information 
One sort of causal information that can be provided by a psychiatric diagnosis is negative 
causal information. While a psychiatric diagnosis may not specify the precise causal 
process leading to the patient’s symptom presentation, it nonetheless excludes certain 
causes. To better understand how this works in clinical practice, we need to look at the 
process of differential diagnosis, which is where the physician considers multiple possible 
diagnoses that could explain the patient’s symptoms before selecting the diagnosis that 
best explains them. For example, after assessing a patient with chest pain, a physician may 
consider gastro-oesophageal reflux disease, pulmonary embolism, and myocardial 
infarction as possible causes, before inferring that myocardial infarction is the correct 
diagnosis. 
For major depressive disorder, other conditions to be considered in the differential 
diagnosis include thyroid disorders, adrenal disorders, dementia, cerebral tumours, 
nutritional deficiencies, drug or alcohol intoxication, and other psychiatric disorders. 
When assessing a patient with depressive symptoms, it is recommended that he or she is 
appropriately investigated for these conditions. As stated in Kaplan and Sadock’s Concise 
Textbook of Clinical Psychiatry: 
 
The workup should include tests for thyroid and adrenal functions because 
disorders of both of these endocrine systems can appear as depressive disorders. In 
substance-induced mood disorder, a reasonable rule of thumb is that any drug a 
depressed patient is taking should be considered a potential factor in the mood 




Similarly, in Common Medical Diagnoses: An Algorithmic Approach, a guideline is presented for 
the assessment of the symptom of fatigue, according to which major depressive disorder 
would only be diagnosed once investigations have excluded anaemia, uraemia, diabetes 
mellitus, adrenal insufficiency, hypokalaemia, hyponatraemia, hepatitis, thyroid disorders, 
chronic infections, malignancies, and nutritional deficiencies as causes of the fatigue 
(Healey and Jacobson, 2006: p. 3). Accordingly, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, it is recommended that major depressive disorder should only be 
diagnosed once these other medical diagnoses have been excluded: 
 
Such symptoms count towards a major depressive diagnosis except when they are 
clearly and fully attributable to a general medical condition. (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013: p. 164) 
 
This is not to say that extensive investigations are always performed whenever a patient 
presents with mood symptoms. Some conditions may be implicitly excluded due to their 
unlikelihood in the patient’s demographic group, such as dementia or a cerebral tumour 
in a young and otherwise healthy patient with mild depressive symptoms. However, it is 
normally the case that a patient presenting to secondary care with new affective or 
psychotic symptoms would at least have blood and urine tests to exclude certain common 
conditions before a psychiatric diagnosis is established. 
What the above highlights is that the diagnosis of major depressive disorder is not 
made solely on the basis of the relevant symptoms being present, but also requires certain 
medical causes for the symptoms to be ruled out. A patient who presents with depressive 
symptoms that turn out to be caused by a cerebral tumour, for example, would not be 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, because the diagnosis is excluded by the fact 
that the symptoms are clearly and fully attributable to a general medical condition. In 
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virtue of this exclusion criterion, then, a psychiatric diagnosis provides information about 
what is not in the causal history of the patient’s clinical presentation. A diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder may not pick out a specific cause of the patient’s mood 
symptoms, but it does suggest that they are not being caused by hypothyroidism, drug 
intoxication, a tumour, and so on. 
According to David Lewis (1986b), such exclusion of causes would still qualify as a 
legitimate sort of causal explanation. According to his account of causal explanation, “to 
explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history” (Lewis, 1986b: 
p. 217). This does not necessarily entail specifying a cause of the event, as there are other 
kinds of information one can give about an event’s causal history, including information 
about what is not in its causal history. For Lewis (1986b: p.222), negative causal 
information can still be explanatorily relevant information, and so a psychiatric diagnosis 
can be explanatorily relevant by excluding certain causes, even if it does not itself cite a 
specific cause. 
Helen Beebee (2004) offers a modal analysis of how negative causal information 
can be explanatorily relevant. She argues that information about the absence of an event 
provides information about the causal processes in counterfactual worlds where that 
event occurs. For example, consider that Flora normally waters the orchids regularly, but 
forgets on one occasion. According to Beebee, Flora’s failure to water the orchids cannot 
be a cause, because it does not denote an event, but rather the absence of an event. 
Nonetheless, we still accept Flora’s failure to water the orchids as an explanation of the 
orchids dying. This is because it provides information about the causal histories of the 
nearby possible worlds where Flora had not failed to water the orchids and how these 
causal histories differ from the causal history of the actual world. In these counterfactual 
worlds, the causal processes would have ensued in such a way that the orchids would 
have survived.  
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It is important to note that Beebee’s analysis focuses specifically on the roles of 
absences in causal explanations, and so is not wholly analogous with my example of 
diagnostic explanation in psychiatry. Nonetheless, it highlights the general point that a 
causal explanation does not have to cite a specific cause, but can provide modal 
information about the possible causal histories of the explanandum. I suggest that a similar 
modal analysis can be applied to other cases of negative causal information, including 
diagnoses in psychiatry. By indicating that the patient’s mood symptoms are not 
attributable a general medical disorder, the diagnosis of major depressive disorder is 
providing information about what would have been expected in the counterfactual 
worlds where the patient’s mood symptoms are attributable to a general medical disorder. 
For example, in the actual world, the physician might only diagnose a patient with major 
depressive disorder after a thyroid function test yields a normal result, which suggests 
that the result from the thyroid function test would have been abnormal in the possible 
world where the patient is not diagnosed with major depressive disorder due to his or her 
mood symptoms being attributable to a thyroid disorder. 
This negative causal explanation can be valuable in the clinical setting. First, it has 
utility in predicting prognosis and guiding therapeutic intervention. Indicating that a 
patient’s mood symptoms are not due to hypothyroidism suggests that levothyroxine 
supplementation would not be a therapeutically effective intervention and indicating that 
they are not due to a cerebral tumour suggests that neurosurgical referral is not 
warranted. Hence, by excluding these causes, a diagnosis of major depressive disorder can 
inform clinical decisions. Second, even if it does not specify precisely what is causing the 
patient’s symptoms, a psychiatric diagnosis can offer relief and reassurance by ruling out 
certain medical diagnoses. For example, when the family of a patient with a new onset of 
anhedonia, poor concentration, and psychomotor retardation want to know why the 
patient has developed such symptoms, they may find it extremely valuable to know that 
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they are not caused by dementia or by a cerebral tumour. In this sense, the diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder might be compared to the diagnosis of non-cardiac chest pain, 
which is a diagnosis that is made when a patient presents with central chest pain but 
investigations reveal no evidence of cardiac disease. The category does not pick out a 
specific disease kind, as it encompasses oesophageal, pleuritic, and musculoskeletal 
pathologies, but it is explanatorily valuable because it excludes cardiac causes of the chest 
pain. 
This account of negative causal explanation, then, suggests that a psychiatric 
diagnosis does not need to identify a specific disease kind to be of causal explanatory 
value, but can be explanatorily valuable in virtue of the exclusion criterion that states that 
the symptoms must not be attributable to a general medical disorder. As noted by Beebee 
(2004), “E because C” is not equivalent to “C causes E”. Hence, the causal claim “the 
patient’s mood symptoms are caused by major depressive disorder” may indeed be 
misguided, we can still legitimately make the explanatory claim “the patient has mood 
symptoms because of major depressive disorder”. 
However, in spite of the usefulness of negative information in the clinical setting, 
the account of diagnostic explanation presented here has limits. One problem is that it 
sets the standard for an acceptable causal explanation too low. If all that is needed for a 
causal explanation is information about what is not the cause of the explanandum, then all 
sorts of claims that we would not normally consider to be explanations would qualify as 
causal explanations. For instance, “it’s not asthma” would count as a causal explanation 
of a patient’s chronic cough according to the negative causal explanation account. In 
response, one could propose that the strength of a negative causal explanation depends 
on how many causal possibilities are excluded by the explanans. Hence, major depressive 
disorder is a better explanation than “it’s not asthma”, because the former excludes 
several medical disorders while the latter only excludes asthma. Nonetheless, this would 
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still relegate psychiatric diagnoses to similar positions as the medically unexplained 
syndromes discussed in Chapter 2, §2.3.2, whose diagnostic criteria also exclude several 
medical disorders as causes of patients’ symptoms yet are widely considered to be 
explanatorily unsatisfactory (Kirmayer et al., 2004; Jutel, 2011; Cournoyea and Kennedy, 
2014). 
Another problem is that in practice there are many instances where psychiatric 
diagnoses are made without other medical disorders being excluded. In the above 
discussion, I have been considering an idealised case of differential diagnosis where a 
patient presents with a new onset of mood symptoms and different diagnoses are 
presented as possible explanations of the mood symptoms. Here, the diagnoses of major 
depressive disorder, hypothyroidism, and drug intoxication are presented as competing 
hypotheses, and the diagnosis of major depressive disorder is only established when the 
other diagnoses have been adequately excluded. However, there are also cases where a 
psychiatric disorder is not considered as a competing diagnosis, but as a comorbid 
diagnosis. For example, major depressive disorder is often treated as an additional 
comorbid diagnosis in patients with multiple sclerosis, even though it is recognised that 
in these cases the depressive symptoms may be caused by the pathology associated with 
the multiple sclerosis (Marrie et al., 2009). Hence, in this sort of scenario, the diagnoses of 
major depressive disorder fails to exclude multiple sclerosis from the causal history of the 
patient’s mood symptoms. 
And so, while psychiatric diagnoses do sometimes provide valuable negative causal 
explanations, it is implausible that their entire explanatory worth lies only in their 
providing negative information. In the following subsections, I argue that they can also 
provide positive causal information. While these sorts of positive causal information fall 
short of picking out the specific causative pathologies in individual cases, they may 
nonetheless be explanatorily valuable in the clinical context. 
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6.3.2 Disjunctive causal information 
The notion that psychiatric diagnoses do provide some positive causal information about 
patients’ symptoms is corroborated by the fact that we have at least some scientific 
knowledge of the causal factors associated with certain disorders. As noted in §6.2.1, even 
though there is high heterogeneity among cases of major depressive disorder, we can seek 
to understand major depressive disorder in general by constructing an idealised model 
that is abstracted away from the idiosyncrasies of individual patients. Murphy (2014) 
argues that although patients may differ from the idealisation in different respects and to 
different degrees, the model can nonetheless provide at least an approximation of the 
causal processes in the individual case: 
 
The bet is that real patients will be similar to the exemplar in enough respects so 
that the explanation of the exemplar carries over to the patient. We assume that 
within the individual there are phenomena and causal relations that are relevantly 
similar to those worked out for the exemplar, but we cannot expect very precise 
predictions. (Murphy, 2014: p. 106) 
 
The suggestion here is that while a psychiatric diagnosis qua idealised generalisation may 
not specify the precise causal structure underlying the patient’s symptoms in a particular 
case, it does tell us about processes that are approximately similar to the actual causal 
processes in the patient’s case. Hence, Murphy argues that a psychiatric diagnosis is 
explanatorily significant, because it gives us at least a vague idea of the sort of process 
that is producing the patient’s symptoms.  
However, I argue that things are more complicated than this. While the above 
picture acknowledges the high degree of variation between individuals, it rests on the 
assumption that cases of the disorder nonetheless share a similar sort of causal process 
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(Murphy, 2014: p. 106). As noted in §6.2.2, though, it is possible that there are different 
sets of causes leading to the same symptoms in different individuals, and so a general 
model of the disorder would need represent the different routes via which the syndrome 
can be produced. For example, it is possible that depressive symptoms are not caused by 
a single kind of causal structure, but may be associated with a disjunction of several 
underlying states, S1 or S2 … Sn, each produced by a different combination of interacting 
causal variables. 
 This might be viewed as problematic, because it is a matter of contention whether 
or not such disjunctive information can constitute an explanation. According to Jaegwon 
Kim (1998), it cannot. Kim argues that information about a disjunction of possible causes 
does not yield a single explanation with a disjunctive cause, but a disjunction of different 
possible explanations of which the correct explanation remains unknown. His example is 
the symptom of joint pain, which can be caused by a number of different disorders, 
including rheumatoid arthritis and systemic lupus erythematosus. Consider that a patient 
with joint pain undergoes a clinical test, the result of which suggests that he or she either 
has rheumatoid arthritis or systemic lupus erythematosus, but does not indicate which. 
Kim argues that we do not yet have an explanation of the patient’s joint pain: 
 
I think there is a perfectly clear and intelligible sense in which we don’t as yet have 
an explanation: what we have is a disjunction of two explanations, not a single 
disjunctive explanation. What I mean is this: we have two possible explanations, 
and we know that one or the other is the correct one but not which it is. What we 
have, I claim, is not an explanation with a “disjunctive cause”, having rheumatoid 




Kim further qualifies this by arguing that “rheumatoid arthritis or systemic lupus 
erythematosus” qua disjunction does not specify a kind of event, and so is not eligible as a 
cause. Because it is not eligible as a cause, it cannot then be “citable as a cause in a causal 
explanation” (Kim, 1998: p. 109). 
If Kim is right, then there is reason to suppose that major depressive disorder does 
not offer a positive causal explanation of a patient’s mood symptoms, because it is 
associated with a range of many possible underlying causal structures but does not specify 
which one is actually the case in the patient. However, Kim’s criteria for explanation are 
too restrictive. Even if a disjunctive category does not meet the explanatory ideal of 
picking out a specific cause, I argue that it can nonetheless provide some causal 
explanatory information. As noted in §6.3.1, it is not necessary to cite a specific cause of 
an explanandum in order to provide explanatorily relevant information about the 
explanandum’s causal history. For example, one could give information about the possible 
causal histories within which the explanandum’s actual causal history lies. I suggest that this 
is the sort of information a disjunctive category provides. 
We can highlight the explanatory relevance of a disjunctive diagnosis by reframing 
the language in Kim’s example. Suppose we say that the test result indicates that the 
patient has a multisystem autoimmune disease. This is a heterogeneous category that 
includes rheumatoid arthritis and systemic lupus erythematosus. Hence, stating that the 
patient has a multisystem autoimmune disease is equivalent to stating that that he or she 
has the disjunction “rheumatoid arthritis or systemic lupus erythematosus …” without 
specifying which of these disorders he or she actually has. Nonetheless, it is generally 
agreed that indicating that the patient has a multisystem autoimmune disease is still 
explanatorily relevant with respect to his or her joint pain (Rose and Mackay, 1985). Not 
only does it greatly narrow down the range of conditions in which the patient’s actual 
condition could lie, but it also provides positive causal information about the conditions 
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that do fall within this range. The diagnosis of multisystem autoimmune disease tells us 
that the patient’s joint pain could be caused by the erosion of the joint surfaces in the 
case of rheumatoid arthritis, or by systemic inflammation of the connective tissues in the 
case of systemic lupus erythematosus, and so on. 
A disjunctive diagnosis, then, does not specify the actual cause of the patient’s 
symptoms, but it nonetheless subsumes the actual cause within a tighter range of possible 
causal histories than otherwise would have been available and, moreover, provides some 
indication of the mechanisms involved in these possible causal histories. This information 
indicates differences between the causal histories of patients with the diagnosis and those 
of patients without the diagnosis that can inform further investigations and therapeutic 
interventions. For instance, stating that a patient has a multisystem autoimmune disease 
suggests that his or her condition is likely to respond to treatments that act on the 
immune system and provides a rational basis for further investigations, such as blood 
tests for specific autoantibodies, which can help specify whether he or she actually has 
rheumatoid arthritis or systemic lupus erythematosus. A similar example is the category 
of cancer. This is highly disjunctive, as it encompasses many different kinds of 
malignancy. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that it is of causal explanatory value, as it 
narrows down possible causal histories, provides some indication of the mechanisms 
involved in these causal histories, and informs investigations to further specify the 
diagnosis. 
The above analysis accommodates the notion that a psychiatric diagnosis qua 
disjunctive category could still provide explanatorily valuable information about a 
patient’s symptoms, even if it does not specify the precise cause of these symptoms. The 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder, for instance, might be taken to suggest that the 
patient’s symptoms could be due to a state involving underactive serotonin 
neurotransmission plus variables C1 … Cn, or by a state involving hypothalamus-pituitary-
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adrenal axis dysregulation plus variables C2 … Cn+1, and so on. The explanatory value of 
this disjunctive information is that it tells us some of the ways in which the possible 
causal structures that could be underlying the patient’s symptoms might differ from the 
causal structure of the non-depressed state. In this sense, the explanatory role of a 
psychiatric diagnosis like major depressive disorder may be more akin to that of a 
superordinate category like multisystem autoimmune disorder than to that of a specific 
medical diagnosis like rheumatoid arthritis. 
However, while this analysis shows that disjunctiveness does not necessarily 
preclude a diagnosis from being explanatory, this explanatory value is also contingent on 
other conditions. First, it is contingent on whether an exhaustive list of disjuncts can be 
specified. The superordinate category of cancer is explanatorily valuable, because we are 
able to specify the different kinds of malignancy that fall under the category. Moreover, 
we have impressive knowledge of the respective causal structures and mechanisms of 
these different kinds of malignancy. By contrast, we are far from being able to specify all 
the possible causal structures that fall under the category of major depressive disorder, or 
indeed say how many there are. As noted in Chapter 5, we may know a number of the 
causal variables that can be associated with major depressive disorder, but we still know 
little about how different combinations of these variables interact to produce symptoms 
in individual cases. Second, even if some of the disjuncts included in the category could 
be specified, one might argue that the explanatory value of the category is still contingent 
on whether we are capable of finding out precisely which disjunct is involved in any given 
case. This might be made possible with the discovery of biomarkers which indicate 
specific causal factors that may be potential targets for intervention. However, at the time 
of writing, such biomarker tests are conspicuously lacking in clinical psychiatry (Bolton, 
2012: p. 10). Hence, we may currently be in a situation where research can discover 
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various causal factors associated with a psychiatric disorder, but we cannot match them 
to individual patients in the clinic. I shall return to this point in more detail in Chapter 7. 
As a modest response to the above concerns, I suggest that a disjunctive category 
could still provide causal explanatory information of a statistical nature regarding the 
patient’s condition. As noted by Harold Kincaid (2014), despite the diverse range of 
states that may be subsumed under the category of major depressive disorder, the 
diagnosis still indicates that the patient is a member of a class of individuals whose 
biopsychosocial makeups differ in a variety of possible ways from those of non-
depressed individuals. Moreover, even if we cannot specify all of the possible disjuncts 
that fall under the category or find out which disjunct is involved in any given case, the 
diagnosis still indicates an increased probability of the patient having a given causal 
mechanism. This information could be clinically useful. For example, on the basis of the 
knowledge that a proportion of people with major depressive disorder have underactive 
serotonin neurotransmission, we can say that a given patient with a diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder has an increased probability of having underactive serotonin 
neurotransmission. This might provide some justification for a trial of antidepressant 
medication, which is presumed to exert its action by altering serotonin 
neurotransmission. Hence, even causal explanatory information that is of a statistical 
nature can provide some, albeit modest, justificatory support for the predictive and 
interventional functions of the diagnosis. 
It must also be conceded, though, that such clinically useful probabilistic causal 
explanations are limited to a subset of diagnoses in psychiatry. Other diagnoses may turn 
out to be too causally heterogeneous to yield explanatorily significant information. I 
suggest that this may apply to the some of the personality disorders discussed in §5.4.4, 
whose symptoms likely result from highly contingent combinations of circumstances that 
differ across cases. With respect to the diagnosis of histrionic personality disorder, for 
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example, it may be that the lack of even modestly repeatable causal regularities leaves us 
unable to specify any stable disjuncts, or it may be that the vast number of contingent 
circumstances that could result in the syndrome translates to such an enormous number 
of disjuncts in the category that there is only a minute statistical association between each 
causal factor and the disorder. Therefore, it seems that there are some psychiatric 
diagnoses, including paranoid personality disorder, schizoid personality disorder, 
histrionic personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder, which do not provide 
explanatorily significant causal information, even with a disjunctive analysis. 
In summary, a disjunctive analysis accommodates the possibility of a 
heterogeneous diagnostic category being of causal explanatory value. However, this 
explanatory value is also dependent on other considerations, including the degree of 
causal heterogeneity, whether the disjuncts can be exhaustively specified, and whether we 
are able to find out which causal variables are involved in any given case. Given the 
ongoing challenges for research into causal pathways and biomarkers in psychiatry, it 
must be conceded that at present the positive causal explanatory value of a psychiatric 
diagnosis qua disjunctive category is modest at best and, moreover, that there may be 
some diagnoses which are too heterogeneous to provide any causal information that is of 
explanatory value. 
 
6.3.3 Symptom networks 
The third sort of causal information a psychiatric diagnosis can provide is information 
about the causal relations that occur between the symptoms and sustain them as a stable 
cluster. This draws on the symptom network approach to psychiatric disorders advocated 
by Denny Borsboom (2008) and Cramer et al. (2010), which we previously encountered in 
Chapter 5, §5.3.2, in my discussion of homeostatic property cluster conceptualisations of 
psychiatric disorders. Recall that according to this approach, a psychiatric disorder is 
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conceptualised as a network of symptoms that reinforce each other via causal relations. 
For example, in the case of major depressive disorder, fatigue may result in poor 
concentration, which may trigger thoughts of inferiority and worry, which in turn may 
impair sleep, thus reinforcing the fatigue (Cramer et al., 2010: pp. 140–141). 
 By emphasising the causal relations between the symptoms themselves, the 
symptom network approach accounts for why the symptoms associated with a given 
psychiatric diagnosis tend to cluster together in a statistically significant way, without the 
need to invoke an underlying latent pathology as the cause of these symptoms. Fatigue, 
poor concentration, worry, and insomnia cluster together because they causally reinforce 
each other, not because they are caused by a common underlying pathology. Hence, by 
defining a psychiatric disorder at the level of its symptoms rather than at the level of 
underlying biological causal factors, advocates of the symptom network approach can 
sidestep the problems of heterogeneity and complexity that affect these underlying causal 
factors. 
 Conceptualising the disorder at the level of its symptoms has implications for 
diagnostic explanation. In their commentary on Cramer et al.’s (2010) paper, Hood and 
Lovett (2010) present an argument, reminiscent of Thomas Szasz (1960: p. 15), 
suggesting that a logical consequence of excluding underlying causes from the 
conceptualisation of a psychiatric disorder is that the disorder cannot then function as a 
causal explanation of a patient’s symptoms. If it turns out that the diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder, for example, does not refer to anything over and above the 
symptoms of low mood, anhedonia, fatigue, and so forth, then to invoke the diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder as an explanation of why these symptoms occur in a particular 
patient would be circular. Hence, we would be faced again with the conceptual problem 
regarding the explanatory status of a psychiatric diagnosis, which I introduced in Chapter 
1, §1.1.2, and addressed in Chapter 4. However, even if Hood and Lovett may be right in 
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claiming that something cannot be the cause of a set of symptoms if it is nothing over 
and above these symptoms, I argue that the symptom network approach enables a 
psychiatric diagnosis to provide causal information of a different sort. In particular, it 
provides information about the above mentioned causal relations between the symptoms 
themselves. It is in virtue of this causal information that the symptom network approach 
distinguishes between an arbitrary grouping of symptoms and a grouping of symptoms 
that reflect the causal structure of the world. As argued by Borsboom and Cramer: 
 
In addition, network modeling has the philosophical advantage of dropping the 
unrealistic idea that symptoms of a single disorder share a single causal background, 
while it simultaneously avoids the relativistic consequence that disorders are merely 
labels for an arbitrary set of symptoms … (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013: p. 93) 
 
This suggests that although the symptom network model defines a psychiatric diagnosis 
at the level of its symptoms, the diagnosis does not merely serve as a descriptive label for 
these symptoms, but also provides additional information about the causal relations that 
sustain these symptoms as a stable cluster. 
 Consider the patient who presents to the clinic with low mood, poor 
concentration, fatigue, and insomnia. According to the symptom network approach, the 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder indicates that these symptoms constitute a 
dynamically stable system held together by causal relations. Again, this does not meet the 
standard model of explanation where a diagnosis picks out an underlying pathology that 
is causing the patient’s symptoms, but there is nonetheless good reason to think of it as 
being a sort of causal explanation. In particular, it explains why the patient’s symptoms of 
occur concomitantly. By positing causal relations between the symptoms, the diagnosis of 
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major depressive disorder explains why they have aggregated and persisted as they have, 
regardless of what pathological processes may be underlying them in the particular case. 
 Hence, if the symptom network approach is assumed, a psychiatric diagnosis can 
provide some causal explanatory information about a patient’s symptoms, even if the 
underlying causes of the symptoms vary across cases. However, it is causal explanatory 
information of a different sort from that provided by a medical diagnosis like myocardial 
infarction, which picks out an underlying cause of the patient’s chest pain. Again, a claim 
such as “the patient’s mood symptoms are caused by major depressive disorder” is 
misguided, this time because the symptom network model suggests that major depressive 
disorder does not refer to a latent underlying pathology responsible for the symptoms, 
but we can still claim that the diagnosis of major depressive disorder causally explains the 
patient’s symptoms on the grounds that it refers to the causal structure by which the 
symptoms induce and reinforce each other. 
 The claim that a psychiatric diagnoses provide information about the causal 
structures by which sets of symptoms are maintained sits well with the fact that specific 
therapies for some psychiatric disorders often achieve reductions in some symptoms by 
optimally intervening on others  (Borsboom and Cramer, 2013: p. 98). For example, 
cognitive-behavioural therapy for major depressive disorder employs the notion that 
thoughts, actions, emotions, and bodily symptoms can all influence one another. The idea 
is that intervening on the patient’s negative thoughts and level of activity through 
cognitive restructuring and behavioural activation might then lead to improvements in his 
or her mood and interest level. Therefore, under the symptom network approach, the 
causal information conveyed by a psychiatric diagnosis can support therapeutic 
intervention. 
 The symptom network approach, then, makes it possible for a psychiatric diagnosis 
to convey causal explanatory information about a patient’s symptoms without specifying 
205 
 
an underlying causative pathology. However, a limitation of the approach is that it may 
turn out not to be applicable to all major psychiatric diagnoses. For instance, it is not 
obvious why, in the case of schizophrenia, hallucinations and delusions should be 
causally connected to blunted affect and catatonic behaviour. Similarly, in the case of 
bipolar disorder, it is not obvious how mania and depression are supposed to causally 
induce each other. It appears that in these cases we need to appeal to additional causal 
variables, such as underlying neurobiological processes, in order to make the link between 
hallucinations and affective blunting, and the link between mania and depression 
intelligible. Therefore, while there are plausibly some psychiatric diagnoses that provide 
causal explanatory information about symptoms without needing to invoke information 




We should take seriously the possibility that many major psychiatric disorders may turn 
out to exhibit high degrees of causal heterogeneity and complexity. This chapter has 
examined some of the implications of this for the diagnostic explanation in psychiatry. If 
it turns out that a given diagnostic category subsumes a variety of different underlying 
causal structures, then this would suggests that diagnostic explanation in psychiatry falls 
short of the standard model of causal explanation where a diagnosis specifies the 
causative pathology responsible for the patient’s symptoms. 
Nonetheless, I have argued that some psychiatric diagnoses can still provide other 
sorts of causal information that can be explanatorily relevant. First, in virtue of the 
exclusion criteria, a psychiatric diagnosis can sometimes provide negative causal 
information by ruling out other medical causes. Second, in virtue of our scientific 
knowledge of some of the various causal factors implicated in psychiatric disorders, a 
206 
 
diagnosis can provide some probabilistic or disjunctive information about the possible 
causal processes that might be relevant to the patient, although this information is likely 
to be vague and partial given our limited scientific understanding of how these various 
factors come together. Third, in virtue of the causal relations between the symptoms 
themselves, a psychiatric diagnosis can provide information about why the patient’s 
symptoms occur together and persist as they do. I have also shown how these causal 
explanatory functions of psychiatric diagnoses might still be useful in supporting some of 
the other functions of the diagnoses, even if they do not indicate specific causal 
processes. The negative causal information can exclude certain avenues for intervention 
and offer reassurance to patients. The probabilistic information about possible causal 
processes can occasionally support therapeutic decisions, although it must be conceded 
that we are far from being able to specify pathways and biomarkers that could allow for 
powerful interventions. The information about the causal relations between symptoms 
can support therapeutic interventions that target particular symptoms to optimally reduce 
others. However, it must also be conceded that not all psychiatric diagnoses provide all 
three sorts of explanatory information and that there are likely to be some diagnoses that 
do not provide any causal information of explanatory significance. 
 The above considerations have normative implications for clinical practice. These 
include implications for how psychiatric diagnoses are communicated in clinical 
discourse, the validity of current psychiatric classification, and the respective roles of 
categorical diagnoses and individualised formulations in psychiatry. I shall lay out some of 
these implications in Chapter 7. 
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7. Normative and Practical Implications 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter 6, many psychiatric diagnoses do not meet the explanatory ideal in 
medicine of the diagnosis that indicates a specific cause of the patient’s symptoms. 
Nonetheless, I have argued that they can still convey other sorts of causal information 
that are explanatorily relevant, including negative causal information, disjunctive causal 
information, and information about causal relations in symptom networks. In this 
chapter, I explore some of the normative implications of the above for clinical psychiatric 
practice. 
 I look at three areas of practice that are affected by these epistemological issues. 
These are the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are communicated, the validity of 
current psychiatric classification, and the complementary roles of categorical diagnoses 
and individualised formulations. In §7.2, I examine the implications of the above for how 
diagnoses ought to be communicated in psychiatric discourse. I suggest that the ways in 
which they are currently portrayed in some clinical texts amounts to problematic 
essentialisation and that more nuanced language is required. In §7.3, I address whether 
the above concerns warrant revision of our current psychiatric classification system so 
that the diagnostic categories reflect distinctive causal structures. While I agree that there 
are good reasons to aim for a causal classification system, I argue that there remain 
significant challenges to devising and implementing such a classification system that make 
the prospects of one coming into use in the immediate future unlikely. In §7.4, I explore 
whether, given the concern about causal heterogeneity, the diagnostic process in clinical 
psychiatry ought to involve a more individualised approach than merely invoking a 
categorical diagnosis. This is a strategy recommended by the World Psychiatric 
Association’s (2003) International Guidelines for Diagnostic Assessment (IGDA) 
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workgroup. The idea is that an individualised formulation can complement a categorical 
diagnosis to attain more precise knowledge of the causal factors that pertain to the 
particular patient, thus arriving at a more clinically useful explanation of his or her 
symptoms than would have otherwise been provided by the categorical diagnosis on its 
own. 
 
7.2 Communicating psychiatric diagnoses 
7.2.1 The problem of essentialisation 
As noted in Chapter 1, psychiatric diagnoses are often communicated in clinical discourse 
as if they refer to distinctive kinds of condition that are causes of sets of symptoms. This 
is apparent in the passages from clinical textbooks and health information resources 
quoted in §1.1.1. The sort of language used in such passages reflects the influence of the 
“disease entity” model in medicine, whereby diagnoses are taken to correspond to 
distinctive and repeatable causal types (Hucklenbroich, 2014). This model has had 
reasonable success with many, though by no means all, diagnoses in bodily medicine. 
Given the historical and cultural underpinnings of psychiatry as a medical discipline, it is 
unsurprising that such a model remains influential in psychiatric discourse (Poland, 2014: 
pp. 31–33). 
 However, the findings of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 suggest that this sort of 
language regarding psychiatric diagnoses is misguided. With the exceptions of the 
dementias and a few disorders with stable psychological causal structures, most 
psychiatric diagnoses do not correspond to distinctive and repeatable causal types, but to 
heterogeneous categories involving variable combinations of diverse causal factors. 
Hence, a diagnostic category in psychiatry does not refer to a distinctive kind of 
condition that causes a set of symptoms as per the above mentioned clinical textbooks 
and health information resources, but at best corresponds to a disjunction of possible 
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causal structures. This suggests that some of the portrayals of psychiatric diagnoses in 
clinical discourse amount to problematic essentialisation. 
 Such essentialisation is not only misleading, but it has been argued that it is 
potentially harmful. Nick Haslam (2014) presents evidence suggesting that the 
essentialisation of psychiatric disorders can encourage damaging stigma. It might appear 
intuitive that attributing disordered behaviour to a distinctive biological cause such as a 
brain abnormality or a neurotransmitter imbalance would increase sympathy and reduce 
blame, but studies have shown that it is actually associated with negative attitudes 
towards the patient, including the desire for greater social distance from him or her, 
greater perceived dangerousness, and lower expectations that he or she will recover 
(Mehta and Farina, 1997; Lam et al., 2005; Phelan, 2005). According to Haslam, 
essentialisation encourages these attitudes because it “represents sufferers as categorically 
abnormal, immutably afflicted, and essentially different” (Haslam, 2014: p.25). 
 
7.2.2 Modifying clinical discourse 
The above considerations suggest the need for more caution regarding the ways 
psychiatric diagnoses are communicated in clinical discourse. Instead of portraying a 
psychiatric diagnosis as specifying a distinctive kind of pathology that causes a set of 
symptoms, it ought to be made more explicit in clinical textbooks, health information 
resources, and communicative exchanges that a psychiatric diagnosis refers to a 
heterogeneous category associated with a cluster of symptoms that could be caused by a 
variety of possible causal pathways. This would encourage a more nuanced and 
empirically accurate conception of the disorder which acknowledges its causal basis while 
avoiding the problem of essentialisation. Hence, in virtue of the causal knowledge 
attained from empirical research, the diagnosis is not a mere label for an arbitrary 
collection of symptoms, yet the complexity and heterogeneity of its causal profile 
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indicates that the category does not pick out an invariant type, but subsumes a variety of 
causal processes. 
 I also recommend that the multifactorial natures of the causal pathways ought to be 
acknowledged more explicitly. As noted by France et al. (2007), the dominant cultural 
narrative regarding major depressive disorder is that it is a chemical imbalance, a narrative 
that is partly attributable to the influence of the pharmaceutical industry’s marketing 
antidepressant medication as restoring chemical balance. Another popular narrative is the 
claim that psychiatric disorders are brain disorders, a narrative that is motivated by recent 
research in neuroscience (Insel et al., 2010). However, as shown in Chapter 5, there is 
evidence that the causal profiles of many psychiatric disorders involve complex 
interactions between diverse biological, psychological, and social factors. Hence, 
neurocentrism leaves out many important aspects of psychopathology and avenues for 
intervention. Instead, I suggest that we ought to endorse an explanatory pluralism that 
does not privilege any single level of analysis and explicitly acknowledge that psychiatric 
disorders are constituted by combinations of biological, psychological, and social 
processes. This can encourage more a more nuanced understanding of psychiatric 
disorder that reflects its multifactorial nature. Such a notion is not new to psychiatry and 
can be traced at least as far back as George Engel’s (1977) biopsychosocial model of 
health. The original version of the model has recently been criticised by Nassir Ghaemi 
(2009) for its empirically questionable claim that biological, psychological, and social 
factors are always equally involved. Nonetheless, as noted by Derek Bolton (2013), we 
can still maintain a version of the model that is consistent with the recent developments 
in psychiatric science which states that the causal pathways and interventions for 
psychiatric disorders may involve biological, psychological, and social levels, without 
claiming that all of them are always involved to equal degrees. Kenneth Kendler (2012) 
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also argues this sort of pluralism can also enable more unbiased and empirically rigorous 
research into psychiatric aetiology and treatment. 
 While I have argued that it is mistaken to speak of many psychiatric diagnoses as if 
they correspond to distinctive kinds of pathology that cause sets of symptoms, I suggest 
that it can nonetheless be defensible, except perhaps for those diagnoses that are not 
associated with even modestly repeatable causal factors, to speak of symptoms being 
explained by psychiatric diagnoses. As noted in Chapter 6, Helen Beebee (2004) argues 
that a causal explanation involves providing information about the explanandum’s causal 
history but does not necessarily require the precise cause of the explanandum to be cited, 
and so “E because C” is not equivalent to “C causes E”. A psychiatric diagnosis like 
major depressive disorder may not specify the precise cause of the patient’s symptoms, 
but it does convey other sorts of causal information as argued previously. Hence, we 
would be mistaken to say “the patient’s anhedonia and fatigue are caused by major 
depressive disorder”, but we could still say “the patient has anhedonia and fatigue 
because of major depressive disorder”. However, I suggest that it should also be clarified 
what sort of explanatory information is being provided when such a diagnosis is being 
communicated. 
 I concede that there are likely to be difficulties with implementing the above 
recommended changes in the communicative practices regarding psychiatric diagnoses. 
As argued by Peter Zachar (2014), the ways we tend to think about disorders are 
influenced by pervasive essentialist biases that are difficult to overcome. Furthermore, as 
previously noted, the “disease entity” model, which is a dominant paradigm in modern 
medicine, is shaped by such essentialistic thinking (Hucklenbroich, 2014). Hence, 
conceptualisations of psychiatric diagnoses that acknowledge their causal complexity and 
heterogeneity not only run counter to our habits and inclinations regarding disorders, but 
challenge deeply entrenched medical tropes and traditions. Nonetheless, I remain 
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optimistic that causal complexity and heterogeneity can be successfully communicated in 
terms that are comprehensible and acceptable to the public. A good example can be 
found in the recently published health information leaflet on major depressive disorder 
by the Royal College of Psychiatrists: 
 
Why does it happen? … There is often more than one reason, and these will be 
different for different people. They include: Things that happen in our lives … 
Circumstances … Physical illness … Personality … Alcohol … Gender … Genes 
… (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2015) 
  
While it does not go into a lot of detail, this leaflet is commendable. First, it 
acknowledges that major depressive disorder can have different causal structures in 
different patients. Second, it acknowledges that these causal structures can involve 
combinations of factors at biological, psychological, and social levels, without privileging 
any particular level over the others. Third, it achieves the above without compromising 
the idea that major depressive disorder is a valid clinical condition. I suggest that other 
portrayals of psychiatric diagnoses should follow this authoritative example. 
 
7.3 Classificatory revision 
7.3.1 Current classification in context 
In addition to the need to modify the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are 
communicated in clinical discourse, there is the more radical question of whether the 
issues raised above warrant the revision of the diagnostic classification system in 
psychiatry so that its categories reflect invariant causal types. As noted in Chapter 1, 
§1.1.3, the dominant classification system in use today is the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which is currently in its fifth edition (American 
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Psychiatric Association, 2013). Since DSM-III (1980), the definitions of and operational 
criteria for the diagnoses have largely been based on observable symptoms, rather than 
underlying causes. A key motivation for this atheoretical approach to classification is to 
enable use by and increase diagnostic reliability among practitioners from different 
theoretical backgrounds. Of course, it is worth noting that whether or not DSM-III 
actually succeeds at being genuinely atheoretical is contested. For example, Fulford et al. 
(2006: pp. 289–313) suggest that DSM-III cannot be atheoretical but must be at least 
implicitly theory-laden, on the basis that observations in general are theory-laden. 
Nonetheless, what is important is that the diagnoses in DSM-III are explicitly classified 
and defined on the basis of symptoms, while remaining neutral about causes. This also 
applies to DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-5 (2013), despite the latter having a revised chapter 
organisation whereby disorders that are believed to have similar aetiologies are placed 
adjacent to each other. 
A consequence of such an aetiologically neutral nosology is that it permits the 
possibility of diagnoses that are causally heterogeneous. For example, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, there appear to be several possible causal pathways that could produce the 
symptoms of major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and generalised 
anxiety disorder. For other diagnoses, such as some of the personality disorders, there 
may even be so many contingent reasons why the syndromes arise that it may not be 
possible to discern repeatable causal structures. The likelihood of DSM-5 including 
causally heterogeneous diagnostic categories is further compounded by the fact that the 
classification has also been shaped by influences other than scientific research. Rachel 
Cooper (2005) notes that a variety of social and political forces, including insurance 
companies, the pharmaceutical industry, and lobbyist groups, have influenced the 
diagnostic categories in the recent editions of the DSM. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 5, 
§5.4.4, it has been argued that some diagnostic categories, especially the personality 
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disorders, have been heavily shaped by moral judgements and cultural attitudes regarding 
gender (Charland, 2004; Potter, 2004). Of course, it is by no means necessarily the case 
that all diagnostic categories that are shaped by such social and political forces are 
causally heterogeneous. However, the suggestion is that the inclusion of a given 
diagnostic category in the DSM may not be entirely based on a scientifically informed 
expectation that instances of the diagnosis share the same kind of causal structure. 
 
7.3.2 Towards a causal classification 
Several theorists in the philosophy of psychiatry find the DSM’s symptom-based 
approach to classification unsatisfactory, because it permits diagnostic categories that are 
causally heterogeneous (Poland et al., 1994; Bentall, 2003; Murphy, 2006; Haslam, 2014). 
According to Dominic Murphy (2006: pp. 323–324), this places psychiatry at odds with 
the rest of medicine, where diagnoses correspond to the causal antecedents of symptoms. 
Accordingly, there have been recent calls to revise diagnostic classification in psychiatry 
so that its diagnostic categories correspond to distinctive and repeatable causes. 
 Different authors suggest different approaches to classificatory revision. Poland et 
al. (1994) argue that the focus of investigation should be the individual problems of 
patients, such as elemental cognitive deficits, behavioural skills deficits, and problematic 
social interactions, which are not adequately captured by the DSM categories. Similarly, 
Richard Bentall (2003) proposes that we abandon the current diagnostic categories and 
instead try to locate regularities at a finer level. For example, he suggests that the category 
of schizophrenia should be discarded, and that instead we should separate out and 
investigate the individual problems, such as auditory hallucination and thought disorder, 
in isolation. According to Bentall, these individual problems are what are likely to yield 
stable causal structures, whereas the current category of schizophrenia merely represents 
a contingent and variable conjunction of these problems. For instance, he hypothesises 
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that thought disorder has a stable causal structure consisting of disturbances in working 
memory due to emotional arousal interacting with other deficits in semantic memory and 
introspective monitoring. 
 A current research programme that follows a similar approach is the National 
Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) programme (Insel et al., 
2010). The RDoC programme “asks investigators to step back from diagnoses based on 
heterogeneous clusters of symptoms and, instead, to focus on basic dimensions of 
functioning across the wellness spectrum that might relate to various aspects of 
symptoms” (Ford et al., 2014: p. S295). Rather than beginning with the current DSM-5 
categories, it suggests beginning with “what is known about healthy, adaptive behavioral 
and neural circuit functioning, and then to understand how alterations in these systems 
could eventuate in various types of symptoms and impairments” (Ford et al., 2014: p. 
S296). For example, instead of beginning with a syndromic category like schizophrenia, 
the RDoC might begin with a symptom like auditory hallucination, and proceed to study 
the associated neurobiology in clinical and non-clinical populations. The aim is to 
discover the causal mechanisms that can produce auditory hallucination in clinical and 
non-clinical populations, which in turn can inform new ways of classifying 
psychopathology for research purposes. 
 The above described approach of searching for causal regularities at the level of 
individual symptoms is dubbed by Dominic Murphy as the “zooming-in” approach 
(Murphy, 2010: p. 607). In contrast to this approach, Murphy endorses a “zooming-out” 
approach. Rather than isolating individual symptoms as the objects of investigation, he 
suggests constructing exemplars, which are idealised theoretical representations of 
syndromes abstracted away from the idiosyncrasies of individual cases. Empirical 
research can then enable us to build models of the various causal factors and mechanisms 
that can contribute to the phenomena described by the exemplars. 
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The idea, according to Murphy, is that the knowledge of causes provided by these 
models can inform a new aetiologically-based classification system. If multiple syndromes 
turn out to result from the same causal pathway, then this might support the lumping 
together of these syndromes into a single category. For example, in general medicine, the 
syndromes that were known as phthisis, consumption, and scrofula were eventually 
lumped together and subsumed under the diagnosis of tuberculosis when it was 
discovered that their causal structures all involve Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection. With 
respect to psychiatric disorders, Murphy (2006: p. 355) makes the tentative suggestion of 
lumping specific phobias and panic disorder together as threat response system disorders. 
Conversely, if there turn out to be a number of causal pathways that can produce a given 
syndrome, then this might support the splitting of the old diagnostic category into new 
diagnostic categories, each representing one of the causal pathways. Murphy (2006: pp. 
352–354) discusses the case of paediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorder 
associated with Streptococcus (PANDAS) as an example of a category that arose from such 
splitting. Among the population of children diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, some cases were observed to have developed following infections by group A 
β-haemolytic Streptococcus pyogenes (Swedo et al., 1998). These cases were subsequently 
discovered to involve a distinctive pathological process, antibody-mediated inflammation 
of the basal ganglia triggered by S. pyogenes antigens, which is markedly different from the 
cognitive basis of classical obsessive-compulsive disorder. The discovery of this 
distinctive causal pathway led to PANDAS being recognised as a separate diagnostic 
category from standard obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Importantly, Murphy (2006: pp. 357–359) contends that a distinctive causal 
pathway does not entail a specific aetiological factor such as a single gene, but can consist 
of a proximal generalisation involving the complex interaction of multiple variables, 
provided this process is sufficiently stable across cases. Furthermore, these variables may 
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occur at different levels of organisation and belong to different theoretical frameworks. 
For example, a causal process might involve interactions of genes, cognitive disruptions, 
psychodynamic factors, and social factors like marital difficulties (Murphy, 2006: p. 351). 
In view of these divergent theoretical frameworks in psychiatry, Jonathan Tsou 
(2015) proposes that the move to an aetiologically-based diagnostic classification would 
benefit from theoretical pluralism, both in the revision process and at the taxonomic 
level. He suggests that the DSM revision process ought to involve dialogues between and 
accommodate the research of investigators from diverse theoretical backgrounds, 
including literature reviews from investigators working outside the DSM revision process. 
Furthermore, given that there are multiple purposes for classifying disorders, he suggests 
that researchers and clinicians should develop alternative classifications, which can then 
inform the future DSM categories. The hope is that the theoretical knowledge about the 
causes of psychiatric syndromes provided by these alternative classifications can be 
incorporated into the new DSM classification system. 
Although their suggested methods differ, the theorists mentioned in this subsection 
describe the shared goal of a classification system whose diagnostic categories correspond 
to distinctive causal processes that are sufficiently stable across cases. Ultimately, such an 
aetiologically-based classification system would require us to discard or further subtype 
diagnostic categories that are causally heterogeneous. This would certainly not be without 
precedent in the history of medicine. For example, when diabetes mellitus was discovered 
to be associated with two different pathologies, namely autoimmune destruction of 
pancreatic β-cells and insulin resistance, it was subtyped into type I diabetes mellitus and 
type II diabetes mellitus, respectively (Zajac et al., 2010). When bronchial carcinoma was 
discovered to include neoplasms with varying histological origins, it was subtyped into 
small cell carcinoma, large cell carcinoma, squamous cell carcinoma, and adenocarcinoma 
(Travis, 2012). When dropsy was discovered to subsume a number of different 
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pathological processes, including heart failure and renal failure, the category of dropsy 
was discarded in favour of more specific diagnoses that referred to these pathologies 
(Kendell, 1989; Peitzman, 2007). Also, such an aetiologically-based classification system 
may require us to relocate a diagnostic category if new information arises regarding the 
kind of causative pathology with which it is associated. For example, Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease was once thought to be a viral disease, but it was subsequently reclassified as a 
prional disease after it was discovered that the responsible agents lacked nucleic acids 
(Thagard, 1999). 
A revisionary approach to psychiatric classification, then, suggests that some of the 
current DSM-5 diagnoses, perhaps including major depressive disorder and 
schizophrenia, can be likened to the archaic diagnosis of dropsy, because each subsumes 
a heterogeneous range of causal pathways. Under an aetiologically-based classification 
system, their replacement with or division into newer categories that reflect more precise 
causal pathways might be warranted. Other diagnostic categories may need to be 
reshuffled if an aetiologically-based classification is assumed, such that those with 
associated with similar kinds of causal process are placed closer together. Finally, other 
diagnoses, such as some of the personality disorders, may not be associated with even 
modestly repeatable causal pathways, and so an aetiologically-based classification system 
may require us to discard them altogether. 
 
7.3.3 Critical discussion 
In theory, there are good epistemic reasons to prefer an aetiologically-based diagnostic 
classification to the current symptom-based classification. If diagnostic categories are 
made to correspond to distinctive causal structures, then this would make them more 
precise causal explanations of patients’ symptoms than the current DSM-5 diagnoses. 
While current DSM-5 diagnoses like major depressive disorder and schizophrenia are 
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associated with heterogeneous ranges of possible causal processes, the aim is that a 
diagnosis under a successful aetiologically-based classification would specify the causative 
pathology responsible for the patient’s symptom presentation, and so meet what is often 
considered the diagnostic ideal in medicine (Schwartz and Elstein, 2008; Cournoyea and 
Kennedy, 2014). 
 Potential practical benefits of this enhanced causal explanatory function include 
stronger predictions and targeted therapeutic interventions. As noted by Robert Kendell, 
it was “only after physicians had learned to distinguish between the renal and cardiac 
forms of dropsy that it was possible to predict which patients were likely to benefit from 
digitalis” (Kendell, 1989: p. 47). While a diagnosis that subsumes a range of possible 
causal pathways can still support probabilistic estimates, its heterogeneity makes it 
unlikely to yield very precise predictions. However, a diagnosis that corresponds to a 
specific causal structure is capable of supporting more precise predictions about clinical 
outcomes and guiding more effective treatment decisions. This is for two reasons. First, 
as argued by Richard Boyd (1999), a causally homogeneous category is more projectable 
than a causally heterogeneous one, because its members share causal similarities that can 
ground inductive inferences. Second, a diagnostic category that reflects a distinctive 
causative pathology rather than a range of possible causal pathways provides more 
precise knowledge of the mechanisms producing the patient’s symptoms, which identifies 
targets for therapeutic interventions. In other words, by indicating the cause of the 
patient’s symptoms, such a diagnosis tells the clinician where to intervene. 
 Of course, basing diagnostic categories on causes is not the only reasonable way of 
revising psychiatric classification. Another alternative might be to classify diagnoses based 
on treatment effects, an approach Jennifer Radden (2003) calls “drug cartography”. The 
idea is to group together conditions that respond to the same kind of treatment, such as 
placing conditions that are alleviated by antidepressant drugs in the same category. In 
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their recent paper, “Carving Bipolarity Using a Lithium Sword” (2014), Malhi and 
Geddes suggest classifying affective disorders based on responsiveness to lithium. An 
obvious strength of this approach is its therapeutic utility. A diagnosis based on treatment 
response tells the clinician what therapeutic intervention is likely to alleviate the patient’s 
condition. Moreover, diagnostic categories whose respective members are unified by their 
treatment effects can potentially support inductive inferences that can inform evidence-
based treatment guidelines. However, a drawback of such a treatment-based classification 
is that like the current symptom-based classification, its diagnostic categories have limited 
explanatory value. Although they may permit inductive inferences about therapeutic 
outcomes, they do not explain why these therapeutic outcomes occur, nor do they 
indicate the specific causes of the patients’ symptoms. By contrast, an advantage of an 
aetiologically-based diagnostic category is that it provides a causal story about why the 
patient has a certain set of symptoms and why they are likely to respond to a certain 
treatment.  
In spite of the above mentioned benefits of classificatory revision, I argue that 
there are significant empirical, conceptual, and bureaucratic challenges to devising and 
implementing a successful aetiologically-based classification system that make one 
unlikely to in the immediate future. A problem with the “zooming-in” approach of 
relocating the categories at the level of individual problems is that there is no guarantee 
that these individual problems will be significantly less causally heterogeneous than the 
current syndromic categories. For example, discarding the syndromic category of 
schizophrenia and examining the individual problem of delusion in isolation may seem 
like a promising way to focus in on a more stable unit, but this rests on the assumption 
that the category of delusion has a significantly more stable causal structure than 
schizophrenia. However, as argued by Murphy (2014), the concept of delusion is not 
defined by a causal signature but by folk psychological assumptions about how the mind 
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works, and so it would not be surprising if there turns out to be numerous possible causal 
pathways that could lead to what we call a delusion. 
Moreover, I argue that it is possible that an individual problem studied in isolation 
could actually turn out to be more causally heterogeneous than it would have been if it 
had been studied as part of a broader syndrome. Consider the example of headache as a 
symptom of migraine. This is currently understood to be caused by the disturbance of the 
subcortical aminergic sensory modulatory systems (Goadsby, 2012). However, headache 
can also occur in many other disorders and has different causes depending on the 
diagnosis. For example, headaches in meningitis and subarachnoid haemorrhage are 
caused by irritation of the nociceptors in the meninges, headache in a cerebral tumour is 
caused by raised intracranial pressure, and tension headache is caused by activation of the 
peripheral nerves in the head and neck (Bogduk, 1995). Ignoring the diagnostic categories 
and studying headache as an independent category, then, would yield much greater causal 
heterogeneity than studying headache as part of a given syndrome. The diagnostic 
category of migraine in this case narrowed down the type of headache being investigated, 
and so allowed the discovery of a distinctive causal structure. It is therefore important to 
consider the possibility that some syndromic categories in psychiatry might also narrow 
down the scope of investigation, such that studying a certain symptom as it occurs in a 
given syndrome could yield less causal heterogeneity than studying the symptom 
regardless of the diagnosis. 
 Another problem with the “zooming-in” approach, noted by Murphy (2010: p. 
608), is that even if stable causal processes are found at the level of individual problems, 
it does not account for how these processes interact to produce the various clinical 
presentations of actual patients. He notes that individual psychiatric symptoms are not 
independent of each other, but tend to occur together in statistically significant clusters. 
This suggests that psychiatric syndromes are not just static conjunctions of individual 
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problems with each its own distinctive causal structure, but depend on complex and 
dynamic interactions between diverse causal variables. 
 The “zooming-out” also faces challenges. As noted in §7.3.1, Murphy (2006) 
suggests revising diagnostic categories based on the causal processes that account for the 
phenomena described by idealised representations of psychiatric syndromes. However, 
given that psychiatric disorders involve heterogeneous combinations of different sorts of 
factor interacting across multiple levels of organisation, it is not clear how such a 
cornucopia of diverse and interacting causal variables can be reconciled with a simple and 
stable classificatory system to be used by clinicians and researchers (Bolton, 2007). In 
view of this causal complexity, it is plausible that there may be multiple ways to categorise 
disorders based on their causes. This is recognised by Kendler et al., who argue that 
knowledge of causes on its own “does not tell us how or whether to privilege one set of 
mechanisms over another” (Kendler et al., 2011: p. 1149), and so is insufficient for 
determining the lumping or splitting of categories. 
 A plausible idea is that in addition to knowledge of causes, explanatory interests 
help determine the lumping and splitting of categories. This is hinted at by Beebee and 
Sabbarton-Leary (2010: p. 24), who argue that if schizophrenia were to turn out to have 
two distinct neurological bases N1 and N2, there would only be grounds to split the 
category of schizophrenia into N1 and N2 if these separate categories yield better 
predictions than the old category of schizophrenia, but not if it turns out that whether 
one has N1 or N2 makes no significant difference to prognosis or treatment. A problem, 
however, is that different people may have different explanatory interests. As we saw in 
In §7.3.1, Tsou (2015) recommends that in light of their different explanatory interests 
and theoretical backgrounds, clinicians and researchers develop alternative classifications 
that can then inform future revisions of the DSM. The challenge, then, would be how to 
successfully reconcile these different classifications in view of these divergent interests 
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and theoretical perspectives. It may turn out to be the case that a universal and 
aetiologically-based classification system that satisfies both researchers and clinicians of 
different theoretical orientations is not feasible. 
 A final challenge to classificatory revision in psychiatry is that there are external 
processes that make the DSM very resistant to change. Rachel Cooper (2015) provides an 
account of these processes with appeal to the concepts of path-dependence and lock-in 
(Bowker and Star, 2000). These refer to when a classification that at an initial time is 
accepted as part of the information infrastructure of science facilitates processes that 
further reinforce the use of that classification, until the classification becomes extremely 
hard to dislodge. With respect to the DSM, Cooper suggests that path-dependence and 
lock-in have occurred at two levels. First, the American Psychiatric Association’s past 
success in publishing the DSM facilitates its future success. The sales of DSM-III and 
DSM-IV brought in substantial profits for the American Psychiatric Association, allowing 
them to invest more in future editions and build up the bureaucratic structures that 
enable their production. This makes it very difficult for any other professional body to 
produce an alternative classification to rival the DSM. Second, Cooper argues that it has 
become very difficult for the American Psychiatric Association to radically change the 
DSM categories. Since the DSM categories became accepted, they have been extensively 
used in research, as well as tied to other bureaucratic structures such as the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases and health insurance companies. The 
need to maintain acceptability with these external organisations sets complex constraints 
on the ways in which the DSM categories can be revised. Hence, despite Kupfer et al.’s 
(2002) vision of DSM-5 marking a paradigm shift in diagnostic classification, its actual 




In this subsection, I have presented some of the challenges to classificatory revision 
in psychiatry. While in principle an aetiologically-based classification system whose 
diagnostic categories correspond to distinctive causal processes would have significant 
epistemic benefits, there are substantial empirical, conceptual, and bureaucratic issues that 
make the development and implementation of such a classification system very difficult. 
This is by no means saying that such a classification system can never be achieved or that 
the efforts towards developing one are futile. To the contrary, I argue that the knowledge 
gained from such research efforts is of tremendous benefit for clinical practice and 
progress in psychiatric science. Nonetheless, as it stands, these challenges do suggest a 
successful aetiologically-based classification system for diagnoses in psychiatry is unlikely 
to come into use in the immediate future. In the following section, I look at how the 
causal explanatory practices of psychiatrists can be improved in clinical practice while 
working with the current DSM-5 diagnoses. Moreover, I show how the knowledge gained 
from the above mentioned research efforts towards an aetiologically-based classification 
can still be put into use without having to abandon the current diagnostic categories. 
 
7.4 Psychiatric formulations 
7.4.1 Working with the current diagnostic categories 
In the present absence of an aetiologically-based alternative to DSM-5, there would be 
costs associated with giving up the current diagnostic categories in clinical psychiatry. As 
argued in Chapter 6, psychiatric diagnoses may not meet the explanatory ideal in 
medicine of the diagnosis that indicates a specific cause of the patient’s symptoms, but 
some can still provide other sorts of causal explanatory information that enable them to 
serve clinically useful functions. These include conveying that the patient’s symptoms are 
not caused by a general medical condition, signalling the possible causal factors that could 
be relevant to the patient’s case, and providing some indication of why the symptoms 
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cluster together as they do. Such explanatory information can in some cases provide 
support for predictions and interventions. Hence, I argue that such diagnoses are not, as 
Jeffrey Poland (2014: p. 34) suggests, “free riders” that add little or nothing further to the 
knowledge of the individual symptoms. 
 Another useful function is denotation. Even in cases where the diagnoses do not 
provide useful causal explanatory information, such as with some of the personality 
disorders, they can still function as shorthand descriptive labels for collections of 
symptoms, which can be useful for facilitating communicative exchanges between 
clinicians. The diagnoses in DSM-5 offer standardised definitions of psychiatric disorders, 
thus providing a common language with which clinicians can communicate information 
about patients’ problems (Tsou, 2015). Moreover, the fact that certain symptoms cluster 
with others in statistically significant ways means that the diagnostic labels do not just 
correspond to arbitrary sets of symptoms. Some combinations of symptoms occur with 
greater frequencies than others, and so it is useful to have shorthand labels for those 
more frequent combinations. Such labels can be predictively valuable. For instance, a 
diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder quickly and concisely tells the clinician that the 
patient exhibits suspiciousness, sensitivity to criticism, and a tendency to bear grudges, 
knowledge which is useful to the clinician for planning his or her approach towards the 
patient. 
 It is also worth acknowledging the useful social functions served by psychiatric 
diagnoses, including the mobilisation of therapeutic resources and authorisation of 
financial support. As noted in §7.3.3, the DSM has become tied to bureaucratic 
structures, such as health insurance companies and other funding bodies. For instance, in 
the United States of America, a diagnosis is required for a patient to be allocated state-
funded care. Of course, we saw in Chapter 2 that whether or not these social functions 
are justified in light of the epistemic concerns about psychiatric diagnoses is a matter of 
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contention (Ingleby, 1982; Moncrieff, 2010), although I suggest that the other sorts of 
explanatory information supplied by psychiatric diagnoses could provide at least some 
justificatory support for some of these social responses. For example, negative causal 
information that excludes general medical causes supports the allocation of the patient to 
a mental health service team rather than to a general medical team, while probabilistic 
information about the possible psychological and social processes that could be involved 
in the patient’s condition provides some support for the mobilisation of certain 
psychotherapeutic and supportive resources. Nonetheless, regardless of the concerns 
about whether these responses are epistemically justified, the very fact that certain 
institutional arrangements are dependent on and tied up with the DSM categories 
highlights further costs to giving up our current diagnostic practices in psychiatry. 
 And so, while most of the current psychiatric diagnoses do not meet the 
explanatory ideal in medicine, they nonetheless still serve some useful epistemic and 
instrumental functions. Given that we currently do not have a successful alternative 
classification system, it is worthwhile exploring how we might improve the causal 
explanatory practices in clinical psychiatry in a way that continues to utilise the current 
diagnostic categories. In what is to follow, I look at how this can be achieved by 
complementing categorical diagnoses with individualised formulations. 
 
7.4.2 Individualised formulation 
While a diagnosis assigns a patient’s condition to a generalised category, a formulation is 
supposed to be an individualised account that pertains to the idiosyncratic circumstances 
and problems of the particular patient. Over the past two decades, practitioners have 
emphasised the importance of the individualised formulation in psychiatry (Weerasekera, 
1996; Aveline, 1999; Mace and Binyon, 2005; MacNeil et al., 2012). This is motivated by 
the recognition that the DSM categorical diagnoses on their own miss out much 
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information that is important for explaining patients’ symptoms, planning therapy, and 
understanding the individual circumstances of patients. For example, Mark Aveline 
(1999: p. 200) argues that formulations can provide clearer guides to aetiology, prognosis, 
and treatment than diagnoses on their own, particularly for patients with personality 
disorders. Similarly, MacNeil et al. (2012) argue that a categorical diagnosis tells us little 
about the actual causation of the symptoms in a particular case, while an individualised 
formulation can yield more precise understanding of which causal factors pertain to the 
patient in question. In their discussion of the individualised formulation in 
psychodynamic psychotherapy, Mace and Binyon (2005: p. 418) argue that personalised 
information about the patient’s defence style can sometimes predict prognosis better than 
a categorical diagnosis. 
Although the above authors argue that individualised formulations can supply more 
clinical information about patients than categorical diagnoses, they do not suggest 
abandoning categorical diagnoses in favour of individualised formulations. Rather, they 
propose that categorical diagnoses and individualised formulations are complementary, 
and that both have useful clinical roles. This is consistent with the recommendations in 
DSM-5, which states that the “ultimate goal of a clinical case formulation is to use the 
available contextual and diagnostic information in developing a comprehensive treatment 
plan that is informed by the individual’s cultural and social context” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013: p. 19). 
The idea, then, is that a categorical diagnosis and an individualised formulation 
both feature in the assessment of a patient. This is made explicit by the World Psychiatric 
Association’s (2003) IGDA workgroup. As part of the Institutional Program on 
Psychiatry for the Person, the IGDA workgroup advocate a comprehensive model of 
assessment that involves “the articulation of two diagnostic levels”, the first being “a 
standardised multi-axial diagnostic formulation, which describes the patient’s illness and 
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clinical condition through standardised typologies and scales”, and the second being “an 
idiographic diagnostic formulation with a personalised and flexible statement” (World 
Psychiatric Association, 2003: p. S55). 
The first level, the “standardised multi-axial diagnostic formulation”, is supposed to 
include a categorical psychiatric diagnosis, numerical ratings for disabilities in four 
domains, codes for contextual factors, and a standardised score for quality of life. The 
IGDA workgroup recommend the use of ICD-10 for the categorical diagnosis and the 
contextual factors (World Psychiatric Association, 2003: pp. S52–S53). Interestingly, 
DSM-IV (1994) also recommended diagnostic assessment in multiple domains or axes, 
but this was removed in DSM-5 (2013) in favour of categorical diagnosis in a single axis. 
The second level, the “idiographic diagnostic formulation”, is supposed to reflect the 
integrated perspectives of the clinician, the patient, and the patient’s family. It is 
supposed to include information about the causal factors relevant to the patient’s 
condition, the positive factors of the patient, and the expectations on the restoral of 
health. The information about the causal factors includes “the biological (e.g. genetic, 
molecular, toxic), psychological (e.g. psychodynamic, behavioural, cognitive) and social 
(e.g. support, cultural) factors that are relevant to that condition” (World Psychiatric 
Association, 2003: p. S55). Positive factors might include personality traits, skills, social 
resources, personal aspirations, and spiritual beliefs. Expectations on the restoral of 
health include specific expectations about the types of treatment and aspirations about 
health status. 
 Other authors vary somewhat in their recommendations for what should be 
included in the individualised formulation. These differences partly reflect their different 
theoretical orientations. Mark Aveline (1999) emphasises the role of the formulation in 
explorative psychotherapy, and so suggests that it includes information about intrapsychic 
conflict, the effects of the problem on others, coping strategies, biological vulnerabilities, 
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social stressors, motivation to change, and so on. By contrast, Priyanthy Weerasekera 
(1996) and MacNeil et al. (2010) present the formulation as a more general tool that 
serves a broad range of functions in the assessment and management of a patient, 
including identifying aetiological factors, understanding key difficulties, guiding 
therapeutic interventions, and anticipating challenges. They suggest the inclusion of the 
“five Ps”, which are the presenting problem, predisposing factors, precipitating factors, 
perpetuating factors, and protective factors. Despite their differences, authors share the 
general idea that the formulation is supposed to identify the factors that contribute to the 
development and maintenance of the symptoms in the particular patient, as well as the 
internal and external factors that are likely to influence the outcome. 
 
7.4.3 Idiographic understanding 
Advocates of the individualised formulation in psychiatry often emphasise one of its roles 
as providing understanding of the patient’s condition in the context of his or her 
individual perspective, values, and experiences. The IGDA states that one function of the 
formulation is to offer a “thorough, contextualised and interactive understanding of a 
clinical condition and of the wholeness of the person who presents for evaluation and 
care” (World Psychiatric Association, 2003: p. S55). Similarly, Mace and Binyon suggest 
that the formulation “is concerned with why events have followed one another and the 
meaning of these for the patient” (Mace and Binyon, 2005: p. 417). Such emphasis on the 
contextualised understanding of the patient’s condition recalls Karl Jaspers ([1913] 1997), 
who taught that explanation in psychiatry should be complemented by understanding. 
The former accounts for a psychic state in terms of causes, while the latter is the 
empathic insight into the meaningful connections between thoughts.  
Tim Thornton (2010) is a contemporary philosopher who interprets the aim of the 
individualised formulation as the provision of meaningful understanding over and above 
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the sort of explanation provided by the criteriological diagnosis. In his analysis of the 
World Psychiatric Association’s comprehensive model, he compares the IGDA’s 
“standardised multi-axial diagnostic formulation” and “idiographic diagnostic 
formulation” respectively to Wilhelm Windelband’s ([1894] 1980) nomothetic and 
idiographic approaches to understanding. A nomothetic approach applies laws that are 
generalisable to several instances, thus emphasising the similarities between instances of a 
particular kind. By contrast, an idiographic approach investigates the contingent and 
unique characteristics of an individual case, thus emphasising the properties that set this 
case apart from others. Thornton suggests that a successful idiographic approach in 
psychiatry is one that provides a judgement about the patient that is “epistemically 
independent of all other judgements” (Thornton, 2010: p. 255). In other words, it is to 
provide a judgment that does not involve comparison with other cases. 
However, Thornton argues that the sort of idiographic judgement outlined in the 
IGDA’s publication ultimately falls short of being epistemically individualised in this way. 
He appeals to what Wilfrid Sellars ([1956] 1997) calls the “myth of the given”. This 
characterises a form of foundationalism, according to which perception can supply non-
inferential knowledge of a fact and this non-inferential knowledge presupposes no other 
knowledge of further facts. Sellars accepts the former claim, but rejects the latter on the 
grounds that the knowledge expressed in a perceptual report depends on one’s overall 
worldview, which includes knowledge that the perceptual report is reliable and the 
knowledge that a specific type of perceptual report corresponds to a specific type of state 
of affairs (Thornton, 2010: p. 256). And so, Thornton argues that the information that is 
supposed to be included in the IGDA’s idiographic formulation, such as information 
about biographical contingencies, does not constitute epistemically individualised 
understanding because any judgement concerning these factors is dependent on 
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knowledge of how these factors normally relate to patients more generally. Rather, the 
information just provides a further, albeit more detailed, generalisation. 
Instead, Thornton proposes that epistemically individualised understanding can be 
provided by a narrative account of the patient’s condition. This is also suggested by the 
psychiatrists Juan Mezzich (2005) and James Phillips (2005) in their discussions of the 
IGDA. Such a narrative account, according to Thornton, answers “to a different kind of 
internal logic to non-normative nomological accounts” (Thornton, 2010: p. 259). 
Drawing on the vocabulary of Wilfrid Sellars ([1956] 1997) and John McDowell (1994), 
he states that the internal logic of a narrative account belongs to the “space of reasons”, 
whereas that of a nomothetic account belongs to the “realm of law”. In other words, 
whereas a nomothetic account is couched in terms of law-like generalisations and causal 
connections, a narrative account is couched in terms of rational connections between 
propositional attitudes. According to Thornton, such a narrative account allows the 
clinician to make a normative yet individualised account. It is normative because it relies 
on our norms of rationality, but it is individualised because it does not involve 
“subsuming symptoms under kinds which fit into law-like patterns of disease aetiology 
and prognosis” (Thornton, 2010: p. 259). Therefore, Thornton proposes that a narrative 
account can add something epistemically novel to the assessment of a patient over and 
above the explanation provided by a nomothetic account, insofar as the former provides 
information about reasons and the latter provides information about causes. 
I agree that complementing a categorical diagnosis with an individualised 
formulation can provide meaningful understanding over and above the sort of 
explanation provided by the categorical diagnosis. However, I argue that Thornton is too 
quick to dismiss the sort of non-narrative idiographic judgement that is suggested in the 
IGDA’s model. While it may not constitute epistemically individualised understanding, I 
propose that it nonetheless provides important information that is not captured by the 
232 
 
categorical diagnosis on its own. More specifically, it complements the diagnosis by 
enabling a more precise causal explanation of the patient’s symptoms that is informed by 
the findings from empirical research into psychiatric aetiology. 
 
7.4.4 Individualised causal explanation 
The idea that an individualised formulation can provide relevant causal explanatory 
information about the patient’s clinical presentation is often mentioned in the literature 
on psychiatric formulation. As noted in §7.4.2, the IGDA proposes that the formulation 
should include “the biological (e.g. genetic, molecular, toxic), psychological (e.g. 
psychodynamic, behavioural, cognitive) and social (e.g. support, cultural) factors that are 
relevant to that condition” (World Psychiatric Association, 2003: p. S55). MacNeil et al. 
propose that one function of the formulation is “understanding significant etiological 
factors that have influenced the person’s presentation”, including “possible biological 
contributors (for example, organic brain injury and birth difficulties), genetic 
vulnerabilities (including family history of mental health difficulties), environmental 
factors (such as socio-economic status, trauma, or attachment history) and psychological 
or personality factors (including core beliefs or personality factors)” (MacNeil et al., 2012: 
p. 2). The Royal College of Psychiatrists, in their curriculum for specialist training in 
psychiatry, state that psychiatrists constructing a formulation should describe “the various 
biological, psychological and social factors involved in the predisposition to, the onset of 
and the maintenance of common psychiatric disorders” (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
2013: p. 44). 
In addition to providing meaningful understanding of the patient’s condition, then, 
the information in an individualised formulation can complement the categorical 
diagnosis by more precisely specifying the relevant causal factors that contribute to the 
particular patient’s presentation. I suggest that this process can utilise the findings of the 
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research efforts into the causes of psychiatric syndromes mentioned in §7.3.2, while still 
involving the DSM-5 or ICD-10 categorical diagnoses. The idea is as follows. A 
categorical diagnosis in psychiatry is highly causally heterogeneous, and so only provides 
imprecise causal explanatory information regarding an individual patient’s symptoms. 
Nonetheless, empirical research has revealed a range of biological, psychological, and 
social factors that can causally contribute to the symptoms of the disorder in general, at 
the population level. When assessing a patient with such symptoms, the clinician can use 
this theoretical knowledge of the causal factors associated with the diagnosis in general to 
guide and focus further enquiry, in order to specify the causal factors that are actually 
instantiated by the particular case. The result is a formulation that provides an 
individualised causal explanation of the patient’s symptoms. 
Although he does not link it to psychiatric formulation, Murphy (2006) sketches 
the outline of a similar approach. He writes: 
 
A clinician can treat the causal pathways of interest as schema to be filled in with 
the specific details of interest in the particular case. Each path through the model 
can be realized by numerous different causal histories, so the clinician can use the 
pathway to a given symptom as a way to look for and organize the relevant details 
of the patient’s life. (Murphy, 2006: p. 369) 
 
It must be conceded that with the current state of our scientific knowledge in psychiatry, 
we do not yet have knowledge of specific causal pathways for many disorders, and so the 
suggestion as put by Murphy may seem overly optimistic in the present day. However, we 
do, as mentioned above, have knowledge of several of the biological, psychological, and 
social factors that contribute to these disorders, even if we do not know how these 
factors interact within specific pathways. In view of this, I suggest that it is more 
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reasonable to expect a psychiatric formulation to provide a looser sort of causal 
explanation of a patient’s symptoms, whereby the relevant causal factors and known 
mechanisms are specified, but not necessarily unified into a coherent pathway. 
Nonetheless, such explanatory information would still be an improvement over what is 
provided by the categorical diagnosis on its own, because it specifies the causal factors 
that pertain to the patient rather than suggesting causal possibilities. 
It might be supposed that if a formulation does indeed provide a better explanation 
than a diagnosis, then this would make the diagnosis redundant (Johnstone, 2006: p. 275). 
However, I argue that this is not the case. First, the diagnosis can still serve the 
communicative and administrative functions described in §7.4.1. Second, whatever 
limited explanatory information is supplied by a diagnosis can be instrumental in the 
process of generating the formulation. In virtue of our theoretical knowledge of the 
various possible causal factors that can contribute to a syndrome, a categorical diagnosis 
functions as a heuristic tool that informs the selection of what information is relevant to 
include in the formulation. That is to say, the causal search does not stop at the diagnosis, 
but is guided by it. Therefore, while the individualised formulation potentially has more 
explanatory value than the categorical diagnosis, this does not make the latter 
superfluous. By signalling the causal possibilities that could be associated with the 
patient’s condition, the categorical diagnosis frames the formulation process so that each 
patient does not need to be treated as a “first instance” (Johnstone, 2006: p.277). 
It is also worth noting the information gathered in the formulation can also 
influence the diagnosis. Consider a patient presenting with symptoms that initially suggest 
a provisional diagnosis of major depressive disorder. If a more detailed formulation 
reveals causal factors and biographical details that are normally more closely associated 
with a different syndrome, then this might provide grounds to rethink the diagnosis. For 
example, if the formulation reveals that the patient has a strong family history of bipolar 
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disorder, a history of poor responses to antidepressants, and previous episodes marked 
by prominent psychomotor changes, then this might warrant the consideration of bipolar 
disorder, even in the absence of symptoms that meet the DSM threshold for hypomania. 
Therefore, it is helpful to think of the relation between the diagnosis and the formulation 
being bidirectional. 
 
7.4.5 An example formulation 
To illustrate how a diagnosis and a formulation can work together in practice to causally 
explain a patient’s symptoms, let us consider an example formulation by Priyanthy 
Weerasekera (2009). The case concerns Antoinette, a young woman diagnosed with 
anorexia nervosa. The history includes a history of an eating disorder in her mother, a 
history of weight problems in her father, the divorce of her parents when she was a child, 
perfectionistic personality traits, and high achievement at school. The formulation 
includes the following: 
 
From a biological perspective, she is vulnerable to anorexia given that her mother 
has suffered from this condition. In addition, her father struggles with weight 
issues indicating further biological vulnerabilities towards weight instability. … The 
client’s early developmental years indicate a mother who wished her daughter to 
follow in her footsteps: to be thin and to be a ballerina. Antoinette, however, was 
unable to pursue her mother’s dream, for she was seen has having a muscular 
physique … It is possible that the rejection of her body type set the stage for her 
obsessional preoccupations with thinness, perfectionism, ritualistic eating and 
exercising. … Her father and brother leaving shattered her family as she knew it, 
leading her to feel even more helpless about her ability to control the world around 
her. Her ritualistic eating behaviour and struggle to be perfect may be seen as her 
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attempt to exert some control over a life which is perceived as unpredictable and 
chaotic. (Weeraseksera, 2009: pp. 149–150) 
 
The formulation then goes on to discuss the factors maintaining Antoinette’s condition, 
positive and negative prognostic factors, and a treatment plan that is informed by 
consideration of these factors. 
 I bring attention to three notable features of Weerasekera’s formulation. First, in 
keeping with the suggestions made in §7.4.4, the causal information that is selected for 
inclusion in the formulation is partly guided by the categorical diagnosis of anorexia 
nervosa and the theoretical knowledge of the possible causal factors that can be 
associated with the condition. Weerasekera explicitly highlights the role of this theoretical 
knowledge in the generation of the formulation: 
 
The variables chosen for inclusion were those that related to the predisposing, 
precipitating, perpetuating and protective factors, and the coping-response style 
since this this framework is used in multiperspective case formulation. … Research 
tells us what has been empirically investigated and what is the most plausible 
hypothesis or explanation of the patient’s current difficulties. … Prospective 
research particularly informs us about variables that may be important in the 
development of a condition. (Weerasekera, 2009: pp. 146–147) 
 
As with most psychiatric diagnoses, anorexia nervosa is a causally heterogeneous 
category. Nonetheless, empirical research has implicated a number of causal contributory 
factors associated with the disorder at the population level, including genetic factors, 
perfectionistic personality traits, disturbed family relationships with enmeshment and 
rigid parenting, and cultural expectations regarding body image (Cowen et al., 2012: pp. 
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353–355). Weerasekera’s above formulation applies this theoretical knowledge of 
anorexia nervosa to identify, organise, and elaborate on the causal factors that are actually 
relevant to Antoinette’s particular case. The result is an individualised causal explanation 
of Antoinette’s symptoms. 
 Second, Weerasekera’s formulation integrates multiple theoretical perspectives. As 
noted in §7.3.2, most psychiatric disorders involve the complex interactions of multiple 
causal variables that belong to different levels of organisation. Accordingly, there has 
been a call for psychiatry to engage theoretical pluralism in the conceptualisation of such 
disorders (Mitchell, 2008; Kendler, 2012; Tsou, 2015). In her formulation, Weerasekera 
uses such a pluralistic approach to explain Antoinette’s symptoms. By bringing together 
information about Antoinette’s genetic vulnerabilities, cognitive schema, coping style, and 
family environment, the formulation integrates biological, cognitive, psychodynamic, and 
social theoretical perspectives. 
 This is not to say that all formulations are theoretically pluralistic. While 
Weerasekera explicitly endorses a multiperspective approach to formulation, other 
formulations can lean towards particular theoretical orientations. For example, Aveline 
(1999), and Mace and Binyon (2005) emphasise the role of the formulation in 
psychodynamic therapy, and so focus more on the psychodynamic factors that are 
relevant to patients’ conditions. Hence, one’s choice of theoretical orientation and 
selection of the causal factors to include in the formulation depends on one’s therapeutic 
interests. Nonetheless, Weerasekera’s formulation of Antoinette’s case demonstrates that 
individualised psychiatric formulations can accommodate the theoretical pluralism that 
has been encouraged in the research into psychiatric aetiology. 
 Third, the formulation contains narrative strands. The passages about Antoinette’s 
struggle to be perfect and attempts to exert control over a life perceived as chaotic are 
very much couched in terms of meaningful connections between propositional attitudes. 
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Her ritualistic eating behaviour is interpreted in light of her experiences, values, and 
desires. Therefore, in addition to providing causal explanatory information, the 
formulation can also provide the sort of individualised understanding of reasons that 
Thornton (2010) endorses. 
 
7.4.6 Critical discussion 
To briefly recapitulate, I have proposed that a categorical diagnosis and an individualised 
formulation can have complementary roles in the causal explanation of a patient’s 
symptoms in psychiatry. In virtue of the theoretical knowledge of the causal possibilities 
that are associated with a given syndrome, a categorical diagnosis narrows down the sorts 
of information to be considered in the formulation. The formulation particularises this 
information to the individual case, thus providing an account of the causal factors that 
are actually instantiated by the patient. Hence, the complementing a diagnosis with a 
formulation can overcome the problem of causal heterogeneity that affects the former. 
 I should stress that I am in no way suggesting that causal explanation is the sole 
purpose of the psychiatric formulation. As noted in §7.4.2, MacNeil et al. (2012) 
emphasise that the formulation is a versatile tool that can serve a broad range of 
functions in the clinic. One such function, discussed in §7.4.3, is to provide reason-based 
understanding of the patient’s condition in light of his or her experiences, values, and 
desires. Other important functions include identifying the key difficulties the patient is 
facing, guiding therapeutic interventions, anticipating challenges, and predicting 
prognosis. My claims are rather that causal explanation of the patient’s presentation is 
one of the useful functions served by an individualised formulation and that a categorical 
diagnosis can assist in this process. 
 It should also be noted that the above described process whereby the categorical 
diagnosis narrows down the causal information to be considered in the individualised 
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formulation may not be applicable to those psychiatric diagnoses that do not give any 
useful causal information, such as paranoid personality disorder, schizoid personality 
disorder, histrionic personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder. Because these 
diagnostic categories are not associated with stable causal factors, they do not contribute 
to clinical assessments in the ways described above. However, I argue that the lack of 
useful causal information supplied by the categorical diagnoses makes individualised 
formulations even more crucial for these conditions. As I noted in Chapter 5, §5.4.4, 
while there may not be causal factors that generalise across cases, it is still possible, via 
narrative exploration, to uncover factors and processes contributing to the development 
and maintenance of the patient’s problems in a particular case. This is a line of thought 
endorsed by Aveline (1999: p. 200), who argues that the formulation is a better guide to 
aetiology, prognosis, and treatment than the diagnosis in the case of personality disorder, 
because it explores various factors and the links between them in the context of the 
patient’s particular developmental history. Moreover, although the categorical diagnosis 
may not contribute causal information in such a case, I argue that it can still contribute 
descriptive information that is useful for the process of constructing the formulation. For 
example, as mentioned in §7.4.1, a personality disorder diagnosis informs the clinician 
that the patient is likely to display certain sorts of interactive behaviours, which can be 
useful to know for the purposes of planning the style of consultation. 
 Practising psychiatrists may find the above unsurprising on the basis that it 
describes what they have already been doing all along. Nonetheless, I argue that my 
discussion makes some important philosophical contributions. First, it offers support to a 
deflationary approach to the classification problem in psychiatry. As I discussed in §7.3, 
there have been calls to revise diagnostic classification in psychiatry, with particular 
emphasis on moving towards an aetiologically-based classification system. While this may 
be an epistemically respectable endeavour, there are significant challenges that make a 
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successful aetiologically-based classification unlikely in the near future. However, in his 
discussion of the classification problem, Derek Bolton (2012) argues that this should not 
be too much of a worry, because classification is not the main point of psychiatric 
science. Rather, he suggests that the main aims of science are “prediction, refined by causal 
explanatory models, and, on that basis, if cause-effect relationships are sufficiently strong, 
making technological applications including interventions” (Bolton, 2012: pp. 6–7). 
Psychiatric science, according to Bolton, has come to over-value classification as a goal in 
itself, when it should be seen as an instrument whose purpose is to help us achieve the 
more important goals of prediction, causal explanation, and intervention. 
 My analysis of the psychiatric formulation supports the sort of deflationary 
approach offered by Bolton, because it shows that psychiatry has other resources, aside 
from diagnostic categories, that contribute to predictions, causal explanations, and 
interventions in clinical practice. Due to its causal heterogeneity, a psychiatric diagnosis 
on its own may not meet the explanatory ideal in medicine of the diagnosis that specifies 
the causative pathology and mechanisms responsible for the patient’s symptoms, but the 
psychiatrist has another resource, namely the formulation, which can complement the 
diagnosis to support stronger predictions, inform targeted interventions, and supply a 
more precise causal explanation that is particularised to the patient’s individual case. 
Hence, in virtue of its complementary relation with the formulation, a psychiatric 
diagnosis can still have an important role in the production of such a causal explanation, 
even if the diagnostic categories in the current classification system do not reflect distinct 
and homogeneous kinds. 
 Second, my analysis provides a clarification of the epistemic relations between 
scientific research, categorical diagnosis, individualised formulation, theoretical pluralism, 
and causal explanation in psychiatry. Research into psychiatric aetiology yields empirical 
knowledge of the various possible causal factors that can be associated with a given 
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diagnosis. In virtue of this empirical knowledge, the diagnosis informs what aspects of 
the patient’s history are relevant causal factors to include in the formulation. Given that 
these causal factors may belong to different explanatory levels, the formulation may 
integrate multiple theoretical perspectives. The result is a formulation that can provide, 
among other things, an individualised yet evidence-based causal explanation of the 
patient’s symptoms. 
 This individualised causal explanation can, in theory, enable more targeted 
treatment, as it identifies the relevant factors contributing to the syndrome that could 
potentially be modified by therapeutic interventions. In the formulation of Antoinette’s 
case presented in §7.4.5, perfectionistic attitudes, perceived loss of control, parental 
issues, biological vulnerability to weight instability, and rejection of her body type are 
identified as relevant causal factors in the development of her symptoms. Accordingly, 
the treatment plan proposes cognitive-behavioural therapy, experiential techniques to 
facilitate the expression of affect, family therapy, a selective serotonin reputable inhibitor 
to stabilise eating behaviour, and ongoing social activities to reinforce confidence as 
therapeutic interventions to target these respective causal factors (Weerasekera 2009: pp. 
153–154). 
 There is also the suggestion that the individualised causal explanation provided by a 
formulation may be more epistemically satisfactory to the patient than a categorical 
diagnosis on its own, although it must be conceded that there is very little qualitative data 
to determine whether this is the case in practice. One study, by Chadwick et al. (2003), 
investigated the perspectives of patients diagnosed with psychotic disorders. The majority 
of participants reported increased hope and understanding after their formulations, which 
could be interpreted as supporting the claim that individualised explanations can be of 
some intrinsic value to patients. However, some participants also described finding the 
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information upsetting and worrying, which suggests that patients’ affective and cognitive 
responses to receiving explanations of their conditions are complex. 
 While a psychiatric formulation can in principle provide a resource for 
individualised and evidence-based causal explanation, I do not mean to present it as a 
panacea. Given the current status of scientific knowledge in psychiatry, the full epistemic 
value of the psychiatric formulation remains tentative. In other words, given that a 
formulation can only draw on the best available scientific evidence, our incomplete 
scientific understanding of a certain disorder poses a limit on the causal explanatory 
strength of the formulation. As noted in §7.4.4, while we have substantial empirical 
knowledge of the various causal factors and mechanisms that occur in many disorders, 
we do not yet have precise understanding of the complex interactions between these 
variables. Therefore, for such disorders, formulations might only be able to provide loose 
causal explanations which specify the relevant causal factors and mechanisms without 
unifying them into complete causal pathways. The hope is that as the causal explanatory 
strengths of psychiatric formulations will improve as the empirical research into 
psychiatric aetiology and mechanisms progresses. 
 A related challenge, which I briefly raised in Chapter 6, §6.3.2, is that even if 
empirical research has revealed various causal factors that can be associated with a 
diagnostic category, we currently lack biomarker tests that enable us to match these 
specific causal factors to individual patients (Bolton, 2012: p. 10). Of course, it is possible 
to identify some causal factors through the clinical interview, mental state examination, 
and collateral history, particularly the psychological and social factors. For instance, it is 
possible to establish the presence of a causally relevant adverse social context by simply 
asking the patient. It may even be possible to infer a heritable component to the disorder 
by asking about family history. However, for many biological factors, such as specific 
genetic variants, neurochemistry, and neural circuitry, tests are not readily available for 
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use in the clinic. For example, a number of peripheral biomarkers for inflammation and 
oxidative stress in major depressive disorder have been explored, but these are neither 
sufficiently sensitive nor specific to be used in isolation (Lopresti et al., 2014). Recent 
functional neuroimaging data has suggested some potential avenues for biomarker 
research, such as the review by Roiser et al. (2012), mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, §5.2.4, 
which found differential responses to pharmacological treatment and psychological 
therapy for depressed patients with and without abnormal anterior cingulate cortex 
activity. However, such tests are usually reserved for research, rather than clinical, 
purposes. With respect to biomarker tests that could be readily used in clinical practice 
and not just in the research laboratory, psychiatry has fallen short of other medical 
specialties. Therefore, an individualised formulation may attain more precise causal 
information than the categorical diagnosis on its own with respect to certain 
psychological, social, and heritable factors that pertain to the patient’s case, but the 
absence of readily available biomarker tests makes us unable to attain greater precision 
with respect to many of the neurobiological factors. 
 A final challenge, raised by Lucy Johnstone (2006), is that while for a given disorder 
there may be a considerable evidence base regarding causal factors from which the 
psychiatric formulation can draw, there is currently little empirical evidence for the 
therapeutic effectiveness of the psychiatric formulation as a specific intervention. As 
mentioned earlier, in theory, a psychiatric formulation could draw on scientific knowledge 
about causal factors and mechanisms to inform targeted interventions. However, whether 
this actually makes a difference to the therapeutic outcome in practice is not clearly 
established. Studies investigating therapeutic effectiveness have yielded equivocal results. 
For example, Schulte et al. (1992) compared two groups of people diagnosed with 
phobias, with the first group receiving standardised behavioural therapy and the second 
group receiving tailored therapy based on individualised formulations. In this study, it 
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was the standardised treatment group that showed more improvement. Emmelkamp et al. 
(1994) performed a similar study comparing two groups of people diagnosed with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, with the first group receiving standardised exposure 
therapy and the second group receiving tailored cognitive-behavioural therapy based on 
individualised formulations. Both groups showed improvements, but no significant 
differences were found between their respective outcomes. 
 In their review of these studies, Tarrier and Calam (2002) argue that the results 
have poor generalisability because the sample sizes were too small to demonstrate 
statistically significant differences in the effect sizes. The study by Emmelkamp et al. used 
a sample size of 22, but Tarrier and Calam estimate that the sample sizes that would be 
needed to show significant differences with 80% power and 0.05 significance level would 
be 25 for the Rational Behaviour Inventory, 560 for the Symptom Check List-90-Revised, 
800 for the Self-Rating Depression Scale and Inventory of Interpersonal Symptoms, 
4,000 for the Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory, and over 15,000 for 
measures of anxiety and discomfort (Tarrier and Calam, 2002: p. 316). Therefore, studies 
on the therapeutic effectiveness of the psychiatric formulation would require much larger 
sample sizes than the extant studies to yield statistically significant results. 
 There is also a gap in the literature on therapeutic effectiveness with respect to the 
range of conditions and purposes for which formulations are constructed. The studies 
mentioned above look at formulations constructed for specific psychotherapeutic 
purposes in patients with phobias and obsessive-compulsive disorder. However, studies 
on the therapeutic effectiveness of the psychiatric formulation as a more general 
assessment tool for a broader range of psychiatric disorders are lacking at the time of 
writing. 
 And so, as well as the multidisciplinary research into the causes and mechanisms 
associated with psychiatric disorders, the scientific respectability of the psychiatric 
245 
 
formulation would also depend on support from additional clinical studies investigating 
its practical utility. Outcomes to investigate might include prognostic power, patient 
acceptability, and therapeutic effectiveness compared to the categorical diagnosis on its 
own. However, given the very large sample sizes that would be required to show 
significant results, such research is likely to involve serious methodological and logistical 
challenges. A possible solution might be to utilise practice research networks consisting 
of clinicians who collaborate to gather data from actual practice rather than from 
orchestrated clinical trials (Zarin et al., 1996; Margison et al., 2000; Audin et al., 2001). This 
inclusion of practice-based evidence could potentially provide datasets large enough to 




To sum up, the heterogeneous causal profiles of psychiatric diagnoses suggest the need 
for more caution regarding the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are communicated in 
clinical discourse. More specifically, portrayals of the diagnoses should explicitly 
acknowledge the variable and multifactorial natures of their causal pathways, and care 
must be taken not to misleadingly essentialise the disorders. The issue of heterogeneity 
has also led to claims that the current diagnostic categories are unsatisfactory and has 
inspired calls to replace them with an aetiologically-based classification system. While this 
may be an epistemically respectable endeavour, there are serious conceptual, empirical, 
and bureaucratic challenges that make the development and implementation of a 
successful aetiologically-based classification system unlikely in the near future. 
 Nonetheless, this should not cause too much worry, because there are other 
resources in clinical psychiatry apart from categorical diagnoses that serve useful 
epistemic functions. One such resource is the individualised psychiatric formulation. In 
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addition to providing meaningful understanding of the patient’s condition, the 
formulation can draw on empirical knowledge concerning psychiatric aetiology to provide 
an individualised causal explanation of the patient’s symptoms. Furthermore, in virtue of 
the theoretical knowledge of the causal possibilities that can be associated with a given 
syndrome, the categorical diagnosis complements this process by narrowing down the 
sorts of information to consider in the formulation. Therefore, despite their high degrees 
of causal heterogeneity, categorical diagnoses can continue to have important roles in the 
generation of causal explanations of patients’ symptoms. However, while the 
individualised causal explanations provided by formulations could in theory inform more 
targeted therapeutic interventions, there remain significant empirical challenges. First, 
more research is required to better understand the various causal pathways of disorders 
and to identify biomarkers that could help us match these pathways to individual patients. 
Second, more evidence is required to assess the therapeutic effectiveness of the 





We have reached a good point to sum up the main points of this thesis. I began my 
investigation with some observations on the roles that diagnoses have in clinical practice 
and how they are used in medical discourse. In bodily medicine, diagnoses often, though 
by no means always, serve explanatory functions. That is to say, when a patient presents 
to the clinic with a set of symptoms, the physician infers a diagnosis to explain why he or 
she has these symptoms. I have argued that this normally constitutes a causal explanation, 
whereby the diagnosis indicates the causative process responsible for the patient’s 
symptoms and this relation is understood within a broader theoretical framework of 
mechanisms. I have also argued that this causal explanatory function is important, 
because it informs therapeutic interventions, supports predictions about prognosis, and 
conveys understanding to the patient. In psychiatry, diagnoses are sometimes presented 
in clinical texts and discourse as if they also serve as such causal explanations of patients’ 
symptoms. This is unsurprising, given that psychiatric practice occurs in a context shaped 
by medical roles and traditions. However, there are serious conceptual and ontological 
problems that cast doubt on whether psychiatric diagnoses actually do serve these causal 
explanatory functions. Over the course of the thesis, I have addressed these problems in 
order to arrive at a clearer understanding of the causal explanatory roles of diagnoses in 
clinical psychiatry. 
 The conceptual problem is that according to formal diagnostic manuals, psychiatric 
diagnoses are defined by their symptoms. This suggests that invoking a psychiatric 
diagnosis as an explanation of a patient’s symptoms, when it is merely a descriptive label 
for them, amounts to problematic circularity. To address this problem, I explored how 
diagnostic terms secure their meanings according to theories of reference in the 
philosophy of language, and showed how both kinds of talk regarding psychiatric 
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diagnoses, namely diagnoses qua descriptions of symptoms versus diagnoses qua causes 
of symptoms, are accommodated by a conceptual framework based on two-dimensional 
semantics, which integrates descriptive and causal considerations. According to this two-
dimensional semantic framework, a diagnostic term has a complex semantic value 
involving both a primary intension and a secondary intension, which respectively 
correspond to the descriptive and causal conceptions of the diagnosis. These are not to 
be taken as exhausting the meaning of the term, but as capturing different aspects of the 
term’s complex semantic value that have useful epistemic roles. This allows us to take 
seriously the descriptive definitions in diagnostic manuals as necessary criteria for the 
diagnoses, yet still talk about the diagnoses as referring to the causes of the symptoms 
that make up these definitions. Therefore, the fact that psychiatric diagnoses are defined 
by their symptoms does not necessarily preclude the possibility of appealing to them in 
causal explanations of these symptoms. 
 This brings us to the ontological problem. Even though my two-dimensional 
semantic framework accommodates the possibility of a diagnostic term being taken to 
denote the causal process responsible for a cluster of symptoms, the epistemic value of a 
diagnosis in the individual case also depends on whether the category a posteriori 
corresponds to a causal structure that is stable enough to be citable in a causal 
explanation. I have argued that one reason why a diagnosis in bodily medicine can 
function as a good causal explanation of a patient’s symptoms in the individual case is 
because the category captures a distinctive kind of causal structure that is sufficiently 
invariant across cases in the appropriate respects. In virtue of this invariance, the disease 
type that is denoted by a medical diagnosis can be considered to represent with accuracy 
the actual causal structures instantiated by the particular patients with the diagnosis. 
However, this sort of invariance is not to be found in many of the current diagnostic 
categories in psychiatry. The findings from empirical research into psychiatric aetiology 
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indicate that, with the possible exceptions of the dementias and some disorders with 
stable psychological profiles, most psychiatric diagnoses are highly causally 
heterogeneous. That is to say, in different patients with the same diagnosis, the symptoms 
may be produced by different causal processes. Furthermore, these causal processes 
typically involve complex interactions between diverse variables at different levels of 
organisation, which suggests that there is no single privileged level of organisation at 
which a psychiatric diagnosis can be aetiologically defined and that theoretical pluralism is 
desirable in the causal conception of a psychiatric disorder. Hence, a typical diagnostic 
category in psychiatry is not associated with a distinctive causal structure that is invariant 
across cases, but a heterogeneous range of possible causal structures, each involving the 
complex interactions of biological, psychological, and social variables. 
 Due to their high degrees of causal heterogeneity, many psychiatric diagnoses do 
not meet the explanatory ideal in bodily medicine of the diagnosis that picks out a 
specific causative process responsible for the patient’s symptoms. The dementias are 
exceptions, as the categories respectively correspond to reasonably distinctive and stable 
kinds of neuropathological mechanism that are causally responsible for the clinical 
presentations. I have also conceded that some diagnoses, such as panic disorder and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, may be heterogeneous at biological levels, but are 
characterised by more stable causal regularities at psychological levels. Therefore, while 
these diagnoses may not specify what biological processes are involved, they could serve 
as psychological causal explanations of patients’ symptoms. However, it must be 
acknowledged that these sorts of diagnosis are relatively rare in psychiatry and that many 
other psychiatric diagnoses, including major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder, appear to be heterogeneous all the way down. 
 Still, I have argued that some of the complex and heterogeneous diagnoses in 
psychiatry still convey other sorts of causal information about patients’ symptoms that 
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can be explanatorily relevant. First, a psychiatric diagnosis might convey negative causal 
information. It is recommended in clinical texts that symptoms count towards a 
psychiatric diagnosis only if other medical causes have been satisfactorily excluded, and 
so a psychiatric diagnosis contains an implicit supposition that the patient’s symptoms are 
not caused by any of these other medical conditions. Second, a psychiatric diagnosis 
might convey some disjunctive information about the causal possibilities that may be 
relevant to the patient’s symptoms. Although our current diagnostic categories in 
psychiatry have turned out not to respectively correspond to homogeneous causal 
structures, empirical research into psychiatric aetiology has yielded knowledge of various 
causal factors that can contribute to the development of the clinical syndromes. In virtue 
of this empirical knowledge, a psychiatric diagnosis can provide some disjunctive 
information about the possible causal processes that might be contributing to the 
patient’s symptoms. However, we can only expect this information to be partial and 
imprecise, given the limited extent of our current empirical knowledge. Third, a 
psychiatric diagnosis might convey information about the causal relations that occur 
between the symptoms themselves. Recent theorists suggest that the symptoms of a 
psychiatric disorder constitute a network and reinforce each other via reciprocal causal 
relations. Hence, while it may not indicate a specific pathology underlying the symptoms, 
a psychiatric diagnosis can still, in virtue of the causal relations between the symptoms, 
provide some sort of explanation of why the patient’s symptoms aggregate and persist as 
they do. I have suggested, then, that there are ways in which a psychiatric diagnosis can 
convey some causal explanatory information about a patient’s symptoms, albeit 
information that falls short of the explanatory ideal of specifying a particular causal 
process that is responsible for the symptoms. 
 While the above considerations apply to many major psychiatric diagnoses, such as 
major depressive disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety 
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disorder, I have argued that there remain some psychiatric diagnoses that may not even 
serve these limited causal explanatory functions. I have suggested some of the personality 
disorders as examples. The problem is that the behavioural features associated with these 
diagnoses could possibly result from various combinations of highly contingent 
circumstances that we may not be able to locate causal regularities that generalise even 
modestly across cases. Hence, the diagnostic categories fail to supply explanatorily 
significant information about what factors are likely to have caused the patients’ 
symptoms. Nonetheless, such diagnoses may still be clinically useful for descriptive 
purposes. 
 Finally, I looked at some strategies for achieving better causal explanations of 
patients’ symptoms in psychiatric practice. In view of the fact that many of the current 
diagnostic categories in psychiatry do not correspond to distinctive and homogeneous 
kinds of pathological process, some theorists in the philosophy of psychiatry advocate 
revising the diagnostic classification system so that the categories do respectively reflect 
more stable causal structures. While a move to a classification system based on causes is 
an epistemically respectable endeavour, I have argued that there are significant 
conceptual, empirical, and bureaucratic challenges that make the development and 
implementation of such a classification system unlikely in the near future. Nonetheless, I 
have tried to deflate this concern by emphasising that clinical psychiatry has another 
resource, the individualised formulation, which can serve a complementary epistemic role 
to the categorical diagnosis. In addition to conveying meaningful understanding of the 
patient’s predicament in terms of reasons, a formulation can utilise the knowledge gained 
from empirical research and supplement the categorical diagnosis to provide a more 
satisfactory causal explanation of the patient’s symptoms that can inform therapeutic 
interventions in the individual case. In virtue of the knowledge acquired from empirical 
research of the causal possibilities that can be associated with a given diagnostic category, 
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the diagnosis indicates what sorts of causal information would be relevant to consider in 
the formulation. The formulation then specifies the causal factors that are actually 
instantiated in the particular case, the result being an individualised causal explanation of 
the patient’s symptoms. This can also accommodate the theoretical pluralism that is 
considered desirable in the understanding of a psychiatric disorder. Therefore, despite its 
high causal heterogeneity, a categorical diagnosis in psychiatry can still make an important 
contribution to the development of a causal explanation of a patient’s symptoms in a way 
that is clinically useful. However, I made some concessions. First, given that the 
formulation draws on our empirical knowledge of causes and mechanisms in psychiatry, 
and that this empirical knowledge is currently limited, we can only expect a formulation 
to provide a loose and incomplete sort of causal explanation that might specify only some 
of the relevant causal factors and mechanisms without unifying them into a complete 
causal pathway. Second, more clinical studies are also required to assess the therapeutic 
effectiveness of the formulation as a specific intervention in practice. 
 Through my philosophical investigation, I hope to have contributed some novel 
insights to our understanding of the epistemic roles and uses of diagnoses in medicine 
and psychiatry. More specifically, I would like to believe that this thesis has enhanced our 
understanding of the explanatory relations between diagnoses and symptoms, how the 
uses of diagnostic terms reflect their complex semantic values, and the implications of 
causal heterogeneity and complexity for the explanatory roles of psychiatric diagnoses. 
This thesis also has normative implications for clinical practice and research, such as how 
psychiatric diagnoses ought to be communicated in ways that do not amount to 
problematic essentialisation, how categorical diagnoses need to be complemented by 
individualised formulations in causal explanations of patients’ symptoms, and how the 
problem of diagnostic classification must be approached with the recognition that 
classification is not the primary purpose of psychiatry. Parts of this thesis suggest some 
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degree of scepticism regarding certain aspects of psychiatric diagnoses. However, this is 
at most a modest scepticism limited to the idea of psychiatric diagnoses referring to stable 
disease types and the sorts of causal explanation they are sometimes portrayed as 
providing in clinical discourse. Nowhere do I dispute the distress experienced by patients 
with the diagnoses or the appropriateness of managing such distress in a health care 
setting. 
 As we draw to a finish, I would like to briefly reflect on the implications of my 
discussion for Thomas Szasz’s critique of psychiatry in “The Myth of Mental Illness” 
(1960), which I cited at the beginning of this thesis as one of the motivations for my 
investigation, and on some potential areas for future philosophical research. First, Szasz 
argues that mental illness cannot be invoked as an explanation of certain behaviour, 
because it is just a shorthand label for this behaviour. Second, he argues that unlike bodily 
illness, mental illness is not defined by a pathophysiological lesion, but by the deviation 
from moral and social norms. Regarding the first argument, this can be dispelled by the 
two-dimensional semantic framework I put forward. A diagnostic term can have a 
complex semantic value, and so a descriptive definition based on a cluster of symptoms 
does not necessarily preclude it from referring to the causal profile underlying these 
symptoms. Regarding the second argument, the implications of my investigation are 
more nuanced. Indeed, if we take a pathophysiological lesion to mean, as Szasz does, a 
distinctive morphological abnormality, then it would seem that, with the exceptions of 
the dementias, he is correct that psychiatric diagnoses are not associated with 
pathophysiological lesions. However, I argue that this does not warrant his claim that 
they are therefore not genuine illnesses, but rather incentivises us to acknowledge that 
there may be other kinds of causal profile with which illnesses can be associated. While 
most psychiatric disorders are not constituted by distinctive morphological abnormalities, 
empirical evidence suggests that they are characterised by interactions between biological, 
254 
 
psychological, and social factors that are heterogeneous but still tend to aggregate in 
statistically significant ways. 
 Therefore, for many common psychiatric disorders, including major depressive 
disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder, Szasz’s 
arguments can be effectively countered. While major depressive disorder, for example, is 
defined descriptively through its symptoms, the diagnosis can still, under the two-
dimensional semantic framework I have presented, refer to the causal profile responsible 
for its symptoms. Of course, we need to concede that the causal profile associated with 
the diagnostic category is comprised by a complex and heterogeneous array of diverse 
variables rather than a distinctive pathophysiological lesion, but I have shown that there 
are ways in which this can be explanatorily valuable. However, I accept that Szasz’s 
arguments could still apply to those diagnoses that do not appear to be associated with 
even modestly generalisable causal factors, such as some of the personality disorders. 
Given these diagnoses do not convey anything significantly informative regarding what 
might be causing the behaviours of patients, it appears that they are little more than 
shorthand descriptive labels for these behaviours. 
 With respect to Szasz’s proposal that the attribution of mental illness depends on 
consideration of moral and social norms, I have not written anything in this thesis which 
disputes this. As I conceded at the beginning of this thesis, my investigation focuses on 
just one aspect of diagnosis, that is, the diagnosis qua explanatory hypothesis about the 
patient’s clinical presentation as examined through the lens of analytic philosophy of 
science. As such, I have not had the opportunity to explore in detail the other interesting 
and important philosophical aspects of diagnosis in psychiatry that are raised by Szasz’s 
above proposal. These include the distinction between disorder and non-disorder, the 
roles of values in diagnosis, the historical and cultural dynamics that have shaped our 
diagnostic categories, and the performative roles of diagnoses in the social context. While 
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these issues run orthogonal to my analysis, there will nonetheless be areas where they 
meet. Such areas would provide rich grounds for future research. For example, it would 
be worthwhile to investigate whether the nature of the explanation provided by a 
diagnostic category has any bearing on whether the condition denoted by the category is 
considered a medical disorder or another kind of problem, such as a moral or a social 
problem, as this would be relevant to discussions about what conditions to include and 
exclude in future diagnostic classification systems. It would also be worthwhile to 
examine the roles that values have in the development of a diagnostic category, the 
assessment of symptoms in the diagnostic process, and the judgement about whether the 
patient warrants a diagnostic label, as these considerations have the potential to influence 
clinical practice. Finally, it would be worthwhile to further explore the relation between 
the explanatory status of a diagnosis and its use as a social device to legitimise certain 
activities, as this could have political and legal implications. These are tasks for another 
day, but such philosophical research would be welcome to integrate the epistemological 
contributions of this thesis with these other important issues, and so attain a more 
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